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Economic Value of Pro-Environmental Farming 
- 	A Critical and Decision-Making Oriented Application of the 
Contingent Valuation Method 
Jyrki J. Aakkula 
Abstract. This study investigates the applicability of the contingent valuation method 
(CVM), in particular, and monetary valuation in general in a situation where the CVM 
is used to elicit a monetary value of the conversion from conventional agriculture to 
pro-environmental farming for the social decision-making purposes. In order to frame 
the social decision-making context, a theoretical moclel is developed to derive the basic 
social design of pro-environmental farming. 
The study has two empirical objectives. First, the reliability of the willingness to pay 
results is analyzed. The task is carried out by using different elicitation fomiats, theoretical 
moclels, and statistical estimation techniques in the estimation of the average WTP 
figures. Second, the validity of the CVM results is examined. The focus is on the 
commensurability of preferences, infiuence of attitudes, and the effect of additional 
information. 
The analysis of the reliability of the average WTP results is carried out by using both 
the combined bidding game and payment card approach and the dichotomous choice 
elicitation technique. Mean WTP for the whole sample ranges from FIM 290 to 615, 
and median WTP for the whole sample from FIM 150 to 379. The results suggest that 
all the elicitation techniques and moclel specifications applied are reliable enough 
when the mean or median WTPs for the whole sample are concerned. 
The examination of the validity of the CVM results is carried out by analyzing 
response behavior in relation to preferences and the effects of the interplay between 
information and attitudes. A conceptual model including response behavior and response 
motives is developed. The identification of the interactions between various types of 
response behavior, additional information, and the respondent's attitudes is carried out 
by means of the factor and cluster analyses. The results suggest that the provision of the 
additional information can raise the stated WTPs if the respondents have a positive 
initial attitude towards the good being valued, and the additional information providecl 
reinforces their initial attitude. 
Taking certain reservations into account, the conclusion is that the estimated total 
WTP (ranging from FIM 0.541 to 2.216 billion) can be interpreted as the maximum 
amount of money which the society can spend on the socially acceptable conversion 
from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming. 
Index words: agricultural policy-making, contingent valuation method, information 
effect, monetary valuation, preference structure, welfare analysis 
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1. Introduction 
The role of agriculture has changed considerably in most European countries 
after the World War II. There was a food shortage right after the war, but it did 
not take long to recover from it. In a couple of decades, famine was replaced by 
surplus of most agricultural products. Overproduction started to be a major 
agricultural policy problem. This is still the case even today, but during the past 
twenty years some other agricultural policy aspects have gained more weight. 
One of the most important ones is the relationship between agriculture and the 
environment. Now it is widely recognized that agricultural production practices 
may harm as well as benefit the environment if they are not implemented in a 
proper way in relation to the needs of the ecosystem. For instance, excessive 
and inappropriate use of artificial fertilizers and pesticides can in the long run 
degrade the carrying capacity of the ecosystem and endanger the sustainable 
development. On the other hand, agricultural production maintains the rural 
landscape, which is usually appreciated highly among city-dwellers. 
Adverse and beneficial environmental impacts of agriculture emphasize the 
fact that in a modern society farming has other tasks in addition to food produc-
tion. For its own part, agriculture is responsible for the maintenance of pleasant 
living circumstances and stable food supply conditions. These objectives have 
many dimensions, ranging from food safety promotion to upholding of a viable 
countryside. Most of these dimensions are somehow related to the connection 
between agricultural production and its interaction with the surrounding and 
supporting ecosystem. In this respect, it is obvious that the choice of agricultural 
production technology matters when social well-being is concerned. Farming 
practices that are environmentally-friendly are more likely to help the agricul-
tural sector to accomplish goals related to creating welfare from other sources 
than food production only. 
Environmentally-friendly production practices create environmental and other 
benefits. They also mitigate certain harmful environmental effects due to agri-
culture. In this study, an environmentally-friendly agricultural production prac-
tice called pro-environmental farming is introduced. The idea behind pro-envi-
ronmental farming is that, in addition to the production of foodstuffs, valuable 
environment-related services can be produced. In practice this is primarily done 
by reducing the use of chemical inputs and applying alternative cultivating 
methods. Thus, pro-environmental farming enhances the environmental and 
ecological quality of the rural environment which, in turn, is a resource entity 
consisting of both natural and man-made elements of the physical environment, 
and individual perceptions related to those elements. We can say that the rural 
environment is a stock of agriculture and environment producing market and 
nonmarket values, and pro-environmental farming is an agricultural practice 
capable of providing a considerable increase in their worth. 
11 
For a number of reasons, changes in the environmental or ecological quality 
cannot be priced through the market system. Thus, there is a need for valuation 
methods that help to attach a value to environmental and other effects resulting 
from a change in farming practices. This information is required for the pur-
poses of social decision-making. If the market mechanism is not able to provide 
enough information, it is quite natural that additional approaches must be ap-
plied in order to facilitate the decision-making process. However, it should be 
clear that when we deal with a broader policy-making context, matters often 
become complicated. There is no established single scientific theory or theoreti-
cal framework that could cover the large number of social phenomena related to 
decision-making and the various forms that it takes in different circumstances. 
In the study, however, an attempt is made to give an idea of the difficulties 
involved when environmental and other nonmarket values are included in the 
social decision-making process. 
The empirical analysis concentrates on the application of the contingent 
valuation method (CVM), which is used to elicit people's willingness to pay for 
a conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming. The 
CVM is employed to create a hypothetical market for different kinds of non-
priced effects that take place because of the conversion. The construction of the 
hypothetical market is required before monetary valuation can be applied. How-
ever, the emphasis of the study is not on the derivation of monetary measures of 
welfare change but on the assessment of the applicability of the WTP results in 
relation to the needs of policy-making The idea is to broaden the framework 
through which the relationship between welfare change measures, human 
behavior, and social decision-making is interpreted in approaches based on the 
postulates of welfare economics. 
The following parts of this chapter first introduce the agricultural policy 
background. This is relevant in order to perceive the development that has led to 
the recognition and inclusion of the increasing importance of environmental 
issues in the Finnish agricultural policy. This depiction is even more important 
as, during the preparation of this study, the Finnish agricultural policy has 
radically changed because of Finland's membership in the European Union 
from the beginning of 1995. \Second, the main objectives of the study and the 
reasoning behind their selection are presented, followed by a review of the 
theoretical framework that the analysis relies on. Finally, the overall structure of 
the study is described. 
LL Agricultural Policy Background 
Right after the World War II Finland was faced with serious difficulties. It had 
lost the war and, although Finland was not occupied, the war had ruined the 
Finnish economy. An additional burden was created when Finland was com- 
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manded to pay a considerable amount of war indemnities to the Soviet Union. 
Agricultural production had declined, there was a lack of food, and rationing of 
foodstuffs was part of everyday life. Some eastern and northern territories that 
had earlier belonged to Finland were now merged into the Soviet Union. As a 
consequence, hundreds of thousands of evacuees had to be settled. In addition, 
there was a considerable number of soldiers who were returning from the front 
without a job or a place to go. 
At the same time, the Finnish government was worried about the increase of 
the political influence of Finnish comrnunists, who were more or less visibly 
backed by the Soviet Union. There was a danger of social unrest and political 
instability, which the government wanted to avoid. The solution was a land 
reform, which guaranteed for the evacuees and veterans a right to receive a 
small holding of a couple of hectares. This was not actually the first time in 
Finland when an attempt was made to calm down social unrest and discontent 
by a land reform. In 1918, right after Finland's independence and the Finnish 
Civil War, a land reform was introduced in order to give tenant farmers a 
possibility to buy the farm holdings that they had been cultivating under lease 
contracts. This reform was only a partial solution: still a large number of farm 
workers were without a possibility to have land of their own. Consequently, in 
1922 a subsequent land reform was carried out. Everybody who had not pos-
sessed land before and was considered to be skilled enough to practice farming 
was guaranteed a right to have a small holding at a very reasonable cost (Kananen 
1986, pp. 32-39). The success of these reforms obviously encouraged the settle-
ment of the evacuees and veterans a few decades later. 
It is generally acknowledged that structural problems of Finnish agriculture 
date back to the land reform after. the World War II. This is not to say that the 
land reforms did not work. From the point of view of political stability, the land 
reforms did what was hoped for. In less than five years political institutions and 
the society were operating in a rather democratic way. Food shortage was also 
eliminated, although it is hard to say if the reforms played a maj or part in this 
development. However, the land reforms were probably the best thing to do in a 
very serious and difficult situation. The actual mistake was made in the agricul-
tural policy that followed. Already in the late 1950s, but especially in 1960s, 
many owners of small holdings moved into cities or Sweden because of grim 
future prospects. Their farms were too tiny to give a decent living and except for 
logging there were few possibilities for working outside farms. In order to 
encourage people to stay in the countryside the government developed agricul-
tural policy into a direction that made it possible to survive on a rather small 
farm, too. Consequently, the structural development in Finnish agficulture al-
most ceased. This led to agricultural policy that guaranteed sufficient farm 
income through high pro ducer prices and other forms of agricultural support. As 
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a result, Finnish agriculture was soon tackling with problems of overproduction 
and excessive agricultural subsidies. 
The need for an agricultural policy reform became more and more evident 
during the late 1980s and the early 1990s. However, the reform had to wait until 
the beginning of 1995, when Finland joined the European Union (EU). Agricul-
ture was the most important single sector that had to face considerable adjust-
ments. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU had to be adopted, 
but not immediately in a complete manner. The greatest alteration was that 
Finland' s border control and import levy system for agricultural products were 
abolished overnight in the beginning of 1995, which meant that producer prices 
sank to the general EU level. However, Finland negotiated a five-year transition 
period involving certain exemptions. Finland received a right to establish spe-
cifically targeted support measures, which were not available for old EU mem-
ber countries. Exemptions were granted by the EU based on Finland's harsh 
climatic conditions and undeveloped farm structure. There was a consensus 
between Finland and the EU that Finnish farmers cannot survive without special 
arrangements that give them time to rationalize their production. Thus, during 
the transition period Finland has a possibility to accelerate the structural change 
independent of some standard guidelines set in the CAP stipulations. 
Currently, Finland has experienced four years of EU membership. Before 
this most people believed that the EU membership would rapidly alter the state 
of Finnish agriculture and would especially increase the welfare perceived by 
consumers. However, the first years in the EU have not really fulfilled these 
expectations. Both producer prices and input prices have fallen, but the decrease 
of the producer prices (on the average 40%) has been so extreme that the 
reduction in the input prices has not been able to compensate for the farm 
income losses. As a result, farmers would have gone into bankruptcy without 
the massive direct income support from both EU and national sources. Com-
pared to the situation before the membership, the major change has occurred in 
the structure of agricultural support, not in its total amount. The support element 
that was earlier included in producer prices has now transformed into direct 
income support. There have not been major changes in the production, either. 
The cultivation of cereals has increased and livestock production has stayed at 
about the same level (MTTL 1999). 
From the environmental point of view, the EU membership has had some 
positive ramifications. The implementation of the CAP-based agricultural sup-
port structure made it possible to introduce a new type of subsidy that was 
aimed to enhance the environmental quality resulting from agricultural produc-
tion practices. This measure, titled as "Finnish Agri-Environmental Program" or 
FAEP, was based on Council Regulation 2078/92. 
The overall goal of the FAEP is to reduce the load directed to the environ-
ment, especially surface and ground water and the air, and the hazards caused by 
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the use of pesticides, to preserve biodiversity, and manage the rural landscape. 
The program also aims at preserving or improving the productive capacity of the 
land. The program is mainly directed to the arable farming, as well as preserva-
tion of the landscape related to agriculture. There are connections to the forestry 
sector mainly for the part of traditional biotopes, forest pastures, and concerning 
the staging zones of arable land and forest and the advising on these issues 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 1994; Ministry of Agriculture and For-
estry 1995). The financing of the agri-environmental program is carried out as a 
joint action between Finland and the EU. Both parties contribute annually an 
equal share of ECU 135 mill. Thus, the total amount of environmental support is 
ECU 270 mill., which corresponds annually to about FIM 1,700 mill. during the 
years 1995-1999. 
The agri-environmental program consists of the General Agricultural Envi-
ronmental Protection Scheme (the GAEPS) and the Supplementary Protection 
Scheme (the SPS). The GAEPS is paid in the whole country based on the arable 
land area, and it is differentiated by region. SPS is paid to regionally restricted 
measures and other special actions, which are directed to a limited number of 
farms. In addition, support is granted for advisory services of farmers, training, 
and financing of experimental projects related to the management of the envi-
ronment. Joining the program is voluntary for farmers. To join the GAEPS 
program, a farmer has to fulfill several criteria. These criteria are: 1) making a 
farm environmental management pian, 2) meeting certain fertilizing base levels, 
3) inspection of the pesticide sprayer, 4) having buffer strips on fields, 5) 
maintaining adequate plant cover, 6) and preserving landscape. 
The implementation of the FAEP is the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, and, as it comes to the Supplementary Protection 
Scheme, the Ministry of the Environment is also involved. Authorities use 
monitoring to assess the activity of farmers to join a voluntary support scheme 
with environmental goals. The main idea in organizing the monitoring system 
for the use of agri-environmental support has been to utilize the existing admin-
istration and monitoring system of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The 
monitoring duty of the Agri-Environmental Protection Scheme is assigned to 
regional authorities, i.e. rural districts, which have also prepared regional pro-
grams in cooperation with environmental authorities. Environmental authorities 
can also take part in the monitoring or, if agreed, Environmental Centers can 
perform monitoring for rural districts (Pirttijärvi et al. 1995). 
Although the FAEP has been the most influential single agri-environmental 
policy measure in the Finnish agriculture, there has been some preceding work. 
A good example of this is the first action program for sustainable rural develop-
ment, introduced in 1992, when the Ministry of the Environment completed the 
Environmental Program for Rural Areas (EPRA) (Ministry of the Environment 
1992). 
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According to the EPRA program, a prerequisite for agriculture is the adjust-
ment of the economic system to the natural cycle to ensure that the harmful 
effects of agricultural production are as low as possible. Economic and social 
benefits must be optimized in a responsible manner, without endangering the 
potential for such benefits in the future. The living environment must be kept 
clean, diversified, and renewable for future generations. Informational, eco-
nomic, and other instruments based on voluntary action of farmers are used to 
promote the protection of the rural environment. Environmental impacts will 
already be taken into consideration at the preparatory stage of agricultural 
decision-making and in shaping the structural, production. and income policies 
related to agriculture. 
Thus, earlier developments in agricultural policy had already led to the 
adoption of more environmentally-friendly farming practices. Jokinen (1995, p. 
132), for instance, notes that the Finnish agricultural policy has moved towards 
a new phase in environmental issues: it is recognized and even emphasized that 
agriculture is a potential source of valuable environmental services. It also 
seems that consumers favor agricultural products that can be claimed to be 
produced in an ecologically sustainable manner. In this respect, however, only 
the first steps have been taken. Measures implemented so far are insufficient 
because the inclusion of environmental and other nonmarket benefits into the 
social decision-making process has not really started yet. Both research and 
public discourse are required before the society will learn how to handle the 
information about people' s wants and desires coming simultaneously from mar-
ket and nonmarket sources. This study is intended to contribute to this discus-
sion. 
1.2. Main Objectives and Central Themes of the Study 
The general purpose of this study is to illuminate the difficulties that are bound 
to be encountered when an attempt is made to include environmental and other 
nonmarket values in the social decision-making process. The empirical case 
utilized in order to make this attempt is based on a contingent valuation method 
(CVM) application. People's willingness to pay (WTP) is estimated for a con-
version from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming. The em-
pirical data is first used in an analysis that deals with an issue that can be labeled 
as the reliability of WTP results. This part of the study is concemed with 
methodical topics related to the CVM. It concentrates on the assessment of 
different elicitation and estimation techniques of mean and median WTPs. The 
CVM application also acts as an example of a monetary valuation method, 
which makes it possible to reflect the methodological problems that are related 
to the revelation of individual preferences, expression of attitudes, and the role 
of information. The idea is to examine the applicability and feasibility of money 
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metric measures of welfare change in a complex valuation situation which 
produces information for policy-making purposes. In this sense, it is also impor-
tant to find out people's general attitudes towards agriculture and the environ-
ment, because they may explain people's responses better than the expressed 
monetary values. In other words, what we are concemed with here is the validity 
of WTP results. 
Thus, at the primary level this study aims to appraise how feasible the CVM 
is for the valuation of benefits due to a change in agricultural production 
practices. At the conceptual level, the analysis is broadened to cover more 
complex theoretical issues, which cope with the assessment of the informational 
needs of the social decision-making process. Based on all this, the main objec-
tives of this study can be presented in more detail: 
Objective 1: To assess, based on the average WTP estimates and taking into 
account both the limitations set by the policy-making context and 
the implications of the survey findings and design, what can be 
said about the social desirability of the conversion from conven-
tional agriculture to pro-environmental farming. 
Objective 2: To examine how robust the mean and median WTP estimates are 
with regard to elicitation formats, model selection, and statistical 
estimation techniques. The point is to illustrate that different 
approaches to the estimation of mean and median WTPs produce 
somewhat diverse results, and that each estimate can be inter-
preted to be biased in one way or another. The 'goal is not to 
promote a certain CVM survey design but to give an idea about 
the factors that influence average WTP estimates at various stages 
of the design, implementation, and data analysis of a CVM sur-
vey. 
Objective 3: To identify the connection between individual preferences and 
attitudes and 'the stated willingness to pay. The focus is on stabil-
ity and commensurability of preferences, influence of attitudes, 
and effect of additional information. The idea is to test the possi-
bility that in a valuation situation a respondent may not be able to 
act as rationally as the economic theory assumes. Preferences 
may be incommensurate or sensitive to additional information 
and initial attitudes related to the amenity to be valued and the 
valuation framework. 
The main hypothesis conceming the interplay of information 
and attitudes is that additional information raises the respondents' 
willingness to pay only if additional information is consistent 
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with the respondents' prior information and if it strengthens the 
positive initial attitude of the respondents towards the valuation 
object. In certain cases, additional information can even reduce 
willingness to pay. This can happen if additional information 
makes the negative initial attitude towards the object of valuation 
more intensive. 
The central hypothesis related to people's preference structure 
is that in complex valuation situations, which involve significant 
environmental and other nonmarket values, and where the trade-
off between money and environmental benefits becomes actual, 
some people express preferences that can he identified as non-
exchangeable. 
Even though the maun interest of the study is directed towards the complex 
relationship between the CVM and the social decision-making, it should not he 
forgotten that the suggested conversion from conventional farming to pro-envi-
ronmental farming has remarkable policy relevance in any case. The design of 
the Finnish agricultural policy will still he encountering great challenges be-
cause of the ending of Finland's five-year transition period in the European 
Union in the beginning of 2000. In addition, the restructuring of the common 
agricultural policy of the EU (CAP) is expected to gain momentum in the near 
future because of the implementation of Agenda 2000. Thus, great changes are 
waiting. It is very likely or at least desirable that agricultural support schemes 
will also he based on other qualities of agricultural production than the produc-
tion of foodstuffs only. It is an advantage if this issue is thoroughly reviewed 
before actual decisions have to he made. 
1.3. Framework of the Study 
The theoretical basis of this study is in neoclassical economics, especially in 
welfare economics and environmental economics. However, part of the material 
owes to ideas developed in the fields of ecological economics, institutional 
economics, environmental ethics, and environmental philosophy. 
The framework of the study is depicted in Figure 1.1. A valuation process 
cannot emerge without an interaction between individuals and social institu-
tions. The society builds upon individuals who have different attitudes, tastes, 
ethical views, and values. In other words, individuals have different prefer-
ences, which they reveal in varying ways through their behavior in relation to 
economic and political institutions. Consequently, the preferences of different 
individuals become aggregated into social preferences, which through some 
mechanism define socially desirable resource allocation. 
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Socially desirable 
resource allocation 
ECONOMIC 	 POLITICAL Social preferences INSTITUTIONS INSTITUTIONS 
• 
Assessment of social welfare 
changes in monetary terms 
(theory of benefit-cost analysis 
and money metric measurement 
of welfare changes)) 
Contingent valuation method (CVM) 
(theory of survey response behavior) 
Policy proposal 
OBJECT OF VALUATION 
(a transition from 
conventional agriculture 
to pro-environmental 
farming) 
(tura' environment) 
Individual C's 
preferences = 
attitudes, 
values 
and tastes 
Individual D's 
preferences = 
attitudes, 
values 
and tastes 
Individual A's 
preferences = 
attitudes, 
values 
and tastes 
Individual B's 
preferences = 
attitudes, 
values 
and tastes 
When the market mechanism is in question, socially desirable resource allo-
cation occurs at the market place, if ali the relevant factors of the transaction are 
properly priced. The problem is that the market mechanism may not be able to 
do the pricing in a correct manner. Because of the physical or institutional 
characteristics of the factors involved, property rights cannot be defined in 
nonattenuated manner In practice this means that we are dealing with nonmarket 
or public goods. Consequently, we must find another way to reveal individual 
preferences in order to guarantee socially desirable resource allocation. Political 
institutions are suitable for this purpose, but in a political system like the 
representative democracy very few issues can be decided in a referendum-type 
voting process where citizens can directly express their opinion. This is why we 
SOCIETY 
Figure 1.1. Framework of the Study. 
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need mediating methods like the CVM that reveal people' s valuations in rela-
tion to nonmarket commodities. 
A valuation process inevitably concentrates on some good, commodity, serv-
ice, or amenity. The characteristics of the object of valuation influence consid- 
erably the method chosen and the applied methodology. In this case, the object 
of valuation is the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-environmen- 
tal farming. However, the conversion as such is only an array of cultivation 
practices aimed to produce ecological, environmental and other nonmarket ben-
efits that enhance the quality of the rural environment. From the valuation point 
of view, this approach has many important features. The rural environment can 
be considered a public good, which means that policy issues related to its 
quality enhancement have to cope with incompletely defined property rights and 
internalization of positive and negative externalities. It is quite clear that the 
attachment of an economic value to these kinds of processes is a controversial 
and demanding task. In addition, the rural environment is likely to be interpreted 
in many different ways in people's minds. In this sense, it is essential to 
examine very carefully ali the dimensions that are shaping people's standpoints 
in relation to pro-environmental farming and the rural environment. 
When we apply monetary values that are based on people's responses con-
cerning a hypothetical valuation situation, we have to make assumptions about 
people's response behavior in order to identify the possible sources of error. 
Motives behind response behavior can vary considerably, and this must be taken 
into account when WTP results are analyzed and conclusions are derived. We 
can also argue that the extensive bias literature that has originated in relation to 
the CVM is to a large extent a result of varying survey response behavior. Thus, 
the identification of the major features of response behavior makes it possible to 
interpret in a more holistic way how individual WTPs are constructed, and this 
helps to assess their applicability in the policy-making context. 
Social preferences are derived from individual preferences in one way or 
another. In this sense, people's individual preferences concerning the conver- 
sion from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming reflect a cer- 
tain social preference. The difficulty is that, in the world of scarce resources, 
this particular social preference must be assessed in relation to other social 
preferences. The objective is to find a social preference ordering that ali the 
members of the society could approve. This is, of course, an unlikely outcome. 
People have different welfare rankings. The solution is to compare different 
welfare rankings and develop appropriate decision criteria. In this context, the 
commensurability of monetary values appears to be a very useful feature. 
The beneflt-cost analysis (BCA) provides an economic framework to assess 
monetary benefits and costs related to a certain policy proposal. Based on this, it 
is possible to evaluate the social desirability of the policy proposal. Because the 
contingent valuation method produces beneflt (or as well as cost) estimates that 
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are expressed in monetary terms, it fulfills some basic methodological require-
ments of the BCA. In this sense, it is quite natural to use the CVM in the BCA 
framework. By doing this, it is possible to create public awareness for a particu-
lar problem by using money as a readily perceivable indicator of potential 
environmental and other nonmarket benefits or costs. However, many environ-
mental and social changes due to a policy action may be so complex that their 
assessment through monetary valuation may be an inadequate way to facilitate 
social decision-making. 
Clearly, the overall usefulness of the CVM seems to depend on its ability to 
convey reliable information about individual preferences related to the object of 
valuation. The question is about the validity of the underlying theory of measur-
ing money metric utility changes in the form of consumer surpluses. The con-
ceptual structure of the theory of welfare economics is highly elaborated, but 
the theory is not ornnipotent. The application of money metric measures of 
utility changes may be an informative way to approach a decision-making 
situation, but methodological limitations should not be forgotten. 
In addition to methodological validity, issues of methodical reliability must 
also be addressed. From the practical decision-making point of view, the reli-
ability of a method can be even more important than its validity. If a method is 
reliable but not valid, it can be applied to measure changes in certain policy 
relevant variables, if the shortcomings in the validity are appropriately taken 
into account when the results are interpreted. In this respect, when the CVM is 
concerned, it is essential to test how the different value elicitation and estima-
tion techniques as well as valuation scenarios differing in terms of information 
content infiuence the estimates of mean and median willingness to pay, which, 
in turn, may form the major source of economic information used in the social 
decision-making process. As long as the CVM shows some consistency in 
reliability terms, it may be a useful tool to incorporate nonmarket values related 
to pro-environmental farming into the social decision-making concerning agri-
environmental issues. 
1.4. Structure of the Study 
The study has been organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 places the 
object of valuation, the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-envi-
ronmental farming, into a broader framework in both ecological and welfare 
economic terms. The idea is to explain how the concept of the rural environ-
ment, which defines the physical and operative context of pro-environmental 
farming, extends beyond the notion of agricultural landscape. Furthermore, a 
theoretical model is developed to derive the basic social design of pro-environ-
mental farming when, in addition to conventional input choice, the aspects of 
21 
agriculture-supporting ecosystem, rural public goods and externalities are in-
cluded in the social welfare maximization problem. 
Chapter 3 gives a brief introduction about the benefit-cost analysis as the 
major economic framework of policy analysis. Social decision-making criteria, 
which can be seen to provide the justification for the money-based policy 
analysis of BCA type, are reviewed, together with the concept of the total 
economic value and its maun components. The focus is on use and nonuse 
values as well as intrinsic, functional, and instrumental values. The purpose of 
this is to illuminate how the economic concept of value can be broadened to 
cover nonmarket value dimensions inherent in environmental and other public 
goods. Chapter 3 ends with an introduction of monetary valuation methods 
suitable for the assessment of nonmarket costs and benefits. In this connection it 
is shown how the CVM relates to other monetary valuation methods and the 
BCA framework. 
Chapter 4 introduces the essential theoretical concepts of welfare economics 
required in the assessment of welfare changes. The theory that forms the basis 
for money metric measurement of welfare changes is reviewed. The focus is on 
equivalent and compensating surpluses. In addition, the questions why and 
when there are differences between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness 
to accept compensation (WTA) and what the proper use of each measure is will 
be examined This is followed by the presentation of the problems that arise 
when welfare change measures are aggregated across individuals. Chapter 4 is 
summarized by an institutionally-oriented discussion about the social feasibility 
of monetary valuation. 
Chapter 5 presents the essentials of the contingent valuation method. The 
development of the method as well as the maun elements of CVM survey design 
are described briefly. The emphasis of Chapter 5 lies on the evaluation of CVM 
biases. The idea is to show that the analysis of response motives is a useful tool 
when an attempt is made to explain inconsistencies and other anomalies of the 
results, which are frequently encountered in CVM applications. The nature of 
preferences that do not fulfill neoclassical standards is also examined. Next, a 
closer look at various WTP elicitation techniques, which are utilized in CVM 
research, is taken. The point is to argue that the choice of the elicitation method 
may be an interesting question in the academic sense but it may not be equally 
relevant when the social decision-making dimension is concerned. Chapter 5 
ends with an overview of previous CVM studies that are related to the valuation 
of different rural amenities. 
The empirical part of this study starts in Chapter 6. First, the sample and core 
elements of the questionnaire are described. Then, applied elicitation tech- 
niques, model constructions, and statistical estimation methods are reviewed. 
Based on this, different mean and median WTP estimates for the conversion 
from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming are calculated. A 
22 
demand function for pro-environmentally cultivated agricultural land is also 
derived. Finally, it will be examined to what extent starting point bias and 
additional information influence the estimated results of mean and median 
WTPs. 
In Chapter 7 the analysis is extended to cover attitudinal dimensions. By 
employing factor analysis and cluster analysis, seven groups with different 
attitudinal profiles in relation to agriculture and sustainable development are 
identified. Across the attitudinal groups tests are made to find out whether the 
mean WTP is sensitive to the provision of additional information. In this con-
text, the nature of preferences is also analyzed. Based on the attitudinal group 
profiles and stated individual WTPs it is assessed whether the respondents 
behave according to standard neoclassical preferences or not. 
The maun conclusions are presented in Chapter 8. The applicability of the 
mean WTP results from the viewpoint of welfare economics is evaluated. The 
purpose of this is to consider what can he said about the social desirability of the 
conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming. In ad-
dition, some of the findings are discussed in order to assess how probative the 
empirical evidence found is in relation to the instability and incommensurability 
of preferences revealed in the form of attitudes and individual WTPs. Finally, 
some conclusions are derived in order to evaluate the applicability of the CVM 
in actual agricultural policy-making situations. Some ideas related to the need 
for future research are also proposed. Chapter 9 summarizes the whole study. 
2. Pro-Environmental Farming and the Rural Environrnent 
The purpose of this chapter is to place the object of valuation, the conversion 
from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming, into a broader 
framework in both ecological and welfare economic terms. ,First, the idea is to 
explain how the concept of the rural environment, which defines the physical 
and operative context of pro-environmental farming, extends beyond the notion 
of agricultural landscape. Not only aesthetic and scenic dimensions count when 
the value of the rural environment is established. In this connection, attention is 
paid to the observation and perception process taking place when an observer 
has to cope with changes occurring in a complex resource entity like the rural 
environment. Then, a theoretical model is developed to derive the basic social 
design of pro-environmental farming when, in addition to conventional input 
choice, the aspects of agriculture-supporting ecosystem, rural public goods and 
externalities are included in the social welfare maximization problem. In addi-
tion, economic concepts like public goods and externalities that are required to 
identify policy relevant characteristics of pro-environmental farming and the 
rural environment are clarified in more detail. 
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2.1. From Landscape to the Rural Environment 
In most western cultures, the countryside is highly appreciated. There are sev-
eral reasons for this. Peasant values and peasant way of living may have played 
a major part in the historical development of a nation. Usually, if we go, two or 
three generations backwards in history, the roots of most people appear to be 
found in the countryside. However, even if the momentum of the recent history 
is neglected, there are pre-historical reasons for the recognition of the rural 
environment. Tiger (1992) argues that many of the basic sources of enjoyment 
can be traced to the ancestral past of the Homo Sapiens on the savannas of 
Africa. Human sense organs and the whole pattern of appreciation of air, light, 
texture, and sound evolved there. Therefore, the countryside yields primitive 
sensory pleasures, which are more tempting than sensory pleasures created by 
urban surroundings. Furthermore, it was probably an evolutionary advantage to 
live in areas where it was possible to see from distance when predators ap-
proached. It helped both to observe possible game and to receive an early 
warning if predators were coming closer. This may explain, at least partly, why 
a relatively open landscape is still appreciated. Tiger's (ibid.) anthropological 
approach is certainly thought-provoking. It indicates that some elements of the 
rural environment are unique and irreplaceable in the sense that they have 
emerged in co-evolution with the genotype of human beings. Thus, people 
would have a desire for open landscape for evolutionary reasons, at the level of 
basic instincts. 
Usually referring to the rural environment first brings to people's mind 
things that are somehow related to landscape. This can be because of the 
anthropological explanation given above, but it can be also culturally induced. 
Take as an example the use of the word "landscape" in different languages. 
Words corresponding to the English word "landscape" ("maisema" in Finnish) 
have slightly differing connotations in other European languages. Cultural dif-
ferences obviously exist and they have had some influence, although the basic 
functions and properties of landscape have always been rather similar every-
where. According to Keisteri (1990, pp. 33-36), the origin of the word "land-
scape" in Italian (paesaggio), Spanish (paisaje), and French (paysage) is trace-
able back to a Latin root "pagensis" recorded in the Latin of the Imperial time 
ca. 100-200. The English word "landscape" (as well as the word "scenery") has 
also its roots in Latin, in a word "sca(e)na", which means a natural view or 
pictorial landscape. 
Keisteri (1990) also argues that the English word "landscape" actually incor-
porates the meanings of both a physical scene or view and its pictorial represen-
tation. The latter meaning probably entered the English language through Eng-
lish artists who used the word "landscape" to describe landscape paintings of 
Dutch artists. Thus, the word "landscape" also reflects, to some extent, the 
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manner in which an environment is observed. This interpretation is true espe-
cially in English, French, Italian, and Spanish. In German the word "Landschaft" 
(= landscape) is more rigorously associated with a land area with boundaries. It 
is possible to use the word "Landschaft" to refer to a reproduced image from 
landscape, but in most cases the word "Landschaft" is used even today to denote 
only a defined area of land or the area visible to the observer. In Swedish, the 
older connotation of the word. "landskap" was approximately the same as in 
German, the emphasis was on the meaning connected with an area. Nowadays it 
can also be perceived to be related to pictures. 
The meanings of the Finnish word for landscape, "maisema", have devel-
oped, no doubt, from its counterparts in other European languages. Like its 
Swedish equivalent, the Finnish word "maisema" was used at first only in the 
meaning of a restricted area. At that time it corresponded in different dialects to 
words for soil, land, terrain, district, or locality. In modern Finnish, the word 
"maisema" still carries the meaning of land or district, 'but the most common 
definition is the one based on visnal observation. The word "maisema" can be 
defined in English as "an area of land surface, visible to an observer; some-
times: a view or a scene" (Nykysuomen sanakirja 1954, p. 368). As a conclu-
sion, we can say that the words for "landscape" in most European languages 
have developed in two phases from the meaning of a defined area of land to a 
picture of such an area. Thus the European use of the word "landscape" occurs 
in a situation in which visible and experienced land areas can be referred to by a 
single word (Keisteri 1990). 
Most evaluation studies of landscape values (contingent valuation studies 
and others) talk about either "agricultural landscape" (e.g. Russell 1988; Drake 
1993), "cultural landscape" (e.g. Meeus et al. 1988), or "countryside landscape" 
(e.g. Bergstrom et al, 1985). Usually there are no explicit definitions, though 
Bergstrom et al. (1985, p. 140) list five elements of the countryside landscape: 
topography, vegetation, water, sky, and man-made structures. Their view is that 
combinations of these five elements produce landscapes that differ, especially, 
in terms of their visual quality. This seems to suggest that the interpretation of 
landscape in valuation studies follows the general connotation of the word 
"landscape" despite some variation in terminology. However, Pruckner (1995), 
for instance, takes a differing approach. Although he also refers to agricultural 
landscape, his idea is to evaluate "the economic benefits associated with agri-
cultural landscape-cultivating services". The emphasis is not on the value of 
landscape as a visible entity but on its ability to produce services for the tourism 
sector. This is clearly an extension in the use of the word "landscape". Land-
scape is valued indirectly, based on its capacity to provide inputs for other 
industries. 
Traditionally, the physical environment is divided into three categories 
(Linkola 1980, p. 119): natural environment, rural environment, and urban 
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environment. The natural environment is perceived to consist of those areas 
where no or very little influence of human action can be observed. A primeval 
forest is a good example. Well-developed man-made infrastructure, dense popu-
lation, and lack of natural elements characterize the urban environment. Be-
tween these two extremes, there is the rural environment that, for the most part, 
is a product of the cultivation of natural elements. Boundaries towards natural 
environment and urban environment are somewhat vague, and a clear-cut classi- 
fication of a certain area is not possible. For instance, at the age of global 
airborne pollutants, there is no area on earth not affected by human actions. 
Oftentimes, it is also hard to separate a rural settlement from a semi-urban 
settlement. Some measures have been developed for the statistical purposes, but 
in many cases the distinction is just a matter of taste. 
It is obvious that visible landscape is a part of the rural environment. How-
ever, the concept of the rural environment should not be perceived to cover only 
the visible landscape. In the study we assume the view that the rural environ- 
ment is a subjectively perceived resource and service entity that at the physical 
level consists of both natural elements and man-made structures of the physical 
environment (resource base). The main natural elements are topography, veg- 
etation, animal species, water bodies, and space. The man-made structures are 
buildings, roads, ditches, electric wires, i.e. the infrastructure. It is apparent that 
most elements have features from both categories. They are a result of a long 
co-evolving process, during which the natural ecosystem has gradually turned 
into an agricultural production system. The resource base makes it possible to 
produce an array of services, amenities and commodities that are economic, 
socio-cultural, and ecological of their nature. Every observer evaluates both the 
resource base and the array of services subjectively, depending on their previ-
ous experiences, attitudes, and available information (see Figure 2.1). 
If a closer look is taken on the resource base, it can be seen as a combination 
of visible and invisible objects that have more or less concrete and abstract 
characteristics. For instance, landscape can be perceived to consist of elements 
that can be observed visually and to which attributes depicting "objective" 
dimensions like color, shape, and location can be attached. If a group of people 
is asked to describe a landscape view in this simplified manner, their descrip- 
tions are probably not quite similar, but rather close to each other. Most essen-
tial natural elements and man-made structures will be mentioned in this narra- 
tion, even though there will be some variation in exact wordings. The narrative 
can be considered a definition of visible landscape that is at least to some extent 
an "objective" entity in the sense that it is commonly observable. Thus, visible 
landscape represents phenomena that belong to the visible-concrete category of 
the rural elements. 
People do not evaluate landscapes based on shared notions of features only, 
but most of the time they use adjectives that convey very subjective quality 
26 
Concrete 
judgments. Two people can approximately agree on the visual appearance of a 
certain landscape view, but they can end up with very diverse assessments in 
relation to its aesthetic or scenic quality. Visible landscape will be interpreted 
through existing individual values and knowledge. Earlier observations, experi-
ences, and memories related to landscape viewing give a relative position for 
the landscape in question in a subjective ranking scale. It is not only aesthetic 
considerations that matter, but also attitudes towards rural life, rural inhabitants, 
and landscape-independent services affect the evaluation considerably. As a 
RURAL ENVIRONMENT 
	RESOURCE BASE 	 
natural elements and man-made structures 
Visible 	 Invisible 
Abstract 
ARRAY OF SERVICES. 
PRODUCTION OF SERVICES, 
AMENITIES AND COMMODITIES 
economic dimension 
socio-cultural dimension 
ecological dimension 
	1 	
Visual environment 
("landscape") 
Previous experiences 	Attitudes 	ludireet information 
1KNOWLEDGE AND VALUES 
Generalized vision of 
the rural environment 
OBSERVER 	
Figure 2.1. Rural Environment and Its Observation and Perception Process. 
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result, people have different opinions about the value of a certain visible land-
scape. They have, in other words, created an abstract landscape. This refers to 
the visible-abstract category. This view is also supported by Keisteri (1990), 
who emphasizes in her detailed discussion about the definition of landscape that 
there is, in addition to the physical landscape, an experiential, subjective land-
scape. 
Nevertheless, as already mentioned earlier, the concept of the rural environ-
ment goes further, beyond landscape. Invisible elements can also be concrete, 
although they cannot usually be directly observed. This invisible-concrete cat-
egory consists of elements of biogeochemical processes of the life-supporting 
ecosystem. Their existence is common knowledge, although it is usually possi-
ble to receive only indirect information on them. This is why very few people 
have deeper knowledge about mechanisms of the life-supporting system. In 
most cases, however, public perception of the countryside or the rural environ-
ment does not really cover invisible elements of the life-supporting ecosystem. 
People's views are clearly dominated by issues related to visible-concrete and 
visible-abstract landscape perceptions (see e.g. Spedding et al. 1988). 
The invisible-abstract category copes with concepts that are probably very 
seldom taken consciously into account when the rural environment is referred 
to. Many highly philosophical dilemmas are related to the interaction between 
human beings and the ecosystem. The question is about ethical choices concern-
ing the exploitation of environmental and natural resources. People' s views can 
vary from strict anthropocentrism to deep ecocentrism. They may see the nature 
only as a source of raw materials that they are entitled to deploy in order to 
satisfy their needs. Alternatively, they can regard the nature as an entity that is 
immeasurably valuable because of its own cause, without any reference to 
human needs and ends. 
However, when the actual valuation takes place, there are also other consid-
erations, in addition to the resource base objects and characteristics, that matter. 
Without going into the details of the nature of the valuation process, it is 
plausible to argue that at least part of the value of the rural environment is 
indirectly derived through the services it provides. These services have eco-
nomic, socio-cultural, and ecological dimensions. The economic dimension is 
related to the production of commodities that have a market price, like food-
stuffs and certain recreational activities. They are already valued at the market 
place through the price mechanism. 
The socio-cultural dimension is more abstract because it cannot be observed 
in easily detectable quantitative units. Some of its core elements are shown only 
in people's value judgments. What is, for instance, the importance of keeping a 
farm in the same family through generations? What is the significance of a 
living countryside? Certainly, it is hard to measure the value of these factors, 
but we should not deny that some abstract notions related to landscape quality, 
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peasant culture, and viability of the countryside are an essential part of the rural 
environment. Ecological services are products of the life-supporting ecosystem. 
Reference is usually made to biodiversity when these services are considered. 
Life-supporting functions can take place only if there is enough biological 
variability in the ecosystem. Agriculture-supporting biodiversity is responsible 
for the ecological sustainability of the agricultural production system. 
It is quite clear that most services provided by the rural environment have 
features from ali the three dimensions mentioned. Some services may even be 
difficult to classify according to these dimensions. For instance, food supply 
security and food safety are related to the production of foodstuffs, but they are 
not directly linked to the economic value of agricultural production. There is 
also the issue of national military security that is usually connected to inhabited 
countryside. The socio-cultural dimension does not exactly reflect this, although 
there is a close relation. However, the point is not to classify types of services 
provided by the rural environment but rather to remind that they are of wide 
diversity. Furthermore, in some cases it is very difficult to make a difference 
between a resource and a service provided by the resource. If biodiversity is 
defined as a service and the ecosystem as a resource, there is no meaningful way 
to detect when a natural element is part of the resource and when it is part of the 
service. Moreover, even in cases where a clear division between resources and 
services can be made, it is not necessarily important from the point of view of an 
observer who values the rural environment. It is likely that the observer has 
different motives to value different elements of the rural environment, but these 
motives are hardly separable in a quantitative sense. 
Consider now a valuation situation related to the rural environment. Because 
the entity in question is certainly well-known, it is plausible to assume that most 
people already have a generalized vision conceming the rural environment 
before a specific valuation situation takes place. They have gone through the 
observation and perception process a number of times in their lives. They have a 
considerable amount of earlier direct experience regarding the visible land-
scape. Based on these observations and their values conceming the rural way of 
life, people have produced a certain cultural vision of landscape. In addition, 
they have received variable amounts of information about the agricultural eco-
system and the related ecosystems and their functions through education and the 
media. They have also developed certain notions about the desirable relation-
ship between man and nature. This results in a wide range of variation in 
people' s generalized visions of the rural environment. It is likely that their 
views are dominated by visual and cultural images of landscape. The ecological 
aspect is less important, although it is inherent to some extent. 
Taking into account the complexity and subjectivity of the observation and 
perception process, it is quite apparent that an extemal observer like a re-
searcher has enormous difficulties when he tries to cope with people's different 
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notions of the rural environment. This is even more true when a policy aspect is 
introduced. A resource entity and its provision of services are never in a static 
phase. There is always some institutional design going on in the form of differ-
ent policy measures that are aimed to have some impact on the quality and 
quantity of the resource entity. Therefore, it is not possible to make a distinction 
between a resource entity, its provision of services, and policy measures in-
tended to guarantee its maintenance and development. They ali become entan-
gled in a manner that leaves in most cases space for different interpretations and 
conclusions . 
The complicated nature of the observation and perception process related to 
a multidimensional agri-environmental entity poses a challenge to the use of 
monetary valuation methods. On the one hand, from the viewpoint of economic 
theory and methodology, the object of monetary valuation should always be 
defined as unambiguously as possible. On the other hand, from the decision-
making perspective, ali the information about economic consequences of a 
certain policy proposal is relevant, although it may not represent theoretically 
correct welfare measures. Consequently, in most practical decision-making situ-
ations we face a trade-off between policy relevancy and theoretical validity, 
when monetary valuation is applied to the assessment of environment-related, 
complex policy proposals. 
2.2. Socially Optimal Characterization of Pro-Environmental Farming 
Agricultural output is dependent on inputs. When conventional agriculture is 
concerned, the major inputs are seen to be purchased inputs, like fertilizers and 
pesticides, and labor. Pro-environmental farming, in tum, acknowledges that 
also the rural environment has an important role as a production input because it 
provides the agriculture-supporting ecosystem. In this section the general eco-
nomic characteristics of pro-environmental farming are developed and com-
pared with those of conventional farming. 
The agriculture-supporting characteristics of the rural environment cannot be 
defmed in an unanimously manner They are to some extent based on biodiversity, 
which is the major element of life-supporting functions at the ecosystem level, 
but it would be too simplified to consider these characteristics only as a function 
of biodiversity. We can only refer to the preceding chapter where we show how 
the rural environment provides a broad array of different services that play a 
critical role in supporting agricultural production in many ways. 
Let us denote the agriculture-supporting function of the rural environment by 
g and recogmize that it is affected by the use of conventional inputs. Now, 
denote the conventional input vector used in agriculture by x, and certain site-
specific resource characteristics by r. Then, we can write g = g(x, r). In order to 
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simplify the presentation, we can assume that the resource characteristics, r, 
depend only on the geographic location and remain constant over the analysis. 
The relationship between x and g needs a closer look. There is some evi-
dence that the use of conventional inputs harms the environment. However, it is 
not clear if this is always the case. Moreover, the actual impact of the use of 
conventional inputs on the agriculture-supporting functions of the rural environ-
ment cannot be reliably determined in ali the cases. Thus, we cannot say that for 
exi, agxi<0. We have to conclude that the relationship between x and g varies 
so that for some x1, agx j<0 and for other x j, 3g/ax1>0. However, it is reason-
able to assume that in most cases ag/ax is negative, at least in the neighborhood 
of the current use levels of x, because otherwise it would be difficult to explain 
the adverse ecosystem impacts of conventional agriculture. 
Now we can derive a production function for pro-environmental farming (Q) 
by adding g(x) into the standard production function of conventional agricul-
ture, f(x): 
(2-1) 	 Q = f(x, g(x)) 
Consequently, the profit, 17, in pro-environmental farming (in the absence of 
taxes and subsidies) is 
(2-2) 	 TE = pf(x, g(x))—wx 
where p is the vector of producer prices and w is the vector of prices of 
conventional production inputs. The optimal amount of conventional outputs x 
to be used in pro-environmental farming can be found by solving 
aH 	 ag\  
(2-3) 	 ax P 	ag 
The solution of the optimal use of x offers a view on the potential benefits 
and costs due to the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-environ-
mental farming. It also allows an intuitive graphical interpretation. Consider 
first the case of conventional agriculture. In this case all/ax simply gives p(aQ/ 
ax) = w meaning that the value of a marginal product is equal to the input price 
vector resulting in the use of x = x0, as shown in Figure 2.2. In the case of pro-
environmental farming, when g(x) is incorporated, the situation changes. As 
already explained above, it is reasonable to assume that the increased use of 
conventional inputs in most cases reduces the ability of the rural environment to 
provide agriculture-supporting services. Thus (aII/ag)(ag/ax) is negative, creat- 
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Figure 2.2. Effect of Pro-Environmental Farming on the Optimal Use of Con-
ventional Inputs at the Farm Level. 
ing an additional cost (described by the difference between MC and MC) and, 
consequently, the optimal amount of conventional inputs xg is smaller (xg<x0 ) 
than in the case of conventional agriculture. The graphical presentation gives a 
partial analysis in which the prices of agricultural products are kept constant. 
From the farmers' point of view the interesting question is whether pro-
environmental farming is as profitable as conventional agriculture. Unfortu-
nately Figure 2.2 or the theoretical introduction presented above does not an-
swer this. However, considering what we know about yield changes when a 
farm converts from conventional agriculture to a pro-environmental farming 
practice like organic farming (approximately 30% decrease on the average), it 
seems that at least in the short run the conversion is not economically profitable 
if apiaQ = 0, because in most cases it is not reasonable to assume that w(xo — xg ) 
> pffx0 ) — f((xg  ), g(xg  ))). Thus, to make the conversion from conventional 
agriculture to pro-environmental farming take place, we have to assume either a 
farmer's objective function different from the profit function, a producer price 
increase, or a policy intervention in order to improve the economic profitability 
of pro-environmental farming. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that the 
key issue is to assess how the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-
environmental farming affects the social welfare. 
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Consider next the consumer side. Assume that consumers' indirect utility 
function (U) is quasilinear, i.e. linear in terms of income and concave in terms 
agricultural products, Q: 
(2-4) 	 U( p, I)= I +0) ( p(Q)) 
where / is exogenous wage income and p is the price of agricultural products. 
The indirect utility function gives the maximum utility subject to exogenous 
parameters. For instance, for the change in the price of an agricultural product 
holds that, aUlap = d(p(Q))<O, i.e. the higher price decreases the maximum 
utility attainable for the consumer. In addition, consumers suffer from agricul-
tural pollution according to d(z(x)), but also value the agro-ecosystem-support-
ing characteristics of pro-environmental farming according to v(g(x)). Thus, 
d(z(x)) and v(g(x)) express the value of positive and negative externalities and 
public goods that are extracted from the rural environment and its agriculture-
supporting services. 
Now features of pro-environmental farming can be derived as a solution to a 
social welfare maximization problem. Suppose that the social planner chooses 
the conventional input vector, x, in order to maximize the sum of producers' and 
consumers' surplus, their disvaluation of agricultural pollution and their valua-
tion of agro-ecosystem-supporting characteristics of pro-environmental farm-
ing: 
max SW = 17 ( p , w, f(x, g(x)))+0)(p( f (x, g(x)))) 
(2-5) 	 +d(z(x))+v( g(x)) 
The social optimum is characterized by a vector of conventional inputs, x, for 
which holds that 
asw 	 aQ ± aH  aQ ag ± aw ap df(x,g(x)) 
ax 	aQ ax aQ ag ax ap aQ 	dx 
(2-6) 	 ad az av ag +--+-- = o 
az ax ag ax 
The effect of pro-environmental farming on consumers' welfare is explained 
in more detail in Table 2.1. It demonstrates that we have welfare effects of 
opposite signs indicating the potential trade-offs in choosing the optimal level 
of input use. Assuming the conventional Inada conditions for the marginal 
valuation of pro-environmental farming and for the marginal disutility from 
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Effect through the 
change in the prices 
of agricultural 
products 
aco ap df(x,g(x))  
ap OQ 	dx 
<=> 
x SWc 
agricultural pollution is sufficient to guarantee that the conversion from conven-
tional agriculture to pro-environmental farming increases consumers' welfare 
despite the higher prices of agricultural products. Furthermore, this also means 
that the socially optimal input use is less than in the case of conventional 
agriculture. This is shown in Figure 2.3, which is an elaborated version from 
Figure 2.2. Note also that Figure 2.3 has been drawn in such a way that the 
socially optimal amount of x, xsw, appears to be less than the farmers' profit-
maximizing amount of x, xg, in pro-environmental farming. This is a reasonable 
assumption, because we know (keeping in mind the chosen functional forms) 
that for ali xi, 1 dSW/dxi 1> 1 (aSW/aII)(a17/ag)(ag/axi ) 1, meaning that MSC is 
always greater than MCg. 
This analysis of social welfare change shows that environmentally-friendly 
agricultural policy can increase social welfare through the implementation of a 
production technique that is based on the reduced use of conventional agricul-
tural inputs and the maintenance of the agriculture-supporting services of the 
Table 2.1. Changes in Consumers' Social Welfare (SWc) due to Pro-Environ-
mental Farming. 
Type of welfare change Form of welfare change 	Explanation of welfare change 
It is possible that the decrease 
in the use of x reduces Q, 
which in turn makes the 
prices p to rise. Obviously, 
this reduces the utility that 
consumers derive from 
consuming agricultural 
products. 
When x diminishes, also z 
falls, and disutility d 
decreases, i.e. social welfare 
increases. 
If the source of utility is 
the agriculture-supporting 
services of the rural 
environment, it is quite 
obvious that when x 
decreases, g increases, and 
the social welfare v derived 
from the agriculture-
supporting services increases. 
Effect through the 
change in the amount 
of agricultural 
pollution 
Effect through the 
change in the valuation 
of the agriculture-
supporting services 
of the rural environment 
ad az <,›x.1,,swc 
az ax 
<4sw T ag ax 	' 	c  
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Figure 2.3. Effect of Pro-Environmental Farming on the Socially Optimal Use 
of Conventional Inputs. 
rural environment. In this respect, pro-environmental farming can he seen as a 
promising agricultural policy alternative. 
We can conclude that pro-environmental farming is an agricultural produc-
tion practice that is meant to he used in order to maintain and enhance the 
ecological and environmental quality of the rural environment. It aims to reduce 
the use of chemical inputs like artificial fertilizers and pesticides as well the 
consumption of fossil energy. Pro-environmental farming attempts to promote 
production practices that contribute to the maintenance of special features of the 
rural environment and to the protection of life-supporting functions of the 
ecosystem. Reduced use of agro-chemicals, crop rotation, and preservation of 
rare biotopes and habitats are beneficial measures when biodiversity is con-
cerned. Simultaneously, the natural biological potential of the agricultural pro-
duction system is taken into a more efficient use. 
This is the background for the definition for pro-environmental farming 
given in the questionnaire (see Appendix B): "Pro-environmental farming has 
been offered as a solution to the problems of Finnish agriculture. Pro-environ-
mental farming can be defined as an agricultural production practice in which 
the emphasis is on the maintenance of the distinctive characteristics of the rural 
environment and on the protection of the functions of natural ecosystems. Pro-
environmental farming aims to reduce both agricultural surplus and adverse 
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environmental impacts from agriculture. Primarily, this can be carried out by 
reducing the use of artificial fertilizers and pesticides." 
The definition indicates that pro-environmental farming can indirectly also 
infiuence agricultural dilemmas other than adverse environmental and ecologi-
cal impacts due to conventional agriculture. The reference to surplus reduction 
was relevant in 1991, when the interview survey was conducted. At that time 
there was considerable overproduction in most agricultural products. After Fin-
land joined the EU in the beginning of 1995, changes in the agricultural policy 
made the connection between overproduction and people's tax burden much 
less apparent. 
In order to set up the reference point for the welfare analysis of policy 
alternatives, welfare effects due to taxes and subsidies were left out. However, 
in the case at hand income transfers are likely to play a remarkable role, 
although they do not change social welfare, if ali the people are assumed to have 
equal welfare weights. We must keep in mind how income transfers contribute 
to the origination of pre-existing distortions in the real-life policy-making and 
valuation situations. Information on agricultural support, for instance, may af-
fect people's agriculture-related valuations, if people are explicitly made aware 
of the substantial role of subsidies in the formation of farm income. If people 
are not aware of the pre-existing distortions affecting their welfare, the valuations 
that they make in a certain choice situation may not truly refiect their best 
interest. 
Now we can characterize the actual context of the agricultural decision-
making situation that we are facing. The most essential producer-side ramifica-
tion coneerning the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-environ-
mental farming was that it is not likely to increase farmers' profits if producer 
prices do not simultaneously rise. Furthermore, if we consider that the profit 
function is the objective function' subject to which farmers attempt to maximize 
their welfare, they do not have an incentive to change their production practices 
without a policy intervention increasing the economic profitability of pro-envi-
ronmental farming. On the consumer side, in turn, the conversion is bound to 
increase consumers' welfare, even if market prices of agricultural products rise. 
Thus, it could be possible to increase social welfare, if farmers were paid for the 
conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming a sub-
sidy greater than //(x0 ) —17(xsw) but smaller than the monetary equivalent of 
SWG, (xsw ) — SWG, (x0)). 
Of course, we can also assume that farmers derive utility from knowing, for instance, that pro-
environmental farming improves ecological sustainability. In this case, the objective function 
would not be the plain proflt .function, and we could hypothesize that farmers would be 
willing to convert from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming despite de-
creasing profits, because these would become compensated for in the form of utility derived 
from enhanced ecological sustainability. 
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We have now been able to characterize at the theoretical level the factors 
that contribute to the welfare change in the pro-environmental farming policy 
context. In practice, we will encounter a multitude of problems if we atternpt to 
identify and quantify these welfare changes in monetary terms. 
3. Decision-Making and Valuation 
Pro-environmental farming was •characterized on a general level as an input 
choice which equalizes the positive and negative effects in producers' surplus, 
consumers' surplus, and rural amenity valuation. The specification of the exact 
optimal level of input use, or the possible use of economic instruments to 
achieve this goal, requires monetary weighing of the positive and negative 
effects. This sort of analysis is typically carried out in a benefit-cost analysis 
(BCA) framework. The BCA provides a framework which acts as a conceptu-
ally sound basis for social decision-making, as long as we accept that ali kinds 
of values can be expressed commensurably by using monetary units. However, 
we have to keep in mind that in this study the emphasis is on the assessment of 
consumers' willingness to pay for the conversion from conventional agriculture 
to pro-environmental farming, not on the assessment of ali the benefits and costs 
borne in the conversion process. 
First, a brief introduction is given about the benefit-cost analysis as the main 
economic framework of policy analysis. In this connection, we also review 
social decision-making criteria which can be seen to provide the justification for 
the money-based policy analysis of the BCA type. Then, the total economic 
value and its main components are reviewed. The focus is on use and nonuse 
values as well as intrinsic, functional, and instrumental values. The purpose of 
this is to illuminate how the economic concept of value can be broadened to 
cover nonmarket value dimensions inherent in environmental and other public 
goods. Finally, monetary valuation methods suitable for the assessment of 
nonmarket costs and benefits are reviewed. In this connection we also show 
how the CVM relates to these other methods and the BCA framework. 
However, we have to note that in this study the contingent valuation method 
is applied in order to identify and value the benefits of the conversion from 
conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming. The potential costs of 
such conversion are not estimated nor are their possible sources evaluated. 
Thus, this study does not represent a benefit-cost analysis, because it provides a 
monetary value only for the potential benefits of the conversion. Nevertheless, 
the valuation of the potential benefits of pro-environmental farming is carried 
out in a manner which is consistent with the principles of benefit valuation in 
the BCA framework. Accordingly, people's willingness to pay estimates de-
rived in this study could be used as benefit estimates, and the benefit-cost 
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analysis could be completed if the costs of the conversion were available. This 
would be highly interesting, but unfortunately it is out of the scope of this study. 
3.1. Social Decision-Making and the Benefit-Cost Analysis 
According to Boadway and Bruce (1984), the two principal goals of the social 
decision-making process (SDMP) are to produce a social ranking over alterna-
tive possible states of the world and to carry out policies that satisfy individual 
preferences expressed through that ranking In essence, the social decision-
making process is a continuum of policy choices based on information acquired 
from different sources. Practitioners of welfare economics have developed eco-
nomic tools that can be beneficial in obtaining the social ordering of the differ-
ent states of the world and different policy alternatives. In this context, the term 
"state of the world" can be interpreted as a complete description of an economy 
including traditional economic factors, like supply and demand, political condi-
tions, such as the degree of democracy, and physical characteristics, such as the 
natural resource base accessible to the society. 
However, welfare economics is primarily interested in ranking states of the 
world that differ in economic characteristics, such as outputs of commodities, 
supplies of factors for different uses, and distributions of commodities over 
households. That is, the interest is in the ranking of alternative allocations of 
resources, and each of them is typical of a certain state of world or a social state. 
Furthermore, the ranking of social states is undoubtedly a normative procedure: 
it involves making subjective value judgments that are dependent on each 
individual's preferences. It is obvious that, for each set of value judgments 
adopted, a different social ordering results. Therefore there is no objective or 
unique way to order social states, and, as a consequence, there is no decision-
making criterion that could be considered the most preferable. However, the 
lack of an unanimously accepted decision-making criterion does not imply that 
nothing should be done. In practical policy-making situations we are forced to 
choose and apply criteria, although we should simultaneously be aware of the 
problems related to their use. 
We know that any attempt to derive a preferred social decision-making 
criterion is inevitably based on a set of judgments originating from considera-
tions dealing with economic efficiency and social equity. The value judgment 
that is most frequently referred to in welfare economics is known as the Pareto 
principle. The principle postulates that a change in social states is desirable only 
if it makes some individual(s), better off in monetary terms without making any 
others worse off. This kind of change in income is sometimes called the actual 
Pareto improvement (API) (Randall 1987, p. 147). Nevertheless, even this 
rather weak value judgment can be opposed on the grounds of social justice. For 
instance, a change in income can make the rich much better off than the poor, 
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although both will be better off in absolute terms. In other words, the API does 
not take into account an initial or a resulting income distribution. This is a 
serious shortcoming in a policy-making context, because redistribution issues 
are usually of great importance in party politics. From the viewpoint of practical 
decision-making, it is relevant that when the actual Pareto improvement is 
concerned, a policy action producing a change in income should be approved by 
every individual who appears to be affected. 
Apparently, policy-making would be extremely difficult and at least time-
consuming if the Pareto principle were the prevailing decision-making criterion. 
Therefore, there have been a number of attempts to revise the Pareto principle in 
order to create more political applicability. The best known of these efforts is 
probably the Kaldor-Hicks compensation criterion. It can be stated in the fol-
lowing way: Assume that there is a policy A0 as a starting point. Now, if another 
policy A1  could be introduced so that those who gained could afford to compen-
sate the losers and have some monetary gains remaining, the change from Ao to 
A1  would be a welfare improvement at the level of the society. This is some-
times also called the potential Pareto improvement (PPI) (Randall 1987, p. 
147). Obviously, if the PPI is implemented as a social decision-making crite-
rion, more information on people's preferences should be available. A quantita-
tive comparison of preferences between losers and gainers is needed in order to 
calculate in monetary terms how much losers lose and gainers gain. If this 
quantitative comparison is carried out in monetary terms, we have to assume 
that the marginal utility of money is constant. Furthermore, if we want to 
compare preferences of different people in monetary terms, we have to assume 
that everybody has the same constant marginal utility of money. Thus, if the PPI 
is confirmed to be a valid value judgment for policy-making purposes, then it is 
accepted at the same time that interpersonal utility comparisons are feasible. 
The benefit-cost analysis provides a systematic tool that can be applied for 
the assessment of the potential Pareto improvements related to different policy 
proposals. In the broadest sense, the BCA can refer to the measurement of 
economic costs and benefits from any change in resource allocation in the 
economy (Boadway and Bruce 1986). In practice, the BCA uses an array of 
methods which make it possible to give monetary estimates for the different 
value categories depicted in connection with the total economic value frame-
work. The assessment of projects and policy proposals related to environmental 
issues is obviously a natural target for the BCA because there are usually 
benefits and costs involved that the market cannot deal with. Thus, the valuation 
of environmental commodities is often an essential part of the policy planning 
process (see e.g. Navrud and Pruckner 1997). 
Nevertheless, the concept of the PPI must be operationalized before it can be 
used in empirical research. Several numeraires can come into question, but 
usually the net present value (NPV) is preferred. This is a discounted monetary 
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measure of a project's expected worth (Gittinger 1989, p. 487). In essence, the 
purpose of the BCA is to select a project that maximizes the NPV. This can be 
formulated more rigorously as follows: 
T B —C 
(3-1) 	 maxNPV = maxl, 	 
1=1 (1+r)1 
where Bt are benefits and Ct are costs in time period t, r is the discount rate, and 
T is the time horizon. 
Because the BCA is typically a monocriterion analysis, i.e. it is based on a 
construction of a single decision criterion like the NVP, the optimal solution to 
the maximization can occur in the mathematical sense only if certain properties 
are satisfied. First, ali the projects or their combinations compared by using the 
BCA must be mutually exclusive. Furthermore, a complete preorder structure of 
alternatives must exist, and the set of possible projects must be completely 
defined and fixed. These requirements may pose a problem because, given the 
complexity of decision-making situations, it is not always possible to define the 
set of possible projects beforehand in a fixed manner (Munda 1996). 
The use of the monocriterion also implies that ali benefits and costs have to 
be expressed in comparable and commensurable terms. In practice, this means 
the use of monetary units. However, combining different kinds of societal goals 
like economic efficiency, social equity, and ecological sustainability into a 
single numeraire is a problematic task. Consider the ramifications of the poten-
tial Pareto improvement principle. According to the standard neoclassical utility 
theory, the utility derived from consumption can be in the form of a utility 
function, say U = U(Z, X), where Z is a nonmarket good, e.g. environmental 
quality, and X is a vector of ordinary market goods. Furthermore, if a budget 
constraint PX = Y holds (where P is the price vector of X and Y is money 
income), we can define an indifference curve map representing different combi-
nations of money income and environmental quality that yield the same level of 
utility. In other words, it is always possible to find an amount of money in terms 
of willingness to pay for an environmental quality improvement or in terms of 
willingness to accept compensation for environmental quality deterioration that 
keeps utility constant (Munda 1996). 
The dimension of time is highly relevant in the BCA because it implies that 
there is a need to discount benefits and costs that are supposed to take place in 
the future. Choices have to be made about whether to sacrifice consumption in 
one period in order to have more consumption in another. The problem is that 
there is no unambiguous rule to decide what an appropriate discount rate is. 
Using market interest rates may be an intuitively appealing alternative, but it 
lacks firm foundations. Market interest rates are often extremely volatile and 
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they can change considerably during the implementation period of the project. 
In many projects, even a minor change in the discounting rate may play a pivotal 
role when it is determined whether to make the implementation decision. This is 
especially crucial when resource management is in question, since many ad-
verse environmental effects are very long-lived and many beneficial environ-
mental effects occur far in the future. We should also remember that natural 
capital has often much lower growth rates than man-made capital and will 
therefore become obsolete if future retums to production are the sole criterion 
(Hanley and Spash 1993, p. 266) 
Many environmentalists, and even some economists, regard discounting as 
ethically problematic because it appears to be inconsistent with the ideas of 
intergenerational equity. Their reasoning is that the higher the discount rate is, 
the lower the importance attached to the preferences of future generations will 
be. If high discount rates lead to the depletion of natural capital stock, then 
sustainability is jeopardized. Unfortunately, there is no unique relationship 
between high discount rates and environmental deterioration. High discount 
rates may shift cost burdens forward to later generations, but, if the high dis-
count rate is allowed to determine the level of investment, they will also slow 
down the general intensity of development. This will make it easier to preserve 
natural capital stock to the future generations. However, the discounting prac-
tice of the BCA easily biases the analysis in favor of the current generation 
(Pearce and Turner 1990). 
Another issue that must be taken seriously is the ability of the BCA to deal 
with different components of economic value. Especially so-called nonuse val-
ues may be difficult to take into account in the BCA. Their essential nature will 
be analyzed in more detail in the following chapter, where the concept of the 
total economic value is clarified, but at this point we should note that discount-
ing can prevent valuation motives related to nonuse values from being fully 
realized. The use of a monocriterion as the decision rule makes it somewhat 
questionable to aggregate use and nonuse benefits and costs intragenerationally 
because complete commensurability must be assumed. Despite these dilemmas, 
Bishop and Welsh (1992) strongly suggest that the BCA should also include 
nonuse values of environmental resources. They argue that, although resource 
economists may be accused of "disciplinary imperialism" when they attempt to 
incorporate ever wider sets of values under the umbrella of monetary valuation, 
the negligence of nonuse values would also produce accusations of the use of 
masked value judgments in order to promote use values as the only true eco- 
nomic values. 
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3.2. Total Economic Vaille and Its Components 
To fully comprehend the BCA framework and its limitations, we must look 
more closely on the concept of economic value. The most common approach 
used in valuation studies of environmental and resource assets focuses on the 
concept of the total economic value. It is customary to assume that under real-
life conditions (i.e. under uncertainty) ali values become ex ante, meaning that 
they represent an individual's expected benefits based on what is known at the 
time when the valuation takes place rather than in retrospect after the individual 
has experienced the consequences of his choice (Randall 1991). The main 
components of the total economic value are use values and nonuse values. Use 
value is the benefit accruing from the use (in some sense) of the resource, and 
nonuse value is the value a person attaches to a resource independent of his use 
of it (Kriström 1990a, p. 9). There are different forms of use values like direct 
use values and indirect use values (Bateman and Turner 1992, pp. 5-6). Direct 
use refers to either consumptive or non-consumptive use of an environmental 
resource. Consumptive direct use means that the resource will be physically 
utilized in the use process. For instance, when the rural environment is con-
cerned, agricultural products are typical commodities from which direct con-
sumptive use values can be derived. Non-consumptive direct use values are 
related to recreational services provided by the rural environment. The idea is to 
derive benefits from rural resources without reducing their physical quantity or 
quality. Indirect use of the rural environment is linked to appropriation that 
takes place through books, television programs, and other indirect devices. 
In addition to current use, there is also the possibility of future use of the 
resource, which is probabilistic of its nature and thus subject to change as 
conditions alter. Principal value concepts coping with this kind of characteris-
tics are option values and quasi-option values. They are usually included in the 
category of use values (see e.g. Randall 1987 or Bateman and Turner 1992). 
Option value refers to the value that arises from retaining an option to a good or 
service with uncertain future demand. Option value is an additional value to any 
utility that may arise when the good is actually consumed. If there is no uncer-
tainty concerning the future availability of the resource, option value will be 
zero. However, if there is some uncertainty involved, people may be willing to 
pay a premium (option price) to keep the option of future use open. In other 
words, the option price of a resource is the sum of the money that people would 
be willing to pay today for the right to consume some quantity of a resource (at a 
fixed price) in the future. Weisbrod (1964) was first to formulate this. Quasi-
option value (developed by Arrow and Fisher 1974) refers to utility gains 
expected to be realized from not undertaking irreversible decisions, and thus 
maintaining options for future use of some resource, given the expectations of 
future technological advance and/or the growth of knowledge. Suppose that the 
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passage of time leads to new information becoming available about the different 
uses of an environmental resource. If decisions about the development are taken 
later rather than sooner, a greater quantity of this new information can be taken 
into account. The value of the gains that are expected from deterring develop-
ment in these circumstances is known as quasi-option value (Perman et al. 1996, 
p. 277). 
The origin of nonuse values can be traced down to Krutilla (1967), who 
suggested, by introducing a concept called existence value, that people may still 
value a resource even though they do not actually use it. Existence value 
addresses the idea that some people value the existence of a certain natural 
resource although "they would be appalled by the prospect of exposure to it." 
Consequently, the value of the resource is independent of any current or ex-
pected future use. In this sense, the resource's economic value broadens to 
cover a wider array of possible valuation motives than expressed in the defini-
tions of option or quasi-option values. The magnitude of the nonuse values of 
environmental and natural resources is usually assumed to be in close connec-
tion to their degree of uniqueness, irreversibility, and non-reproducibility. Randall 
and Stoll (1983) and Randall (1986b) argue that existence value is motivated by 
altruism and suggest interpersonal, intergenerational, and Q-altruism. Interper-
sonal altruism arises from the well-being that can be experienced by an indi-
vidual by knowing that other people may be able to enjoy the resource (philan-
thropic value). Intergenerational altruism reflects the desire to pass some of the 
present endowments onto future generations (bequest value). Q-altruism is the 
utility that one derives from simply knowing that the resource exists (intrinsic 
value). 
Figure 3.1 summarizes the different components of the total economic value. 
However, because the applied terminology is somewhat vague and occasionally 
even conflicting, the categorization presented here is only indicative of its 
nature. Decomposition of values in practical valuation situations is a very diffi-
cult task. Different value categories can be considered to represent valuation 
motives, but they cannot be really identified and isolated as separate value units 
adding up to the total economic value. Thus, at this point we can only note that 
it is not possible to develop an unambiguous taxonomy of economic values 
which economists could unanimously agree on. 
Cicchetti and Wilde (1992) argue that the total economic value can be 
uniquely decomposed into subcomponents if and only if it is possible to value 
the subcomponents separately and then aggregate them to construct the total 
value. They also note that multi-faceted changes in the quantity or quality of an 
environmental resource will generate total value measures which cannot be 
uniquely decomposed facet by facet. For instance, if a farmer takes an action 
that decreases the quality of the rural environment (say, he destroys a rare 
agriculture-related biotope in order to enlarge the potential cultivation area). In 
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Figure 3.1. Total Economic Value and Its Components. 
this case, there will be lost values associated with both the destroyed biotope 
and the fact that the destruction was caused by human actions. In general, there 
will not be any unique way to separate these two values from each other. 
Furthermore, there is always the danger of double-counting when nonuse values 
are aggregated across individuals. 
It seems that environmental and resource economists agree on the features of 
use values but not on the nature_of nonuse values. For instance, Cummings and 
Harrison (1995) point out that nonuse values may exist, but there is no proof 
that they are measurable or that they form a significant component of the total 
economic value. However, they are- ready to admit that there should not be any 
argument concerning the concept of nonuse values as such. A number of mo-
tive-related reasons can lead- an individual to sacrifice income for an environ-
mental good or for any other public or private good. The dilemma is that there 
exists no operationally meaningful2 way to decompose the total value into use 
values and nonuse values. The same is true if an attempt is made to decompose 
nonuse value further into motive-related components. Consequently, while nonuse 
values of a true nonuser might be obtained through a research instrument and 
considered to represent total values, the decomposition of a resource user's total 
2 Cummings and Harrison (1995) mean by "operationally meaningful" that we should distin-
guish between observable behavior and unobservable motivations. The operationally mean-
ingful decomposition of the total economic value has to be based on observable and traceable 
behavior, not on unproved assertions about possible motives behind non-use values. 
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value for an environmental good into use and nonuse components is a highly 
questionable attempt. 
The pragmatic and conceptual coherence of nonuse values can be also criti-
cized. It can be argued that intrinsic value should not be included in the total 
economic value framework because the total economic value is related to the 
valuation of preferences held by people. Thus, it cannot encompass any value 
that may intrinsically reside in environmental assets themselves. Lazo et al. 
(1992) note that it may be problematic if nonuse values must be constructed in 
people's minds at the very moment when stated. This indicates that nonuse 
values may be highly sensitive to situation-related factors, especially if the 
valuation takes place in an environment of limited information and inadequate 
context. More et al. (1996) argue, in turn, that nonuse values like intrinsic value 
and existence value suffer from serious theoretical difficulties and anomalies 
that are bound to create confusion. First, there is the problem of what is really 
being valued. Existence value can be produced by the resource itself, by Icnowl- 
edge of the resource, and by the satisfaction that people derive from the re-
source. This potential source of conceptual chaos easily leads to a confusion of 
normative and positive economic arguments. 
Second, existence and intrinsic values are essentially static value concepts. 
They value the world the way the world is now. We can think that if everything 
living has a value and moral worth of its own, we should not allow such 
organisms to become extinct. More et al. (1996) argue that the static value 
concept does not really allow room for competition, either in a biological or an 
economic sense. Their conclusion is that the static value concept conflicts with 
forces of social progress like transformation, growth, and creativity. Further-
more, they reason that the emergence of existence and intrinsic values in eco- 
nomic literature in recent years is a result of the rise of ecological threats. The 
world is changing rapidly in often unpredictable and even adverse ways. The 
question is about an attempt to preserve the status quo; to preserve the world as 
it used to be. Concepts like existence value and intrinsic value offer a possibility 
to carry this out by bringing into positive economic tradition normative notions 
camouflaged as "objective" and "quantifiable" scientific arguments. 
O'Neill (1993, pp. 8-15) has discovered that the term "intrinsic value" is 
actually used in at least three different basic senses. First, intrinsic value can be 
considered as a synonym for non-instrumental value. This definition of intrinsic 
value corresponds to Randall' s (1986b) view. The Q-altruism, which is based on 
people's care about nonhuman components of the ecosystem, is a source of 
intrinsic value of non-instrumental kind. The second type of intrinsic value can 
be called "non-relational intrinsic value". In this case, intrinsic value is used to 
refer to the value that an object has solely in virtue of its non-relational proper-
ties. To hold that nonhuman beings have intrinsic value in this sense is to hold 
that the value they have depends solely on their non-relational properties. In this 
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context, non-relational properties of an object are those that persist regardless of 
the existence or non-existence of other objects and that can be characterized 
without reference to other objects. 
The clarification of differences between non-relational intrinsic value and 
non-instrumental intrinsic value requires a distinction between (1) values that 
objects can have in virtue of their relations to other objects and (2) values that 
objects can have in virtue of their relations to human beings. Clearly, the second 
set of values is a subset of the first. In addition, there are also (3) values that 
objects can have in virtue of being instrumental for human satisfaction. Obvi- 
ously, the third set of values is again a subset of the second set of values because 
an object might have value in virtue of its relation with human beings without 
being of only instrumental value for humans. Consider now a wildemess area X. 
One might value X in virtue of not bearing the imprint of human activity. In 
essence, to say, "X has value because it is untouched by humans", is to say that 
X has value in virtue of a relation it has to humans and their activities. In other 
words, the wilderness area has value in virtue of absence of human actions. 
However, the value is not possessed by the wildemess arca in virtue of its 
instrumental usefulness for the satisfaction of human desires. This indicates that 
non-instrumental intrinsic value need not be intrinsic in the non-relational sense 
(O'Neill 1993, pp. 13-15). 
The third kind of intrinsic value is in question when every nonhuman organ-
ism is seen to have intrinsic value independent of its role or position in the 
nature. This value does not depend either on any function that a certain nonhuman 
organism may have or on any outside instance assigning values to that organ-
ism. It can be called "objective intrinsic value". The definition of objective 
intrinsic value is clearly more far-reaching than the definition of non-instrumen- 
tal intrinsic value, which connects values to valuers or human beings. Further-
more, the relation between non-relational intrinsic value and objective intrinsic 
value is not that clear. Ts it so that if there is a value that depends solely on 
intrinsic properties of an object, subjectivism about values must be rejected? If 
an object has value only in virtue of its intrinsic nature, does it follow that it has 
value independently of human valuations? According to O'Neill (1993, p. 15), 
the answer depends on the interpretation given to the phrases "depends solely 
on" and "only in virtue of". If these are interpreted to exclude the activity of 
human evaluation, non-relational intrinsic value behaves like objective intrinsic 
value; i.e. it is independent of the valuations of valuers. However, it is also 
possible to interpret that there is a valuing agent assigning value to objects 
solely in virtue of their intrinsic natures. Given this interpretation of the phrase, 
a subjectivist can be convinced about the applicability of non-relational intrinsic 
value. 
The interpretation of intrinsic value in the objective sense is not consistent 
with the ideas of the total economic value framework. From the economist's 
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point of view, the essence of objective intrinsic value statement is in its denial 
of the subjectivist view of valuation, which states that the source of ali value lies 
in valuers, in their attitudes, preferences, etc. Objective intrinsic value is clearly 
in contradiction with the principles of economic valuation. Of course, in this 
context it is not possible to analyze if the position expressed in objective 
intrinsic value statement is philosophically sound and theoretically defensible. 
However, O'Neill (1993, p. 9) raises an interesting question. He argues that the 
definition of objective intrinsic value is based on a meta-ethical, not an ethical 
claim on nonhuman beings having intrinsic value. Thus, the argumentation 
supporting objective intrinsic value would no longer be concemed with proper-
ties of intrinsic value as such but with properties of preferable ethics. 
Spash (1993), in turn, argues that, if economists want to make progress in 
coping with intrinsic values in the economic analysis, they must incorporate 
new philosophical ideas. A partial challenge against utilitarism is not enough if 
it does not lead to the clear rejection of the whole utilitarian framework. He 
emphasizes that the core of the problem is the confrontation between a 
deontological perspective and a teleological one. Teleological ethical theories, 
which include utilitarian ones, place the ultimate criterion of morality in some 
nonmoral value (for example, utility or welfare) that results from acts. Such 
theories assign instrumental value only to the acts themselves and intrinsic 
value to the consequences of those acts. In contrast, deontological ethical theo-
ries attribute intrinsic value to features of the acts themselves. In this sense, 
behavior violating certain ethical mies is always considered inappropriate and 
unacceptable, even if it would produce the best possible outcome in terms of 
monetary welfare measures. 
It seems that a unified theory of value is an impracticability in economics. Of 
course, it may be possible to bring different value concepts closer to each other, 
but this requires a very careful examination of the prevailing theoretical and 
methodological disagreements. In this respect, we completely share the views 
promoted by Green and Tunstall (1991) and Brown (1984). The former argue 
that the meaningful evaluation of environmental goods depends both upon 
economic theory being adequate and a congruence between economic and envi-
ronmental theories of value. The latter asserts that decision-making procedures 
should use economic measures of value, but these measures should be applied 
with a full understanding and awareness of their context-depending nature. 
When the constraints of the total economic value framework are fully taken into 
account, the contingent valuation method can contribute to the process that aims 
to produce information on nonuse values for the purposes of social decision- 
making. 
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3.3. Monetary Valuation Techniques for Measuring Environmental 
Benefits and Costs 
We should remember that the BCA is a framework for the monetary assessment 
of benefits and costs, not a valuation method as such. The BCA describes the 
principles that are applied when different benefits and costs are evaluated in 
connection with a set of projects or policy proposals. Thus, when the BCA is 
criticized, a distinction should be made between a critical review of the princi-
ples of the BCA and criticism towards the actual monetary valuation method 
used to achieve monetary estimates for benefits and costs. It may happen that a 
monetary valuation method is in contradiction with some principles of the BCA, 
although it supports the basic idea of making benefits and costs comparable in 
commensurable units. There are also other methods than the BCA that are used 
for choosing between different project alternatives. Some of them apply mon-
etary values but are not compatible with the BCA. In this context, however, we 
only examine monetary valuation methods that are compatible with the BCA. 
Figure 3.2 presents a typology of different BCA compatible monetary valua-
tion methods. Ali of them can be used for the assessment of environmental 
benefits and costs on certain conditions, but their theoretical presumptions and 
practical applicability vary. These methods produce monetary estimates for 
environmental benefits and costs, and they can be divided into theoretically 
valid and theoretically defective methods. Theoretically valid methods are based 
on welfare economics and they express welfare changes in terms of willingness 
to pay or willingness to accept compensation. Theoretically defective methods 
lack theoretical purity, although they can produce monetary value estimates that 
are relevant for the BCA. 
Theoretically valid BCA compatible methods can also be called "behavioral 
linkage methods", because they establish a linkage between a change in envi-
ronmental quality and related economic performance (Mitchell and Carson 1989). 
This can be further illustrated by characterizing the methods along two dimen-
sions. The first dimension, revelation of preferences, deals with people's ex-
pression of their preferred choices. They can be displayed either indirectly or 
directly. Preferences toward an environmental commodity are revealed indi-
rectly if the indicator used is the demand of some related market good. Direct 
revelation of preferences simply means that the indicator used is the stated or 
real demand of the environmental commodity itself. The second dimension, the 
nature of market behavior also involves two options, it can be regarded as 
observed or hypothetical. Market behavior is called observed if the analysis is 
based on market transactions really occurred, and it is called hypothetical if the 
market in question has to be created for the purposes of research. 
Mitchell and Carson (1989) provide a comprehensive description of different 
methods belonging to each of these four quadrants. In this context, however, we 
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will concentrate on methods that are widely regarded as competitors of the 
contingent valuation method (CVM) in the valuation of environmental benefits. 
The idea is to show how the CVM (direct-hypothetical quadrant) relates to 
methods like the hedonic price method (HPM) and the travel cost method 
(TCM) (indirect-observed quadrant). A comprehensive review of the CVM is 
not given here but the maun features of the method are examined in detail in 
Chapter 5. 
When the CVM is applied, the main difficulties are related to the hypotheti-
cal nature of the provided market scenario. The HPM and TCM, in turn, experi-
ence limitations because of the indirect approach that they apply to preference 
revelation. The idea behind indirect preference revelation is that the demand for 
nonmarket goods is somehow related to the consumption of market goods. 
Thus, many environmental goods and services have substitutes and/or comple-
ments that are routinely purchased on the market. Furthermore, it is reasonable 
to assume that in many cases the exchange of market goods can generate a 
remarkable amount of implicit information about the demand and supply of 
environmental commodities. The problem is to extract and use this information. 
The core conceptual foundation of this approach is the notion of weak 
complementarity developed by Mäler (1974). 
Consider the utility function U = U(Z, X), where Z is a nonmarket good and 
X is a vector of ordinary market goods. Maximizing utility, U, subject to the 
budget constraint PX = Y, where P is the price vector of X and Y is money 
income, creates a set of Marshallian demand functions for individual x7 : 
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(3-2) 	 xi = xi (Z,P,Y ) 
If the utility function U = U(Z, X) is nonseparable in Z and X, i.e. U = U(Z, X) 
# U(Z) + U(X), the amount ofZ provided will influence the ordinary demand for 
xi. By estimating the demand for xi given various levels of Z, it should in 
principle be possible to describe a demand schedule for Z (Randall 1987, p. 
267). This means that the Marshallian economic surplus associated with a 
change in Z can be calculated. Moreover, if this can be done, it will be possible 
to approximate or to calculate exactly the theoretically correct Hicksian meas-
ures of value. Now, weak complementarity can be defined in the following way: 
a nonmarket (environmental) good Z is weakly complementary to a private good 
xi if aumz = o when xi = 0. This is to say that when the quantity demanded of 
private good xi  is zero, the marginal utility of nonmarket good Z will also be 
zero (Young and Allen 1986). 
When the HPM is applied, the weak complementarity between a market 
good and environmental quality is expressed, for instance, through the relation-
ship between observed house prices and environmental quality in different 
residential locations. Not surprisingly, the overwhelmingly largest part of HPM 
literature has concentrated on the relationship between property values and the 
benefits of improvements in amenities (public or/and environmental goods that 
vary spatially). Typically, the demand function for an environmental amenity of 
interest is estimated through a two-stage procedure. First, expenditures allotted 
to relevant market goods are regressed on measurable characteristics of the 
environmental amenity. The estimated coefficients and the actual values of 
characteristics for the sample are used to compute implicit marginal prices for 
the characteristics. Second, the implicit prices are regressed on the characteris-
tics and other variables, such as income. 
The weak-complementary-based demand for certain nonmarket values is 
also often measured by the travel cost method. It is the oldest and most fre-
quently used method for valuing a recreation site. The travel cost technique 
exploits the fact that people from different origins bear a different travel costs in 
order to reach a common site and, therefore, they can be expected to participate 
in or to visit the site at different rates. Converting travel time and distance to a 
travel cost, assuming that individuals take trips until the marginal cost of the trip 
equals its marginal value, and regressing the number of trips on the marginal 
travel cost and demographic variables reveals the demand function for trips to a 
site. Thus, the TC approach estimates the demand for an input (the site), not the 
joint outputs (e.g. travelers' experiences) (Mendelsohn and Brown 1983). In 
other words, we assume that the only decision variable is the number of visits 
made to a given site, and that the quality characteristics of the site are exog-
enous. The demand equation for the site is given by relating the number of visits 
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to the (fixed) price of return transportation and other demand shifters, such as 
income. The transportation expenses are taken to be a proxy of the price of the 
visit. When possible, allowances should be made for the opportunity costs or 
travel time as well as the direct monetary cost of travel (Young and Allen 1986). 
Both the HPM and the TCM share the theoretical validity3 of the CVM and 
are compatible with the BCA because they reveal, at least indirectly, how much 
people are willing to pay for certain environmental goods and services. In this 
respect, there is no difference between the indirect methods and the CVM. 
However, we can argue that the indirect methods are more reliable because they 
are based on revealed, not stated, preferences. From the point of view of the 
planning of holistic social policy, the most evident problem related to the TCM 
and HPM is that they only capture benefits accruing to direct users of an 
environmental good. They can tell the use value, but not the nonuse value. This 
is usually considered the most significant difference between the indirect meth-
ods and the CVM. For instance, if there are significant benefits to members of a 
society who do not directly participate in the utilization of the rural amenities, 
both TCM and HPM will understate the value of the rural environment. On the 
other hand, for policy purposes concerning rural amenities for which an esti-
mate of the value of recreational benefits is required, the HPM and TCM are 
valid techniques. However, it is important to remember that the indirect ap-
proaches are based on current or historical market data. They are incapable of 
valuing a change in the environmental quality which may take place at a future 
date (Young and Allen 1986). 
There also exists an extensive literature that compares the results of the 
indirect methods to those achieved by using the CVM. Conclusions drawn in 
different studies vary somewhat. However, it seems that in most cases values 
produced by either the indirect methods or the CVM are relatively close to each 
other (Smith 1993), although Cummings et al. (1986, p. 72) argue that ali 
comparative studies have failed to assess the accuracy of both the CVM and the 
indirect methods. According to them, there is a lack of uniform approach to 
evaluate accuracy across individual comparative studies. Of course, we should 
note that if there is a large group of nonusers likely to express considerable 
nonuse values, the indirect methods can yield significantly lower value esti- 
mates than the CVM. 
3 It should be noted that even "theoretical validity" is a relative concept. If in the HPM case a 
demand function is derived that relates house prices (or rents) to environmental quality, then 
estimated welfare change measures represent Marshallian and not Hicksian measures of 
welfare change. For instance, when environmental quality is improved, the Marshallian 
estimate in general overestimates the WTP for that improvement. However, the measure 
provides an upper bound for the theoretically correct WTP. The same is true in the TCM case 
when welfare change measures are estimated based on a demand function that relates travel 
costs of a trip to visit frequency (Perman et al. 1996, p. 264-266). 
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Furthermore, many environmental services and goods are not necessarily 
situation-specific, which means that there is no market data available for indi-
rect revelation of preferences. Even if the data exist, there is no guarantee that 
the indirect methods and the CVM are measuring the same concept of benefits. 
For instance, in one of the first comparisons of indirect and direct methods 
(Brookshire et al. 1982) the hedonic price model and the CVM were contrasted 
in the valuation of air quality. The CVM scenario described the alternative 
general air pollution levels by means of photos, while the hedonic price model 
of property values used changes in concentrations of certain pollutants that were 
explained to offer similar visibility changes. As a result, the CVM described the 
change as affecting the entire area, while the pollution measures in the hedonic 
price model were intended to characterize concentrations at each house location 
(Smith 1993). We can argue that there were two different environmental goods 
in question, although their valuation took place in the same physical framework. 
It is also possible to produce monetary estimates of benefits and costs which 
do not have a sound theoretical background based on welfare economics. This 
can be carried out by applying market value approaches or expert knowledge 
(these methods are titled as "theoretically defective" in Figure 3.2). Market 
value approaches assume that a change in the environrnent may alter economic 
activities and thus change the monetary revenues and costs of the activities. 
Consequently, a change in these revenues and costs can sometimes be used to 
value a change in the environment. The market value techniques value a benefit 
as an increase in revenue or as a decrease in monetary outlay. Similarly, they 
value a cost as an increase in monetary outlay or as a reduction in revenue. It is 
also possible to examine changes in the productivity or income that take place 
because of a change in environmental conditions (Binning et al. 1997). 
The advantage of the market value approaches is that they are based on 
either directly observable revenues and costs or rather simple causal relation-
ships between environmental characteristics and production functions. Their 
disadvantage is that in most cases benefits or costs are not necessarily derived in 
a manner that can be considered to represent the economic concept of value in 
the sense of willingness to pay or willingness to accept compensation. This flaw 
indicates that the implementation of the market value approaches in the BCA 
framework should be carried out with caution. However, the market value 
approaches deal with observable revenues and costs and they ali interpret ob-
servable behavior. In this sense, they have something to offer to the BCA. 
Expert knowledge is still probably the most frequently applied method to 
assess benefits and costs related to the use of natural and environmental re-
sources. Actually, it should not be called a method because it does not rely on 
any identifiable methodology, but the question is about expert judgment. Expe-
rienced professionals who are more or less familiar with the problem present 
their views on the magnitude of benefits and costs involved in a certain project. 
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Expert judgments may be influenced by •results of more rigorous valuation 
approaches, but they are not directly derived from them. Sage (1981) uses the 
term "wholistic evaluation", by which he means that the evaluation and choice 
of alternatives is first and foremost based on previous experience from similar 
situations. Thus, the judgment is intuition-based. In practice, expert knowledge 
plays a remarkable role in most BCA applications because other methods are 
impossible or too costly to carry out. An example of an expert knowledge-based 
method is the unit day value approach. This relies on expert judgment to 
develop an approximation of the average willingness to pay for a recreation 
activity. Selected values are considered to be equivalent to consumer surplus 
(Walsh 1986, p. 230). It is clear that this kind of estimates of consumer surplus 
are not theoretically valid when they are compared to consumer surplus esti-
mates that are derived from WTPs acquired through the CVM, TCM, or HPM. 
There are also approaches to valuation that are not based on the presumption 
that preferences should count in monetary valuation (see e.g. Eberle and Hayden 
1991). However, it is not possible to review .them in this context. Their exist-
ence indicates that information required for social decision-making purposes 
can be constructed through a large variety of methods with very different 
theoretical and ideological premises. Consequently, the usefulness of the CVM 
depends heavily on the chosen presumptions. If the economic methodology 
behind the BCA framework is for some reason rejected, then the CVM auto-
matically loses much of its validity and applicability. Nevertheless, monetary 
valuation in the form of the CVM is a preferred choice when theoretically 
correct monetary value estimates incorporating nonuse values are needed in the 
BCA framework. 
4. Measurement and Welfare Economic Theory 
This chapter introduces the essential theoretical concepts of welfare economics 
required in the assessment of welfare changes. First, the theory that forms the 
basis for money metric measurement of welfare changes is reviewed. The focus 
is on equivalent and compensating surpluses. Then, the questions why and when 
there are differences between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to 
accept compensation (WTA) and what the proper use of each measure is will be 
examined. This is followed by the presentation of the problems that arise when 
welfare change measures are aggregated across individuals. Finally, the chapter 
is summarized by an institutionally-oriented discussion about the social feasibil- 
ity of monetary valuation. 
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4.1. Measuring Welfare Changes in Monetary Terms 
Practitioners of applied welfare economics have developed an elaborated theo-
retical framework to measure welfare changes. Because direct measurement of 
utility is impossible, related measures have to be applied that reflect the changes 
in welfare as well as possible. These measures are usually derived from infor-
mation that is acquired by observing consumers' actual behavior at the market 
place, and that is why they are usually expressed in monetary terms. From the 
viewpoint of policy-making, the question is about an estimation of the sum of 
potential Pareto improvements related to a price or quantity (quality) change of 
a commodity. 
The starting point of welfare change measurement is the demand theory. The 
goal is to deduce as many properties of a demand function as possible and thus 
extract the maximum amount of information available. Consider an individual's 
utility function: 
(4-1) 	 U = U(X, Z, z f ) 
where X is a vector of ali market goods, zf  represents the rural environment, and 
Z is a vector depicting ali other nonmarket commodities. Now, a consumer 
wants to maximize his utility in respect of income, Y: 
(4-2) 
maxU =U( X, Z, z f ) 
s.t. Y = pX 
The solution to the maximization problem (Equation 4-2) is a set of ordinary or 
Marshallian demand functions: 
(4-3) 	 x = 	( p,Y , Z, z f ) 
The demand of any xim is derived from a set of prices, p, consisting of the price 
of the market good in question and prices of ali other market goods, from 
income, Y, and from the existing quality and quantity of the rural environment, 
zf' and ali other nonmarket goods, Z. Demand is uncompensated because, when 
prices change, income is not adjusted to compensate for the resulting change in 
utility. 
Marshallian demand curves are downward sloping when the goods in ques-
tion are normal goods. At a certain market price, a consumer demands a certain 
amount of the good. However, the consumer does not have to pay for every unit 
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as much as he would be willing to pay because at the market he faces only one 
equilibrium price. In other words, the consumer does not have to pay the 
reservation price for every unit. This difference between the reservation price 
and the actual market price is called consumer surplus. Thus, consumer surplus 
is defined as the area under the demand curve and above the market price line. It 
can be interpreted to mimic in observable monetary units an unobservable gain 
in utility. 
Consumer surplus estimates derived from Marshallian demand functions 
have some shortcomings. In the case of multiple price changes or simultaneous 
price-income changes, they cannot produce consistent results. The change in 
consumer surplus depends on the order in which these changes in prices and 
income are considered or, more generally, on the path of adjustment (Johansson 
1987). The associated problem is usually called the path dependency problem. 
The implication of this phenomenon is obvious. It does not make sense to use 
areas to the left of Marshallian demand curves to evaluate changes in consumer 
surplus created by multiple price or income changes unless the resulting change 
in consumer surplus is unique. It is possible to derive a set of rules that makes a 
money metric measure of consumer surplus based on Marshallian demand func-
tions unique, but this kind of situation is far from reality. Individual indifference 
maps are required to be homothetic, because only then the consumer surplus 
change can be uniquely defined in the case when ali prices change. This also 
means that ali income elasticities of demand must be unity. When only a few 
prices change, it is sufficient that the income elasticities for this subset of goods 
are equal. In other words, the marginal utility of income must be constant with 
respect to prices and/or income, which change (Nicholson 1989). 
Unfortunately, even if a money metric measure is unique, it does not neces-
sarily measure the utility change correctly. This may happen despite the fact that 
utility changes themselves are always unique (although they cannot be directly 
observed) (Just et al. 1982, pp. 76-83). The sign of the consumer surplus change 
may be the opposite compared to the sign of the utility change expressed by the 
consumer's individual utility function. Of course, what should matter from the 
point of view of policy-making is the sign of the true welfare change, and not 
the sign of the money metric measure of consumer surplus change (Johansson 
1991, pp. 40-47). Thus, Marshallian demand functions cannot necessarily be 
applied if the uniqueness of the change in consumer surplus is to be guaranteed. 
Fortunately, less demanding money metric measures of consumer welfare change 
can also be developed. They represent simple but rather plausible willingness to 
pay interpretations. 
It is possible to substitute xi back into U() (Equation 4-2), which yields a 
quasi-convex optimal value function V(p, Z, zf , Y). This function is also called 
indirect utility function, and it defines the highest level of utility attainable, 
given prices p, income Y, and the existing quality and quantity of the rural 
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environment, zf , and ali other nonmarket goods, Z. The connection between the 
indirect value function and the Marshallian demand function can be expressed 
by Roy 's identity, which relates xim() and V() in the following way: 
—3V(p, Y, Z, z f ) 
api  (4-4) 	 xr(p,Y,Z,z f )= aV(p,Y,Z,z f ) 
ay 
that is, the derivative of indirect utility function with respect to the ith price 
yields the ith  demand function, after normaiizing by the marginal utility of 
income. Associated to the utility maximization problem presented in Equation 
4-2, there is an expenditure minimization problem: 
(4-5) 
min( pX, Z,z f ) 
s.t. U( X, Z,z f ) =0" 
The solution to this minimization problem is a set of Hicksian (or compensated) 
demand functions 
(4-6) 	 = 	p,(J, Z,z f ) 
which give the quantity demanded as a function of the prices of market goods, 
utility, and the quantity and quality of the rural environment and other nonmarket 
goods when the utility is constant. It should be kept in mind that income is of no 
consequence: as prices change, expenditures are adjusted to maintain the con-
stant utility level. Now the expenditure function, E(), can be derived. It shows 
the amount of income, Y, which an individual would have to attain a utility level 
at a set of prices of market goods,p, and at the existing quality and quantity of 
the rural environment, zf , and ali other nonmarket goods, Z. This can be done by 
substituting the Hicksian demand function back into the objective function 
(Equation 4-5) to yield: 
(4-7) 	 E( 	Z,z f 	( p,(I,Z, z f )] 
Now the Hotelling's lemma can be applied: 
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(4-8) 
api 
z f  = Go, Z, Zf 
That is, the Hicksian demand functions are simply the derivatives of the ex-
penditure fimction with respect to prices. 
Consider a consumer with a specific income facing a set of commodity 
prices, p. One of the prices changes frompo to p1 (see Figure 4.1). Now, the way 
should be found to compare in a feasible way the consumer's well-being before 
and after the change without dealing directly with utility, which is unobservable. 
Based on the earlier theory development, it is possible to define two of the most 
frequently applied money metric measures of welfare change, i.e. compensating 
variation (CV) and equivalent variation (EY). Compensating variation can be 
defined as the amount of income which must be taken away from a consumer 
after a price, quantity and/or income change to restore the consumer's original 
welfare level. Correspondingly, equivalent variation is the amount of income 
that must be given to a consumer instead of price, quantity, and/or income 
changes to leave the consumer as well off as with the change. Thus, compensat-
ing and equivalent variations are•defined as income adjustments which maintain 
the consumer at particular levels of welfare (Just et al. 1982, p. 85). 
Mathematical representation in the case of price change can be derived by 
means of the expenditure function, E(-). If income is Y, and if there is no change 
in the quantities of Z and z f , and if the price of one market commodity changes 
from po to p1  (other prices, p, remaining equal) and, as a result, utility changes 
from U0 toU1, then compensating and equivalent variations can be written: 
(4-9a) 
	CV =E( p , p, Z , z f ,U0 )— E( po , p,Z,z f ,U0 ) 
(4-9b) 
	
EV = E( P P,Z,z f 1) —E(PO , P,Z,z f 
The relationship shown in the Hotelling's lemma (Equation 4-8) indicates 
that Equations 4-9a and 4-9b can be seen as integrals under Hicksian demand 
curves frompo toi)]. Graphically expressed, the area to the left ofxn/(p, Z z f . U1 ), 
between the prices p0 and p1, is the equivalent variation (ABEF), and similarly 
for xh°(p, Z, z f , U0 ), the area ACDF is the compensating variation. Figure 4.1 
also shows the ordinary demand curve x'n(p, Z, z f , Y). It intersects the Hicksian 
demand curve for U0 at po (xh°) and the curve for U1 at pi (xh1). We can easily 
see that the area to the left of the ordinary demand curve (xm) and between the 
price Iines po and 191, i.e. ACEF, is the Marshallian consumer surplus that has 
already been referred to (Kohlstad and Braden 1991, pp. 28-30). 
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The close linkage between the expenditure function and the indirect utility 
function makes it possible to derive alternative definitions for the compensating 
and equivalent variations: 
(4-10a) 	CV = V(p1 ,p,Z,z f ,Y0 )—V(p0 p,Z,z f ,Y0 ) 
(4-1 Ob) 	EV =V(p ] ,p,Z,z f ,171 )—V(po ,p,Z,z f ,17-1 ) 
The theoretical content of this formulation is the same as the formulation 
based on the expenditure function (Equations 4-9a and 4-9b). We can conclude 
that the CV focuses on the initial level of income and reveals the amount of 
required compensation from thereof, while the EV considers the subsequent 
level of income as the reference point. 
In certain cases, especially when we deal with environmental commodities, 
the quantity and/or quality of such a commodity must be taken as given. A 
consumer cannot vary the amount of the commodity that he is going to consume 
or use. The consumer can only decide whether to consume or not. In these cases, 
it is theoretically more appropriate to use other money metric measures than CV 
or EV to estimate related welfare changes. In this context, concepts like com- 
Figure 4.1. Marshallian Consumer Surplus, Compensating Variation and Equiva-
lent Variation (Kohlstad and Braden 1991, p. 29). 
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pensating surplus (CS) and equivalent surplus (ES)are usually applied (Mitchell 
and Carson 1989, pp. 24-27). 
The difference between variation and surplus measures is not very drastic 
but, nevertheless, of some importance when nonmarket commodities are con-
cerned. The change in quantities and/or qualities replaces the change in prices. 
If we assume that there is a change in the quality of the rural environment from 
zfo to zfl'  ali the other variables remaining the same as before, then the CS and 
ES measures based on the expenditure function can be noted: 
(4-11a) 	CS =E( p, Z, z fi ,U 0 )— E( p,Z,Z f0 ,U 0 ) 
(4-11b) 	ES = E( p,Z,Z f0 ,U 1 ) — E( p,Z,Z fo ,U1 ) 
and correspondingly, the CS and ES measures derived from the indirect utility 
function can now be written: 
(4-12a) 	CS = V( p,Z,z f1 ,Y0 )—V( p,Z,Z f0 ,Y0 ) 
(4-12b) 	ES =V( p,Z,Z fi ,Y1 ) — V( p,Z,Z fo ,Y1 ) 
To fully understand the difference between variation and surplus measures, 
consider Figure 4.2, where the price is initiallypo and the quality of the rural 
environment is originally zfo. Now, suppose that as a result of some policy 
action the quality of the rural environment decreases to zfi. From the viewpoint 
of market-oriented consumption, this would be equivalent to raising price to p1, 
so that the consumption would fall to zfi along the Marshallian demand curve 
xm. Assume for a moment that this price increase seemingly accompanies the 
reduction of quality. The Hicksian demand curves associated with the final and 
initial states are thus xhi and x", respectively. The change in Marshallian 
consumer surplus is a reduction of area (B+C+D). Applying the equivalent 
variation the change is only area (B+C), so the associated error in the Marshallian 
consumer surplus change is area (D). On the other hand, the compensating 
variation of changing price from 130 to 131, i.e., area (B+C+D+E), does not 
measure the willingness to pay for the quality reduction in the event of change. 
The consumer is not free to adjust zf following the price change, and so he is 
worse off than otherwise. Of course, the consumer could decide not to visit the 
rural environment ever again, but this would probably cause even a bigger 
welfare loss. 
Apparently, the necessary compensation for an imposed quality change is 
given by the change in the area under the Hicksian demand curve (x"), minus 
the change in what is actually paid. The consumer loses gross benefits of area 
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Figure 4.2. Difference between Variation and Surplus Measures (Just et al. 
1982, p. 137). 
(A+C+D+E+F), but reduces expenditure by area (F—B) for a net loss of area 
(A+B+C+D+E). The error in the Marshallian consumer surplus change as a 
measure of compensating variation is not simply area (E), as in the price change 
case, but area (A+E). This implies that special considerations are required for 
compensating variation when a quality/quantity change is imposed. Similarly, 
special considerations are required for the equivalent variation when a quality/ 
quantity change imposition is removed. Furthermore, if both initial and final 
qualities/quantities are restricted, both variations require special consideration. 
The compensating surplus differs from the compensating variation because 
the CV allows the adjustment of consumption following the compensation. 
Thus, we can conclude that, if the subsequent quality/quantity is limited so that 
adjustment is not possible following the compensation, the compensating sur-
plus should be used instead of the compensating variation. In such cases, the CS 
is no doubt the most correct money metric measure of welfare change. Corre-
spondingly, if the initial quality/quantity is restricted so that adjustment is not 
possible in the event of compensation, the equivalent surplus should be used 
instead of the equivalent variation in welfare analysis (Just et al. 1982, pp. 136-
139). 
From the viewpoint of CVM practitioners the most important thing is, how-
ever, that it is possible to interpret compensating and equivalent variations 
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(surpluses) as willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept compensation 
(WTA). For example, compensating variation for a price fall can be interpreted 
as the maximum amount of income that a consumer would be willing to pay 
rather than reject the price reduction. For a price increase, compensating varia-
tion is the minimum amount that the consumer must be paid or he is willing to 
accept to tolerate the higher price. Thus, compensating variation questions 
measure the gains or losses associated with taking a proposed action, in this 
case changing price. Consequently, WTP can be defined to be the amount of 
money that a consumer would be willing to give up to obtain a change and still 
be as well off as with his previous entitlement. Correspondingly, WTA can be 
defined to be the amount of money that would have to be given to a consumer in 
order to make him forgo a change, provided that he would still be as well off as 
if the change had occurred. 
Equivalent variation, on the other hand, measures gains and losses to the 
consumer associated with not taking the proposed action. That is, equivalent 
variation for a price fall can be interpreted as the minimum amount of income 
the consumer is willing to accept to forgo a lower price. Correspondingly, for a 
price increase, equivalent variation is the maximum amount that a consumer is 
willing to pay to avoid the higher price. Thus, equivalent variation is the 
maximum bribe the consumer is willing to pay to avoid adverse change in 
economic conditions or the minimum bribe necessary to gain relinquishment of 
a claim on improvement in economic conditions (Just et al. 1982, p. 87). The 
connection between WTP/WTA measures and compensating/equivalent varia-
tions and surpluses is summarized in Table 4.1. 
In Figure 4.3, in turn, the relationship between CS/ES and WTP/WTA is 
outlined in a graphical manner, based on Bateman and Turner (1992, pp. 25-28). 
The upper panel of Figure 4.3 describes, by means of indifference curves 
(u0 , u1 ), welfare changes when the consumed amount of the unpriced, quantity-
constrained environmental good, z, alters. The good Y represents ali the other 
Table 4.1. Hicksian Measures for Contingent Valuation Surveys (Mitchell and 
Carson 1989, p. 25). 
Type of change 
	 WTP 	 WTA 
Quantity increase 	 CS 	 ES 
Price decrease EV;ES CV;CS 
Quantity decrease 	 ES 	 CS 
Price increase CV;CS EV;ES 
WTP = willingness to pay 	WTA = wilingness to accept compensation 
CS = compensating surplus ES = equivalent surplus 
CV = compensating variation 	EV = equivalent variation 
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available goods (i.e. total income). The budget line, bl, is horizontal because the 
use of z does not cost anything to the consumer. Thus, the consumption of z is 
solely dependent on its supplied amount. Assume that the initial amount of the 
environmental good z is zo. The corresponding consumer utility is then depicted 
by point A. If the supply of z increases from zo to z1, the consumer moves along 
the budget line to achieve a higher level of utility, B. In the lower part of Figure 
4.3, the corresponding change, described through the Marshallian demand curve 
xm, appears to be an increase in consumer surplus (areas b+c). Both substitution 
and income effects due to the change in supply of z have been taken into 
account. Despite the zero price of z, the income effect still exists4, and the 
Marshallian consumer surplus is not an accurate measure of welfare change. 
The income effect can be compensated by examining how much the consumer is 
willing to pay to make sure that the supply of z increases from zo to z1  (type 1 
measure: WTPcs ). The consumer' s maximum willingness to pay for the change 
from zo to z1  is the payment BC. As a result of the payment, the income of the 
consumer decreases and he returns to his initial utility level (u0 ), which is 
depicted by point C. In the lower panel of Figure 4.3 the Hicksian demand curve 
xh° and area c below it accurately describe the welfare increase (compensating 
surplus) due to the quantity change. 
Alternatively, we can assume that the same quantity increase from zo to z1  is 
not implemented. In this case, the lost possibility of utility increment can be 
compensated to the consumer by paying him the amount AD, which would 
make it possible for him to achieve the higher utility level u1. The amount AD is 
the equivalent value of minimum extra income, which the consumer is willing to 
accept to forgo the welfare gain of increased provision of z. This moves the 
consumer to point D on u ] and maps out the Hicksian demand curve xhi in the 
lower panel. The correct welfare measure for this scenario is therefore the 
equivalent surplus (area a+b+c in the lower panel) (type 2 measure: WTAEs ). 
This means that WTPc,s < Marshallian consumer surplus < WTPEs or 
WTP < WTA. Thus, the consumer wants to have more compensation for an-
nulled quantity increase than he is willing to pay to make the same thing 
happen. 
Consider next a welfare loss, e.g. a decrease in the provision of z from z1  to 
zo. In this case the consumer will start at point B and the initial indifference 
curve will be u1. Faced with a fall to point A on the new utility level uo, the 
consumer will be willing to pay the amount BC to avoid the loss (type 3 
measure: WTPEs ). Nevertheless, if the welfare loss due to the change in the 
provision of z does occur, then the consumer can still be compensated by giving 
4 	Even if z itself is unpriced, its increased provision will still have an income effect by releasing 
some of the income previously spent upon priced goods. For instance, if z is recreation, its 
increased provision relieves spending upon other priced recreation goods. 
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Figure 4.3. Compensated Welfare Change Measures for an Unpriced Quantity 
Constrained Good (Bateman and Turner 1992, p. 27). 
him extra income AD to return him to his initial utility level u1  (type 4 measure: 
WTAcs). The interesting point is that now WTPEs < Marshallian consumer 
surplus < WTAcs Therefore, in the case of both gain and loss, WTA exceeds 
WTP. 
As we can see, there are theoretical problems in the consumer surplus meas-
ure of welfare change. Nevertheless, because of the impossibility of mapping 
utility functions, Marshallian consumer surplus measures have often been calcu-
lated as the best practical estimates of welfare change. In theory, the CVM 
approach, in eliciting explicit statements of how much income consumers are 
willing to pay to ensure that a welfare gain occurs (or to prevent a welfare loss 
from occurring) or how much income they are willing to accept as compensa-
tion to endure a welfare loss (or forgo a welfare gain), directly estimates the true 
Hicksian welfare changes of these measures. This is clearly a theoretical advan-
tage. 
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4.2. Choice Between WTP and WTA 
We can easily see that in a market situation WTP and WTA are logically 
equivalent to the buyer's best offer and the seller's reservation price, which are 
Pareto-safe prices. Therefore, the use of the potential Pareto improvement (PPI) 
criterion actually requires that beneficial and adverse effects have to be valued 
in terms of compensating and equivalent measures of welfare change (Randall 
1987, p. 245). The policy implication is that if a compensation test allowing 
intemersonal cardinal utility comparisons is regarded as a proper criterion for 
social decision-making, then WTP and WTA expressed in equivalent and/or 
compensating measures (variation or surplus, depending on the nature of the 
change) are theoretically the most correct measures of welfare change. 
Apparently, the choice between WTP and WTA measures is in a decisive 
role when an elicitation question in a CVM survey is phrased. Unfortunately, 
their use in the case of environmental and other nonmarket goods is not as 
straightforward as it is when market goods are in question. The nonrival and 
nonexclusive nature of environmental goods makes it impossible to define 
property rights in a nonattenuated manner. This complicates the analysis to 
some extent and, as a consequence, one of the most enduring controversies in 
the field of CVM research is whether the WTP or WTA approach should be 
chosen. 
Willig (1976) showed that, in the case of a price change, the difference 
between WTP and WTA was a function of income elasticity. Moreover, he 
showed that in the case of the income elasticity having a reasonable value, the 
difference between WTP and WTA had to be small. However, in many empiri-
cal studies CVM researchers continuously reported considerable differences 
between WTP and WTA measures for the same good being valued. It appeared 
that his theoretical results were mainly valid for policies that changed prices for 
consumers with well-behaved utility functions. Above ali, this implied that his 
results might not be appropriate for some commonly estimated but not conven-
tional demand functions. This is true especially in cases where the provision of 
public goods involves quantity changes and, in particular, for policy changes 
where the quantity of the good provided goes to zero (Mitchell and Carson 
1989; p. 31). 
Randall and Stoll (1980) expanded Willig's (1976) analysis from price changes 
to a situation where a quantity or quality change of a commodity alters welfare. 
They observed that the CV and EV are identical and equal to Marshallian 
consumer surplus if commodities are fully divisible and tradable without trans-
action costs in an infinite market. For fully indivisible commodities CV is larger 
than EVin a welfare loss case and smaller in a welfare gain case. In addition, the 
difference between CV and EV is somewhere in the middle of these two cases if 
the commodity is divisible and if its exchange claims transaction costs. As a 
64 
practical guideline they concluded that if the commodity is divisible, the com-
modity market is fairly competitive, the transaction costs are low, and the price 
elasticity is small, then the use of Marshallian consumer surplus causes only a 
small error when compared to possible inaccuracies in estimation techniques. At 
the same time, CV and EV are so close to each other that WTP and WTA 
measures should be almost equal. 
Hanemann (1991) showed that in the case of imposed quantity changes, the 
theoretical difference between WTP and WTA is governed by the ratio of the 
income elasticity to the• substitution elasticity rather than by the income elastic-
ity alone. The substitution elasticity refers to the ease with which other market 
commodities can be substituted for the given public good while maintaining an 
individual at the constant level of utility. The elasticity of substitution takes the 
value of zero if no amount of increment in any market goods can substitute for 
the change in the public good, and the value of infinity if at least one market 
good is a perfect substitute for the public good. It is possible to show that the 
smaller the substitution effect and the larger the income effect is, the greater is 
the disparity between WTP and WTA. Furthermore, if either the income effect 
is zero or the substitution effect is infinite, WTP and WTA must coincide. If the 
public good in question is unique and the income elasticity is of ordinary 
magnitude, the difference between WTP and WTA can become considerable. 
There is no doubt that Hanemann's (1991) work is unsettling because it implies, 
in contrast to Willig' s (1976) results, that there may exist large real differences 
between WTP and WTA measures for unique environmental goods. This sug-
gests that the property rights chosen are of great importance. 
Shogren et al. (1994) tested Hanemann's (1991) propositions. The authors 
analyzed experimentally in a non-hypothetical auction market situation differ-
ences between WTP and WTA by using easily substitutable market commodi-
ties (i.e. candy bars and coffee mugs) as well as a nonmarket commodity of low 
substitutability (i.e. reduced health risk). They found out that WTP and WTA 
amounts related to market commodities with close substitutes did not differ 
statistically significantly from each other. The opposite was true in the case of a 
nonmarket commodity without close substitutes. The WTP and WTA measures 
diverged and the difference persisted even with repeated market participation 
and full information on the nature of the good. Thus, the results of Shogren et al. 
(1994) give support to Hanemann's (1991) hypotheses. 
The most serious problem in CVM studies using WTA type questions is that 
it is difficult to create plausible contingent market scenarios (Carson 1991). 
Consequently, the current consensus among CVM researchers seems to be that 
WTA cannot reliably be measured by using a CVM survey. Already Cummings 
et al. (1986, pp. 102-106) in their "reference operating conditions" for contin-
gent valuation studies recommended that only WTP measures should be elicited 
in the attempt of valuing environmental commodities. In addition, the recom- 
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mendation of the NOAA Panel (Arrow et al. 1993) is that WTP format should 
be used instead of WTA format because WTP is a more conservative choice. 
Generally, when aspects of the survey design and the analysis of responses are 
ambiguous, the option that tends to underestimate the acquired welfare measure 
is preferred. However, the NOAA Panel did not review any theoretical issues 
concerning the superiority of WTP to WTA. 
As noted above, the formulation of the elicitation question also depends on 
the prevailing set of property rights. It does not make sense to present a WTA 
question to a non-owner of a resource if the person cannot simultaneously be 
guaranteed property rights that ensure his entitlement to the compensation of-
fered. Mitchell and Carson (1989, pp. 38-41) have developed an interesting 
approach that rethinks the role of property rights when selecting between WTP 
and WTA in the case of public goods which require annual payments or their 
equivalents in order to maintain the given level of quantity and/or quality. Many 
important public goods have this feature. Water quality, for instance, would 
rapidly decline if the government did not spend any money on control measures. 
For public goods of this type, neither ownership nor use as such is able to 
capture the relevant relationship between the good and the consumer. 
Two dimensions of a public good receive special attention: it is held either 
individually or collectively, and its level of quantity/quality is either currently 
accessible or currently inaccessible. Individually held rights to a public good 
can occur when a public good is clearly excludable. Then individuals can be 
granted exclusive rights to its use by the collective if such a grant is considered 
to serve the public interest. Various allocation mies are used when the rights are 
granted, and the rights are usually not transferable. Collectively held rights 
occur when access to the public good is available to ali members of the collec-
tive, and when individual members cannot trade their right to access. The rural 
environment is a good example of a public good of this kind. People have a 
collective property right to visit the countryside (public access), but the right 
cannot be transferred by any means. Now, there is a cost to provide the good at 
a given quality level, and this cost is borne by ali consumers through some 
combination of taxes (agricultural support), prices (agricultural products), and 
the like. Moreover, if the level of payment is not maintained, the quality of the 
rural environment will soon deteriorate. Correspondingly, if a quality increase 
of the rural environment is desired, higher payments (higher taxes, higher pro-
ducer prices) will be needed to cover the cost of providing the new quality level. 
The second dimension for determining the appropriate surplus measure for a 
public good is whether a given level of quantity/quality is accessible. At the 
moment, there exists a certain number of exceptionally valuable traditional 
agricultural landscape areas that have been tracked down by governmental 
authorities. This can be regarded to represent the quality level of the rural 
environment. On the other hand, it is currently impossible to have twice as many 
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exceptionally valuable traditional agricultural landscape areas. This framework 
for conceptualizing the property right to public goods has important implica-
tions for the choice of the correct Hicksian surplus measure for CVM surveys. 
Now, the aim is to measure the benefits of this public good starting from the 
consumer's initial level of utility. If a given utility level of the public good is not 
currently available, the WTI'cs measure determines the would-be value of the 
increased provision. This is parallel to a private good case in which an indi-
vidual has similar property rights (i.e. he is not able to use the good and does not 
own it). In both cases, the WTPcy correctly measures the amount that the 
individual is willing to pay for the improvement that leaves him as well off 
before the change as after it. 
In the public good case, however, the WT13cs is also regarded to be the most 
correct measure for a proposed decrease when a given quality level is currently 
available. The corresponding set of property rights for a private good case 
concerns a situation where an individual has access to a private good (i.e. he 
owns the good and is able to use it). We can easily observe (see Table 4.1) that 
in this private good case (quantity decrease) the recommended welfare change 
measure is WTAG5 instead of the proposed WTI)cs if the measurement is to be 
carried out starting from the initial level of utility. Now, since the individual in 
the public good case is already paying for the public good on a regular basis, the 
Hicksian compensating surplus for this case is the amount that the consumer is 
willing to pay to forgo the reduction in the quality of the good and still be as 
well off as before. If the rural environment is thought of as an example in this 
context, people have two options: better quality of the rural environment and 
higher payments or poorer quality of the rural environment and lower payments. 
In the case of quality decrease of the rural environment, the WTA question 
would inquire how much people would have to be paid to voluntarily accept the 
poorer quality of the countryside. However, as explained above, people are 
already financing the maintenance of the rural environment through taxes. In 
such a situation, people have the right to enjoy the quality of the rural environ-
ment but, simultaneously, they have to pay for it. Thus, the effective property 
right is actually WTP, not WTA. The essential property which makes WTP 
rather than WTA appropriate is that the same people constitute both sides of the 
transaction. 
4.3. Aggregating Welfare Measures 
Aggregation of individual utilities in empirical applications is based on certain 
pre-assumptions, which have to be clarified first. These pre-assumptions are 
related to people' s preferences and behavioral models. In addition, we have to 
deal with the question about the choice of correct summary statistics and appro-
priate statistical estimation techniques of WTP. 
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As we know, utility or welfare cannot be measured directly. There are no 
measurable units that could be identified as "utils". The tradition among econo-
mists is to assume that money is a close measure of utility and that an individual 
expresses his search for ever-greater satisfaction through the consumption of 
goods and services. However, it is not likely that ali people have similar atti-
tudes towards money. For many people money and utility can be surrogates, but 
this need not be the case in general. Thus, the marginal utility of income can 
vary considerably among people. 
Monetary gains and losses can be summed up across individuals in a theo-
retically correct way Only when the distribution of welfare in the society is at 
the optimal level. This, in turn, implies that ali individual marginal utilities of 
income have to be equal (Johansson 1993). This kind of situation occurs only 
when the society is in the Pareto optimal state. Normally, not ali the criteria of 
Pareto efficiency are fulfilled. Thus, certain preconditions have to be satisfied 
before measures of welfare change (for instance, equivalent version of willing-
ness-to-pay) can be added up across individuals or households. First, it is 
necessary that the marginal social utility of income is identical for ali individu-
als. This is possible only in two cases. The first alternative is to assume that the 
marginal utility of income is the same for ali individuals. This is true if ali 
individuals have identical ordinal preferences, i.e. the same indifference curve 
maps. If individual indifference curves do not coincide, there is no unambiguous 
way to make individual marginal utilities of income equal across individuals. 
The second alternative is to assume that some institution (e.g. government) 
continually redistributes income in order to maintain the equality of marginal 
social utilities (Boadway and Bruce 1986). However, every action of redistribu-
tion is likely to create transaction costs. In other words, an attempt to develop a 
society that makes it possible to aggregate individual utilities in a theoretically 
correct manner is in itself a costly project that has redistribution and realloca-
tion effects. 
Aggregation across people can also be difficult because it is hard to know 
what the target population should be. This is a relevant question especially 
when significant nonuse values are involved. Jakobsson and Dragun (1996) 
conducted a CVM survey examining the value of the preservation of endan-
gered species in the State of Victoria, Australia. The population surveyed was 
adult Victorians, but the authors emphasize that it is quite likely that Australians 
in other states and even people overseas may have existence values for Victo-
rian endangered species. Thus, restricting the survey to Victorians may underes-
timate the value of protecting species in the State of Victoria. 
Rubin et al. (1991) carried out a CVM survey that was aimed to investigate 
the value of the preservation of the northern spotted owl in the Pacific North-
west in the USA. The target population consisted of residents of the Washington 
State. The authors reasoned, however, that due to the public good nature of 
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preservation, protecting spotted owls in the Washington and Oregon states 
would provide benefits to people throughout the nation. Therefore, they ex-
trapolated the results to cover the whole country by assuming that WTP de-
creases about 10% for every 1000 miles in distance. Even though the authors 
remarked that their extrapolations are more illustrative than conclusive, their 
approach underlines the potentially important role of nonuse values. 
If the theoretical reservations conceming the aggregation of money metric 
measures of utility are left aside, it seems that aggregation across individuals 
depends heavily on the magnitude of nonuse values involved and on the scope 
of locality of the good being valued. Some natural resources create nonuse 
values on a global scale, for example, rain forests of the Amazon area in Brazil. 
In this case, a random sarnpling from the target population would be extremely 
difficult and costly. Obviously, there is no definite rule where to draw the line in 
the aggregation issue. In practice, nevertheless, some Iines must be drawn. 
Consider the valuation of the Finnish rural environment. It can be regarded as a 
national public good because the deterioration of the Finnish countryside does 
not have much impact on environmental quality and life-supporting systems on 
the world scale, unlike the Amazonian rain forests. Thus, the target population 
is those who are able to enjoy the rural environment and who in essence are 
responsible for the costs of producing the public good in question. This is 
obviously important from the social point of view because people usually con-
sider it fair that potential beneficiaries of public goods participate in their 
production costs. 
Another important aggregation issue is the use of summary statistics, which 
usually means the choice between the mean and the median. In the case of 
dichotomous contingent valuation data, effects of different statistical estimation 
techniques should also be considered. The choice of summary statistics depends 
on the formulation of the valuation scenario and the nature of desired policy 
recommendations. If the ultimate goal is to aggregate costs and benefits in a 
benefit-cost analysis framework, then the mean value is the appropriate measure 
because it makes it possible to apply Pareto concepts in the welfare change 
analysis (Harrison and Kriström 1995). This indicates that, if the objective is to 
find out whether the proposed change is a potential Pareto improvement, the 
mean value should be used. However, if the goal is to interpret the results in 
terms of the outcome of a referendum, the median is a more appropriate sum-
mary statistics, although the use of the median value does not in general produce 
a Pareto efficient outcome (Johansson et al. 1989). 
From the point of view of statistical estimation techniques, the median has 
some advantages over the mean. First, it is a more robust measure of central 
tendency. The mean is more sensitive to perturbations caused by errors in the 
data or by unusual observations (Hanemann 1984). It is also true that the mean 
is sensitive to the specification of the cumulative distribution function used in 
69 
the dichotomous data estimation, while the median is robust in this case, too 
(Kriström 1990a). Furthermore, the mean is more sensitive to methodical alter-
natives in the structural model estimation, such as generalized least squares or 
maximum likelihood (Hanemann 1989). However, robustness of the median can 
also be a problem. Boyle et al. (1988) argue that, although the median may be 
less sensitive with respect to skewness in the distribution, one can expect the 
distribution of WTP values to be skewed, and thus the median may not be the 
ideal measure of central tendency. Consequently, the choice between the mean 
and the median should be made in a theoretically well-grounded manner, al-
though issues related to statistical estimation should not dictate it. 
4.4. Some Institutionally Oriented Viewpoints 
Considering the complexity of the social decision-making process and the number 
of problems related to individual preferences and their revelation, it is not 
surprising that monetary valuation has been seen in many occasions as an 
inadequate approach to provide valid information for the purposes of policy-
making Some social scientists even challenge the rationality of the use of 
individual preferences as the basis for the assessment of social welfare change. 
They either strongly oppose the use of people's preferences as a legitimate 
starting point of social decision-making or favor institutional structures that 
eliminate the necessity of making interpersonal welfare comparisons by a third 
party. 
If preferences are regarded as unreliable and/or invalid, a possible solution is 
to reject the idea that preferences (whatever they are like) should count in the 
social decision-making which deals with environmental amenities and services 
possessing public good characteristics. For instance, Sagoff (1994) promotes 
this rather non-economic view. He argues that choices should count instead of 
preferences, and that preference-satisfaction does not necessarily lead to im-
proved well-being of the society as a whole. According to him, the core of the 
problem is that economists cannot make a difference between preferences as 
psychological phenomena and preferences as logical constructs derived from 
certain behavioral assumptions. 
Empirical psychologists explaining behavior in terms of its causal conditions 
do not give preferences a prominent position. Some of them regard preferences 
as private mental states that are not observable and thus not testable in the 
scientific sense. If an attempt is made to explain a choice of an individual in 
terms of preferences, any explanation will inevitably have an ad hoc nature. 
There can be a dozen of potential explanations, some of them more likely than 
the others, but it is not possible to detect which of them, if any, is the correct 
one. Thus, preferences as psychological phenomena represent unidentified 
behavioral motives behind actual choices. 
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The social choice theory, in turn, presents preferences as formal constructs 
derived logically from stipulated descriptions of individual behavior. The 
behavioral model is prescribed, and the social choice theory does not speculate 
on the psychic, environmental, genetic, or other causes of behavior. Usually the 
applied behavioral concept is rationality. When this approach is broadened to 
the societal level, social choice theorists begin with "given" or "assumed" 
descriptions of altemative social states and then construct preference schedules 
as rankings among stipulated behavioral descriptions. Thus, the social choice 
theory is concemed with the logical, not the psychological, properties of prefer-
ence orderings. Therefore, the relation between preference and choice in this 
context becomes logical, not psychological, or causal. 
Now, Sagoff (1994) argues that welfare economists follow social choice 
theorists by constructing preferences logically from stipulated descriptions of 
behavior. Yet, welfare economists assert that these logical constructs function 
as the psychological causes of this behavior. In this connection, they make 
themselves guilty of the use of ad hoc explanations by supposing that theoreti-
cal terms logically constructed from ways of describing behavior simultane-
ously cause that behavior. In other words, welfare economists misleadingly 
combine an epistemological program of clarifying the logical structure of pref-
erences and a psychological program of identifying the causal mechanisms 
behind them. Consequently, there will be a mix-up of epistemological and 
psychological elements, which leads welfare economists to move casually be-
tween the logical analysis of rationality and psychological claims about behavioral 
motives. 
In practical applications welfare effects of preference satisfaction are ex-
pressed through money metric measures of welfare change, i.e. willingness to 
pay. If social welfare is defined as a function of willingness to pay for some-
thing rather than a function of "true welfare" originating from having some-
thing, the allocation of natural resources takes place in favor of those who can 
afford to pay the most for the use. The pivotal question is whether the WTP 
approach really measures changes in personal welfare associated with the con-
sumption of different goods and services. The problem is that welfare econom-
ics does not offer any other method for measuring changes in personal well-
being. The ramification of this is that the relation between willingness to pay 
and welfare is a stipulative or definitional rather than a contingent one. This is 
why the proposition that the more people will pay for things, the more welfare 
they will derive from having them, must be treated as a tautological definition 
and not as a fact. Therefore, the claim that preference satisfaction promotes 
well-being in essence merely assumes that the truth is what actually should be 
proved to be the truth (Sagoff 1994). 
Conceming the utilization of CVM results in the social decision-making 
context, Sagoff's (1994) claims are extremely discouraging. If stated prefer- 
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ences are not proper indicators of actual future choices, the CVM is hardly 
applicable. In addition, if money metric welfare measures cannot be applied 
when changes in social well-being are assessed and evaluated, the Kaldor-Hicks 
compensation criterion is hardly an appropriate criterion to be used in the 
ranking of alternative policy proposals. However, SagofFs (ibid.) purpose is not 
to rebut the concept of consumer sovereignty. He considers that, although 
markets and democratic processes may fail to produce an optimal resource 
allocation, they should be regarded as the most appropriate settings for individu-
als to make choices and to pursue their visions of the personal and social good. 
The moral properties related to choices, like accountability, responsibility, com-
mitment, and consent, are not dependent upon preferences that can be assumed 
to be behind different choices. Thus, as long as social decision-making is based 
on information gathered from our actual choices and not from our preferences, 
we need not be worried about decisions related to the allocation of natural and 
environmental resources. 
When the CVM is used, the idea of the market failure is implicitly accepted. 
If the market functioned properly, there would not be any necessity to search for 
people' s preferences beyond actual market transactions. In essence, the applica-
tion of the CVM is based on thinking that lies behind the prevailing centralized 
approach to environmental problems. Because of the externality nature of many 
environmental effects, the society is forced to take policy actions to internalize 
benefits and costs produced by these effects. Independent of the nature of the 
chosen policy instrument, a Pigouvian tax, a command-and-control regulation, 
or informative guidance, the point of the centralized approach is that the society 
identifies the amount of harm or benefit and employs some policy instrument in 
order to achieve an optimum where social welfare is maximized as well as 
possible. The CVM is an excellent tool for this kind of approach. It can be used 
for the estimation of nonmarket benefits created by public good or externality 
type environmental commodities and impacts. 
However, ali economists do not feel comfortable with the idea of inevitable 
market failure. In his famous article Coase (1960) sketched an approach that 
emphasized the importance of property rights and rejected intervention by the 
government in favor of market bargaining in order to achieve the socially 
optimal level of internalization of externalities. Given the existence of an appro-
priate property rights system (guaranteed ownership of resources via enforce-
ment by the society) and certain other assumptions, he argued that a harm 
producer and a harm sufferer should be left in an unregulated situation. A 
bargaining process would then develop on an automatic basis. The so-called 
Coase theorems states that if transaction costs are zero, the initial assignment of 
5 The Coase theorem is often abbreviated into the form that property rights do not matter, but 
this is not an appropriate interpretation as Schmid (1987, p. 219) rigorously points out. 
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property rights will not affect the efficiency with which resources are allocated 
(Posner 1993). 
The Coase theorem has been questioned in many occasions in the economic 
literature but it has succeeded in maintaining most of its relevance. The major 
problem with the applicability of the Coase theorem is that in real-life situations 
the role of transaction costs becomes significant. It is quite conceivable that the 
trade between two parties always involves some kind of transaction costs. 
Positive transaction costs would reduce the effective value of any offer or 
payment. The amount paid would he equal to the amount received minus the 
transaction costs. Consequently, if the transaction costs were larger than the 
potential gains from the trade, no trade would take place. 
It is difficult to say to what extent the Coasian approach could really replace 
methods like the CVM. Pearce and Turner (1990) have concluded that the 
Coase theorem has been important in forcing advocates of public intervention to 
define their terms and justify their case more carefully than •they might have 
done otherwise. Randall (1987) emphasizes that the Coasian analysis has con-
tributed to the understanding of extemalities and market fimctions. In essence, 
the theorem has successfully suggested that market phenomena may be more 
pervasive than has been generally recognized, and that the market behavior is 
likely to occur whenever gains from trade exist, even in settings customarily 
considered to be outside the market. Moreover, as Posner (1993) notes, the 
Coasian approach has vividly promoted the point that intelligent public inter-
vention requires more information than govemments are usually likely to have. 
In the CVM context the explicit or even implicit assignment of property 
rights matters. It may affect response behavior. When a respondent is asked, for 
instance, how much he is willing to pay for a conversion from conventional 
agriculture to pro-environmental farming, the scenario indirectly implicates that 
the farmers own environmental benefits related to the rural environment. It is 
not surprising that some respondents oppose this kind of definition, because 
property rights related to the rural environment are far from being defined in a 
nonattenuated way. The result can he a serious motive conflict. On the one 
hand, the respondent wants to have environmental benefits produced by pro-
environmental farming. On the other hand, he is not willing to pay for them 
because, according to what he considers "fair" property rights, he should he 
entitled to them anyway. Of course, it is difficult to say if this kind of respond-
ent would enter any bargaining process either. 
Property rights and other social institutions seem to matter more than is 
usually recogmized. However, it is not realistic to assume that institutional 
innovations and developments could remarkably broaden the applicability of the 
market mechanism when environmental commodities and services are con-
cemed. Problems related to transaction costs will persist. This guarantees that 
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monetary valuation methods of nonmarket beneflts like the CVM will also be 
needed to assist social-decision making in the future. 
5. Creating Hypothetical Markets - The Contingent 
Valuation Method (CVM) 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the essential features of the contin-
gent valuation method. First, some light is cast on the historical development 
and the future prospects of the contingent valuation method (CVM). This helps 
to understand why the CVM has become such a popular tool in environmentally 
oriented monetary valuation. Then, the main steps of the CVM survey design 
are described. Third, a model of response behavior is introduced. It can be used 
when major sources of bias inherent in CVM studies are analyzed. Next, re-
spondents' preference structures are investigated. The idea is to show that they 
may differ in certain occasions from the standard presumptions of the neoclassi-
cal preference theory. In addition, the role of information in contingent valua-
tion applications is examined in more detail, and the most commonly applied 
value elicitation formats and their strong and weak points are reviewed. Finally, 
a brief summary is given concerning some earlier CVM studies related to the 
valuation of services provided by the rural environment. 
Like any other method based on interviews or surveys, the CVM is not a 
monolithic exercise of a standard formula. This is reflected in the various forms 
of the survey design and sometimes complicated interpretation of survey out-
comes. The aims of the researcher may be deliberately or accidentally misun-
derstood among respondents, which has resulted in intensive investigation of 
possible sources of error or biases, as they are usually called in the CVM 
literature. It is also apparent that many biases are more or less connected to 
different survey elements and their design alternatives. This can be easily recog-
nized when the value elicitation question is considered. 
The contingent valuation method involves the use of sample surveys or 
questionnaires to elicit the respondents' willingness to pay for commodities, 
projects, or programs that are generally hypothetical of their nature. The name 
of the method refers to the fact that the values revealed by respondents are 
contingent upon the constructed or simulated market presented in the survey 
scenario (Portney 1994). The great appeal of the contingent valuation method is 
obviously in its market resemblance and conceptual simplicity. When there is 
no market for a good, a hypothetical one can be created for it. People are simply 
asked how much they are willing to pay to receive an increase (or to prevent a 
decrease) in the quality or/and quantity of a good (willingness to pay, WTP). 
Alternatively, people can also be asked how much they demand compensation 
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in case an adverse change in the quality or/and quantity of a good would occur 
or the quality and/or quantity of the good would not improve or increase (will-
ingness to accept compensation, WTA). Most applications of the CVM have 
coped with environmental and other nonmarket commodities that have charac-
teristics of public goods. In this respect, the CVM has a history that indicates its 
appropriateness for the analysis of benefits provided by pro-environmental farm-
ing and the rural environment. 
5.1. Some Milestones and Future Prospects of the CVM 
The birth of the CVM dates back about fifty years. Ciriacy-Wantrup (1947) 
published a paper on the economics of soil conservation, in which he observed 
that some conservation benefits did not fall into the category of market com-
modities. In the paper he also sketched the first CVM question, although there 
was no empirical work included. The first real empirical application of the 
CVM was carried out in 1958 at the request of the US National Park Service. 
The survey was about people's willingness to pay entrance fees in the case of 
publicly owned outdoor recreation areas. The experiment was successful, and it 
was later described in Mack and Meyers (1965). The second application of the 
CVM occurred in 1961 when Robert Davis examined in his Ph. D. dissertation 
the economic value of recreation in the Maine woods (see Davis 1963a). Al-
though it is not likely that Davis at that time was able to imagine the future 
success of his interview technique, he was clearly promoting the monetary 
assessment of recreational values by noting that "Since nearly ali forms of 
outdoor recreation are susceptible of market analysis, it is highly feasible for 
responsible agencies to initiate market studies to uncover the processes of 
demand and consumer valuation which guide user choices." (Davis 1963b, pp. 
248-249). Interestingly, both pioneering applications were produced independ-
ently and the authors were not aware of Ciriacy-Wantrup' s (1947) suggestions 
(Hanemann 1992). 
However, the interest towards the CVM did not really explode. It took some 
time and certain theoretical development was required before the CVM started 
to flourish. The first step was the introduction of new value concepts. Weisbrod 
(1964) focused on uncertainty and presented a concept of option demand that 
later became known as option value. Krutilla (1967) proposed the concept of 
existence value6. He argued that some people may obtain satisfaction from mere 
knowledge that certain environmental and natural resources continue to exist, 
although they would be appalled by the prospect of being exposed to them. It 
was obvious from the beginning, even if not indubitable, that the new value 
6 Different value categories were reviewed in Chapter 3.2. 
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concepts represented a motive for natural resource conservation that was not 
inherent in market prices. Thus, they should be included in a social benefit-cost 
analysis. Nowadays existence value is usually referred to as passive use or 
nonuse value to suggest that the utility derived does not depend on any direct or 
indirect interaction with the resource or good in question (Portney 1994). 
It appeared that the CVM was the only method capable of estimating values 
like option value and existence value7. However, the formal theory of welfare 
economics was not developed enough to provide sound theoretical evidence for 
the estimation of utility changes in the case of public goods. Mäler (1974) was 
able to extend the standard welfare theory of price changes to changes in the 
supply of a public good. After this theoretical achievement, the use of the CVM 
became more popular. It was applied in many fields of environmental benefit 
estimation, for instance, in the assessment of water and air quality, in landscape 
issues, and for recreational purposes. The emphasis was both on applications 
and methodological development (Hanemann 1994a). 
An important milestone in the history of CVM occurred in 1979, when 
Bishop and Heberlein (1979) published their paper, in which a discrete choice 
questioning format was for the first time applied in CVM surveys. The idea was 
to create a hypothetical market that corresponded to the real market as much as 
possible. The respondent was asked if he is willing to pay a certain amount 
(specified by a researcher) for a change in the provision of a public good. The 
only thing that the respondent had to do was answer "yes" or "no". This imitated 
a real market situation where a buyer decides to purchase or not to purchase, 
based on the price of a good. However, as innovative as the discrete choice 
format was, it lacked sufficient utility theoretical background. It was not clear 
whether the welfare measures derived from the discrete choice data automati-
cally carried over to the conventional continuous case (Kriström 1990a, p. 62). 
The problem was solved by Hanemann (1984), who was able to show the 
connection between discrete valuation questions and economic theory via the 
random utility model (see Chapter 6.2 for details). This facilitated greatly the 
spreading of the CVM because the method was now theoretically sound, in 
addition to its better feasibility in the form of mail and telephone surveys. The 
discrete choice format also gave the CVM more credibility because it elimi-
nated some of the criticism that was aimed to the elicitation techniques applied 
previously (open-ended and bidding game formats). Furthermore, it is likely 
that the discrete choice technique provided a more "scientific" status to the 
CVM because it required the application of statistical estimation techniques. 
7 Of course, there are also some differing views. For instance, Larson (1992) argues that 
nonuse values can also be derived from people's observable market behavior. There is also a 
school of economists that denies the entire possibility of estimating nonuse values in an 
economically sound way (see e.g. Shavell 1992). 
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The first comprehensive evaluation of the CVM took place in 1984 when an 
"Assessment Conference" was held in USA. The initiative came from the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which was interested in developing 
more enhanced methods for environmental assessment. This was basically be-
cause of two legislative actions, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980 and the Executive Order 
12291 (46 Fed. Reg. 13, 193. Feb. 17, 1981), which forced the US authorities to 
pay more attention to the assessment of environmental damages. The CERCLA 
recognized for the first time the CVM as an appropriate technique to value 
environmental damages due to release of hazardous substances and oil (Portney 
1994). The Executive Order 12291 required the US Federal Agencies to also 
consider environmental benefits and costs of federal regulations and actions 
before their implementation (Carson et al. 1993). 
The resuIts of the "Assessment Conference" were not unambiguous, but they 
clearly showed some support to the CVM. The overall conclusion was that the 
assessments made during the conference indicated that the CVM has potential 
to become a viable method for estimating values of public goods. However, the 
economists involved stated that the realization of that potential implies chal-
lenges for those who are responsible for the further theoretical and empirical 
development of the method (Cummings et al. 1986). 
The CVM has been dominated by US economists. Even though the interest 
towards the CVM has also risen in Europe (see e.g. Navrud 1992), most applica-
tions are still carried out in the US. This is a ramification of what happened in 
Prince William Sound in March 1989. An oil transport ship, called Exxon 
Valdez and owned by Exxon Company, suffered a shipwreck. A large coastal 
area, mainly in the state of wildemess, was hit by an oil spill. Many instances 
sued Exxon, and very soon it became evident that the method used for damage 
assessment would have a great influence on the total sum of compensation that 
Exxon would be forced to pay to numerous plaintiffs. The Exxon Valdez inci-
dent also influenced the enactment of the US Oli Pollution Act (OPA) in 1990. 
The OPA was important in the sense that it included the recovery of lost 
passive-use values as one of the several types of damages that should be com-
pensated for. Because of this development, industry groups facing potential 
liability suits conceming passive-use damages strongly questioned the reliabil-
ity of the CVM (Carson et al. 1993). 
One of the best-known attempts to deny the applicability of the CVM in 
damage assessment was a seminar in 1992 organized by a consulting company 
called Cambridge Economics, Inc. (see Cambridge Economics 1992). The semi-
nar can he seen as a countermove of the oil industry towards the development 
that took place in the Exxon Valdez issue. The State of Alaska had sponsored a 
CVM researcher group led by Richard Carson in order to acquire estimates for 
lost passive-use values. Consequently, the oil industry wanted to question in 
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advance the validity of any CVM results concerning the estimation of lost 
passive-use values. However, the report requested by the State of Alaska (i.e. 
Carson et al. 1992) appeared to be a very influential CVM study. The intensity 
of debate around the issue helped to move the discussion from academie circles 
to a more political platform. 
Concerns and arguments raised by critics and defenders of the CVM led the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to convene a panel 
of eminent outside experts co-chaired by Nobel prize winners Kenneth Arrow 
and Robert Solow to examine the issue. In January 1993 the Panel, after lengthy 
public hearings and after reviewing a large number of comments and papers, 
issued a report that is considered the most important single guideline for con-
ducting CVM surveys. In the Report of the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valua-
tion it was concluded that "CV [contingent valuation] studies can produce 
estimates reliable enough to be the starting point for a judicial or administra-
tive determination of natural resource damages - including lost passive-use 
value." (Arrow et al. 1993, p. 4610). The NOAA Panel made it clear that its 
favorable opinion was conditional: surveys should follow the guidelines set by 
the NOAA Panel in order to be taken into consideration for litigation purposes. 
However, the NOAA Panel did not really attempt to state the final word because 
its authors admitted that there would always be controversy when intangible 
losses have to be evaluated in monetary terms. 
The NOAA Panel report has had remarkable influence on the CVM research. 
As expected, it has increased the amount of CVM studies that are intended to be 
utilized in a legal or an administrative context. In addition, during the recent 
years, almost every published CVM paper has in one way or another tested the 
NOAA guidelines, responded to the questions, or commented on the topics 
raised by the NOAA Panel (Mäntymaa 1997). For instance, Harrison and Lesley 
(1996) criticized heavily the NOAA Panel's recommendation to use random 
sampling in the selection of respondents. According to them, this practice, 
combined with in-person interviews, makes CVM surveys so expensive that 
very few researchers can afford to carry them out. They presented some evi-
dence showing that by means of a statistical model and by using averages of 
population characteristics it was possible to predict the WTP of the whole 
population without using truly random samples. Cummings and Harrison (1995), 
in turn, attacked indirectly the NOAA Panel by questioning the existence of 
nonuse values as a significant component of the total value of environmental 
resources. 
At the moment it seems that the NOAA Panel's guidelines will survive 
despite the criticism: in Carson et al. (1996, p. 25) it is stated that "Overall, 
then, based on a series of large scale, in-person surveys, we conclude that there 
is support for the Arrow-Solow Panel's proposed protocol for CV surveys. 
While it may be possible to relax these standards, we do not have a basis as yet 
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for determining how adjustments to the recommended practices would influence 
the economic consistency of the CV estimates of monetary values." However, 
despite their general support for NOAA Panel's recommendations Carson et al. 
(1996) also make some reservations. They note that their supplementary re-
search using the Alaska Exxon Valdez survey data suggests that the NOAA 
Panel' s concems about temporal reliability, question format, and social desir-
ability biases appear unwarranted, at least to some extent. 
Another major CVM debate of this decade started from a symposium organ-
ized by the Joumal of Environmental Economics and Management in 1992 
(Mäntymaa 1997). Kahneman and Knetsch (1992a) indicated that the CVM 
suffers from the embedding effect (as a part of a more inclusive good the good 
being valued receives a lower WTP than if it is valued on its own), and that 
respondents in CVM surveys do not behave according to economic theory but 
express moral satisfaction when they have a hypothetical chance to contribute to 
the provision of public goods. In the same issue of the journal, the discussion 
was continued by a comment from Smith (1992) and a reply from Kahneman 
and Knetsch (1992b). Other contributions to the discussion have been articles 
from Harrison (1992) and Carson and Mitchell (1995). 
There have also been many other incidents that have significantly influenced 
the development of the CVM, but it is not possible to list them ali in this 
context. However, the milestones mentioned above should already be adequate 
to show how the CVM has developed from a highly empirical ad hoc preference 
revelation approach to a theoretically and methodologically enhanced monetary 
valuation method, which also starts to gain weight in the social decision-making 
process. Of course, this development has not taken place without fierce criti-
cism, which implies that the CVM still has questionable features, both in theo-
retical and methodological sense. 
It seems that in the future there will be several Iines of development of the 
CVM research. The fundamental division will be, of course, between CVM 
supporters and its opponents. The opponents will attempt to show further that 
the CVM is not able to reveal people's true economic preferences, and that is 
why it should not be used in valuation situations where nonuse values are at 
stake. The essence of this critique can be found e.g. in Diamond and Hausman 
(1994). Moreover, some CVM researchers themselves are also critical towards 
the method. According to Jakobsson and Dragun (1996), there is an evident 
tendency in the CVM literature to focus on methodological issues that offer 
more complex views on the interpretation of CVM results than the basic neo-
classical welfare theory. There is an increasing number of CVM researchers 
who are more and more interested in what is the proper domain of application of 
the CVM (see e.g. Wiestra et al. 1995). 
However, the mainstream of the CVM research will cope with development 
that is more traditional. The questioning and testing of certain NOAA Panel' s 
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recommendations will continue. The embedding effect (also known as the part-
whole bias and the issue of scope) is likely to have a prominent role in the 
research agenda (Mäntymaa 1997). Furthermore, some work will be done in 
order to develop more enhanced estimation techniques for the dichotomous 
approach. There is probably a need for conceptual accomplishments in the 
domain of welfare economic theory, especially in relation to the negative will-
ingness to pay (see e.g. Kriström 1995). Outside academic circles the applica-
tions of the CVM for administrative and litigation purposes will gain more 
acceptance and will become standard tools especially in damage assessment. 
The increasing number of practical applications indicates that the role of the 
CVM in decision-making will gradually be taken into closer inspection. 
5.2. Design of a CVM Survey 
It is obvious that there is no standard approach to the design of a contingent 
valuation survey. Nevertheless, certain elements should be found virtually in 
every well-designed CVM application (see e.g. Cropper and Oates 1992; 
Cummings et al. 1986; Mitchell and Carson 1989; Portney 1994; Randall et al. 
1983). First, the survey must contain a scenario or description of the hypotheti-
cal or real policy or program the respondents are being asked to value or vote 
upon (1). Second, the survey must contain a mechanism to elicit value from the 
respondent (2). Third, the survey has to elicit information on respondents' 
socio-economic characteristics, values, and attitudes (3). 
In some cases, scenarios can be quite detailed, providing information on 
the expected effects of the policy or the program as well as likely ramifications 
if the program is not adopted. The scenario consists of three elements: First, 
there must be a detailed description of the good(s) being valued. The researcher 
constructs a contingent market place, which is communicated to the respondent 
in a written or spoken form. Second, it is important to depict the institutional 
structure under which the good is to be provided as well as the mies under 
which the decision about the possible implementation would be made. Third, 
when the respondent is asked to reveal his WTP, it is also necessary to indicate 
how the payment would be collected. 
As indicated above, the survey must contain a mechanism for eliciting 
value or a choice from the respondent. These are questions that elicit respond-
ents' willingness to pay (or willingness to accept compensation) for good(s) 
being valued. These questions should be designed to facilitate the valuation 
process without themselves biasing the respondents' WTP amounts. They can 
take many forms, including e.g. open-ended questions ("What is the maximum 
amount of money you would be willing to pay for the program X?"), bidding 
games ("Would you pay FIM Y for the program X? If yes, would you consider 
paying FIM Y + n for the program X? If no, would you then consider paying 
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FIM Y + n — k for the program X ?"), or dichotomous formats ("The government 
is planning a program X. Your annual tax bill would go up by FIM Y if the 
program X will be implemented. Do you accept the FIM Y tax increase or not? 
Answer yes or no."). 
(3) Mere WTP responses recorded in monetary terms are not necessarily 
enough for a thorough analysis. There is also a need to elicit information on the 
socio-economic characteristics of the respondents (age, sex, income, etc.), as 
well as on their attitudes towards the good being valued. The purpose of this is 
usually to gather information for the estimation of a valuation function for the 
good that includes these characteristics as possible explanatory variables. It is 
also common to include follow-up questions that attempt to make sure that the 
respondents have understood the scenario correctly and have reacted in their 
responses in an appropriate way, i.e. have taken the presented scenario seri- 
ously. 
In addition, many other things have to be decided before a CVM survey can 
be carried out. A target population and a sampling structure must be chosen. 
There are also many alternatives how to conduct a survey in practice. The 
choice has to be made whether maj!, telephone, or face-to-face interviews, or 
some combinations of these are used. Pre-testing is also a very important ele-
ment in a successful survey design because it is difficult to simulate beforehand 
the respondents possible reactions to certain aspects of the survey construction. 
Even though it is likely that there will never be a CVM survey design of 
universal acceptability, the guidelines set by the NOAA panel in 1993 are the 
most appreciated frame of reference at the moment (Arrow et al. 1993). The task 
of the NOAA panel was related to damage assessment in the context of the US 
Oil Pollution Act in 1990. Consequently, some of the recommendations are 
aimed to improve the court room credibility of the CVM, and they are not 
intended to be methodologically sound in the economic sense. Keeping in mind 
the NOAA Panel' s concentration on damage assessment, it is conceivable that, 
according to Portney (1994), the NOAA Panel8  gave its acceptance to the use of 
CVM with some reluctance. None of the NOAA Panel members would have 
been comfortable with the use of any of the previous CVM applications as the 
basis for actual monetary damage compensation. 
The NOAA panel recommendations for a reliable design of CVM surveys 
are divicled into three groups: general guidelines, guidelines for value elicitation 
surveys, and goals for value elicitation surveys. The general guidelines cope 
with details of survey administration and they can be applied to any survey. The 
report emphasizes that in gathering information it is essential to use personal 
contact, preferably face-to-face interviews. This also helps to minimize 
8 Paul R. Portney was one of the NOAA Panel members. The others were Kenneth Arrow, 
Robert Solow, Edward Leamer, Roy Radner, and Howard Schuman. 
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nonresponses, which is one of the goals. The use of face-to-face interviews 
requires pre-testing for interviewer effects, and the report also recommends 
careful pilot work and pre-testing of the whole CVM questionnaire in order to 
make sure that it is understandable and acceptable across respondents. Further-
more, the panelists suggest that the reporting of results should make clear the 
definition of the target population sampled, the sampling frame used, the sample 
size, and the non-response rate and its components. In addition, research reports 
should include the exact wording, the sequencing of the questionnaire, and the 
description of any other communications used. 
The guidelines for value elicitation surveys are derived from the best CVM 
surveys and represent the state-of-the-art design. First, the recommendation is to 
apply a conservative design in order to avoid implausible WTP estimates. 
Willingness to pay should be used instead of willingness to accept compensa-
tion, and a preferable form of the valuation question is a referendum format (i.e. 
the valuation question should be posed as a vote in a referendum). An accurate 
description of the program or policy must be provided to the respondents. It is 
also necessary to remind the respondents of substitute commodities for the 
program being valued. There should also be a "no-answer" option included (in 
addition to the "yes" and "no" alternatives) in the main valuation (referendum) 
question, and respondents who choose the "no-answer" option should be asked 
indirectly to explain their choice. It would also be preferable to use follow-up 
questions to check the motives behind "yes" and "no" responses. Furthermore, it 
is emphasized that CVM surveys should offer a variety of other variables (e.g. 
socio-economic and attitudinal) that can help to interpret the responses to the 
primary valuation (referendum) question. 
The goals for value elicitation surveys consist of items that, according to the 
NOAA panel, "are not adequately addressed by even the best CV surveys" 
(Arrow et al. 1993, p. 4609). There may be some hubris in the statement, but 
that aside, some of the issues raised by the NOAA panel in this context are of 
great importance when the reliability of results is considered. Survey respond-
ents must be reminded that their willingness to pay for the program being valued 
will reduce the amount of money that they are able to spend on other private or 
public goods. Furthermore, special attention should be paid to the survey design 
in order to eliminate misleading response motives that are based on general 
positive feelings derived from a donation for a good cause (so called "warm-
glow" effect) or on dislike of some of the parties playing an essential role in the 
valuation framework. The NOAA panel was worried that these sentiments can 
be confusing in the sense that they make the respondents focus on issues 
irrelevant to the program being valued. They were also concerned about the 
ability of the respondents to recognize the difference between interim and 
permanent losses in resource quantity and quality. There were other interesting 
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remarks, too, but they chiefly referred to issues that are relevant lin cases where 
CVM results are utilized in a litigation process. 
5.3. Model of Response Behavior and Biases in the CVM 
In the CVM applications, the number of possible sources of error is consider-
able. This is because the CVM is a stated-preference valuation method, not a 
revealed-preference valuation method. There is usually no parallel real market 
data about people's behavior and preferences to contrast results achieved through 
the CVM with. The problem with the CVM is that, in most cases, it constructs a 
more or less hypothetical scenario, which in many respects differs from the 
every-day life decision-making, choice, or valuation situations. Furthermore, it 
is misleading to believe that the valuation scenario is restricted to cope only 
with the quality or quantity changes present in the good being valued. Randall 
(1986a) argues that, in addition to the value of the commodity offered, WTP 
estimates are based on the process by which the commodity is provided, as well 
as on the method of payment. Thus, the valuation of the good itself cannot really 
he separated from the issues associated with its implementation. Very often, the 
valuation scenario includes elements that alter existing property rights in one 
way or another. Moreover, even in cases where property rights are not altered, 
the valuation decision cannot he made independent of the prevailing institu-
tional structure. 
When possible sources of errors (or biases as they are known in the CVM 
literature) are considered, they are apparently related to the concepts of reliabil-
ity and validity. Validity refers to the degree to which the CVM results correctly 
indicate the "true" value of the asset under investigation. Reliability, in turn, 
refers to the consistency or repeatability of the CVM results. It is important to 
recognize that reliability and validity are not synonyms: a particular CVM 
instrument can, in repeated trials, yield a consistent value estimate for a particu-
lar asset. However, if these trials are ali subject to a bias, the results will not he 
valid. Reliability deals with biases related to the questionnaire and scenario 
design, implementation of a survey, and statistical analysis of data. Validity is 
connected to more methodological issues. It is concerned with the links between 
economic theory and the CVM, revelation of "true" preferences, and compari-
son of monetary estimates achieved by different valuation methods (Bateman 
and Turner 1992, p. 37). 
It can sometimes he difficult to define what a bias is. If it is depicted as a 
systematic error that causes an inflated or deflated mean WTP, then there 
should be a benchmark to compare with before a systematic error can he 
claimed to he involved. In this sense it is conceivable that it is not possible to 
create a comprehensive classification of CVM biases. However, some further 
investigation of biases is required in order to understand the critique that is 
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directed towards the CVM. In their extensive typology of CVM biases Mitchell 
and Carson (1989, pp. 236-237) identify 22 different biases, divided into three 
broad categories: (1) response misrepresentation, (2) induced value derivation, 
and (3) scenario misspecification. 
Response misrepresentation. Biases in this class occur when a respondent 
misrepresents his true WTP. The reason for misrepresentation can be inten-
tional. The respondent tries to benefit from it (e.g. strategic bias) or it can be 
less intentional, the respondent may just attempt to please the interviewer or the 
sponsor of the interview (e.g. interviewer bias). 
Induced value derivation. Biases of this category occur when respondents 
believe that elements of the contingent market provide information about the 
"correct" value of the good. For instance, some elicitation methods offer infor-
mation that helps the respondent to define his WTP amount (e.g. starting point 
bias). The act of being interviewed or some features of the situation may 
function as a source of indicators that lead the respondent's answers to a certain 
direction. 
Scenario misspecification. Biases in this class occur when a respondent 
does not respond to the correct contingent scenario. Either the researcher speci-
fies the scenario incorrectly in terms of the economic theory or major policy 
elements or the respondent perceives the good being valued in a way that differs 
from the intentions of the researcher (e.g. part-whole bias). 
Another slightly different typology was created by Smith and Desvousges 
(1986) and further developed by Kriström (1990a) and by Bateman and Turner 
(1992). They also partition biases into three major categories: (1) general, (2) 
procedural, and (3) instrument-related biases. 
General biases include sources of errors that cover a very broad array of 
theoretical and methodological issues. They are derived from the concems 
related to motives of economic behavior (strategic bias), ramifications of the 
artificial market structure (hypothetical bias), rationality of respondents' deci-
sion-making (part-whole bias), and sensitivity to changes in the survey informa-
tion content (information bias). 
Procedural biases are concemed with aggregation problems of monetary 
value estimates (aggregation bias), inaccuracies in sampling (sampling bias), 
and errors due to the interviewer or the interview situation influencing the 
answers of the respondent (interviewer bias). 
Instrument-related biases are concemed with the effect of the form of 
payment used in the scenario (payment vehicle bias) and the effect of applied 
valuation question format (starting point and anchoring biases). 
The two bias typologies follow a slightly different logic, although it is not 
quite clear what the reasoning behind the classification actually is. Therefore, in 
this study, an altemative way to approach the bias problem is outlined. Biases 
are divided into intemal and extemal biases. Intemal biases are related to 
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respondents' behavior in the valuation situation and effects of the valuation 
instrument design. External biases are biases that are created, for instance, by 
sampling errors, defective estimation techniques, or flawed aggregation proce-
dures. The idea behind this classification is that internal biases are something 
unavoidable. The behavior of respondents and the design of the valuation instru-
ment are so organically linked together that an attempt to reduce a certain bias 
element only creates other intemal biases. In other words, intemal biases are 
interacting. External biases, in tum, are independent of each other or internal 
biases. Their elimination is possible without any changes in the value instru-
ment itself. For instance, sampling bias can be removed by taking a new, better 
sample and reproducing the survey. 
Now a response behavior theory can be sketched (see Figure 5.1). There are 
five main categories of response behavior: strategic behavior, misinterpreting 
behavior, indifferent behavior, protest behavior, and expected behavior. They 
are based on goal-oriented, nonchalant and/or well-intentioned response mo-
tives. A goal-oriented response motive means that a respondent is willing to 
prornote his own interests instead of acting according to the wishes of the 
researcher. A nonchalant response motive indicates that a respondent is not 
interested in engaging in the questioning situation at ali. A well-intentioned 
response motive implies that a respondent is willing to act according to the 
wishes of the researcher, but there is no guarantee that the respondent perceives 
the researcher's goals correctly. 
From the researcher's point of view the most desired type of behavior is 
expected behavior because it is just what the researcher wants. A respondent 
behaving expectedly perceives the valuation instrument correctly and is ready to 
express his actual willingness to pay and other relevant preferences without any 
hidden agenda. Misinterpreting behavior differs from expected behavior in cer-
tain respects. A respondent behaving misinterpretingly exhibits well-intentioned 
response motives, but he fails at least partly to understand essential characteris-
tics of the valuation instrument. Therefore, the expressed individual WTP can 
be misleading. The reasons for misinterpreting behavior can vary. The pre-
sented valuation scenario may contain elements which the respondent cannot 
fully understand. In this case, it could be that improved survey design would 
remove the problem. However, it is also possible to claim that the cognitive 
capacity of the respondent is so restricted that it is not possible to construct a 
meaningful hypothetical valuation situation at ali. Nevertheless, if the respond-
ent fails to reveal his true preferences, it is not because of intentional misrepre-
sentation but shortcomings of the survey design or his intellectual capacity. 
Strategic behavior means that the respondent has a clear idea of how he 
should behave in a survey situation in order to benefit from the survey outcome 
as much as possible. His response motive is thus truly goal-oriented. The re-
spondent thinks further than the researcher, and he does not want to reveal his 
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Figure 5.1. Framework to Analyze Response Behavior from the Internal Bias 
Perspective. 
true preferences because that would not help him to achieve his goals related to 
the provision of the good being valued. In other words, the respondent intention-
ally misrepresents his preferences in order to mislead the researcher. Indifferent 
behavior is also problematic from the researcher's point of view, even though 
for opposite reasons than strategic behavior. If the respondent is behaving 
indifferently, his WTP response is random, meaning that it lacks both validity 
and reliability. In the case of strategic behavior the respondents' answers are 
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likely to be highly reliable in terms of repeatability, although not valid in the 
methodological sense. Indifferent behavior, in turn, can be seen to exhibit 
elements that from the researcher's viewpoint seem to be irrational. 
Protest behavior is probably the most complex phenomenon of the different 
response behavior alternatives. This is because the respondent may simultane-
ously express both goal-oriented and well-intentioned response motives. In the 
extreme, protest behavior means that the respondent refuses to participate in the 
valuation situation in any manner. In this case the respondent's behavior is 
based on goal-oriented response motives although it is not strategic. The re-
spondent does not attempt to mislead the researcher by misrepresenting his 
preferences, but he merely signals that his preferences are not compatible with 
the valuation scenario introduced by the researcher. This is usually due to two 
reasons. First, the respondent is not satisfied with the property rights that are 
related to the good being valued, the provision structure, or the payment vehicle 
in the valuation scenario. Second, the respondent may oppose the whole idea of 
making a trade-off between money and an environmental public good (Rekola 
1997). If the proposed valuation scenario includes a major change of property 
rights, it is possible that these changes create conflicting motives of valuation. 
The respondent may favor the actual good and its quality/quantity change being 
valued but cannot really approve the changes of property rights related to the 
provision of the good or the collection of the WTP payment. Property rights 
pose a dilemma even in a case where the valuation scenario does not introduce 
major changes to the prevailing property rights. It is possible that the respondent 
does not approve of the existing state of property rights for some reason. Thus, 
he may be inclined to think that participating in the survey would be an implicit 
sign of acceptance of the prevailing property rights. 
However, it is not likely that the majority of respondents have such well-
formulated views about the valuation situation. Most respondents no doubt have 
well-intentioned response motives when tbey participate in the interview. This 
does not prevent them from recognizing that the valuation scenario includes 
elements that they cannot approve. The result is a conflict of motives. On the 
one hand, the respondent wants to please the researcher and, on the other hand, 
he somehow wants to express differing opinions related to the issue. In this kind 
of situation, protesting can take various forms. The respondent can state zero 
WTP independent of his true valuations in order to show that he fundamentally 
disagrees with the presented scenario or some of its elements. If the structure of 
the survey instrument allows, the respondent may consciously give conflicting 
and inconsistent answers to interrelated questions. Nevertheless, it is likely that 
the protest is mainly directed towards questions that most seriously violate the 
respondent's beliefs. For instance, if the respondent feels that the proposed 
trade-off between money and the environmental public good is inappropriate 
because of ethical reasons, he may state zero WTP but still make clear that he in 
87 
general favors policy actions that promote the line of policy development de-
picted in the valuation scenario. 
In most cases, the connection between the design of the valuation instrument 
and response behavior is obvious. For instance, redesigning those elements of 
the valuation instrument that are potential sources of misunderstanding can 
mitigate the impact of misinterpreting behavior. However, we should recognize 
that there exists no optimal design for a CVM survey. Some of the extemal 
biases can be eliminated by careful design, but most intemal biases are a 
product of the joint impact of design and response behavior. They cannot be 
removed, but their influence can be assessed if they are appropriately recog-
nized. This becomes apparent when the CVM bias literature is reviewed. 
Different types of response behavior outlined above are more or less familiar 
to CVM practitioners. In the CVM literature, for instance, the possibility of 
goal-oriented response motives is well recognized, and it is usually referred to 
as strategic bias (see e.g. Cummings et al. 1986, pp. 21-28). It is quite apparent 
that strategic bias has its roots in the free-rider problem. Because of nonrivalness 
and nonexcludability in the consumption of public goods, it is not necessarily 
possible to make potential users of a public good pay their fair share of the 
production or maintenance costs of the public good. Thus, a respondent may 
figure out that by stating an artificially low value he may be able to reduce his 
payment obligation considerably. Of course, this means that other respondents 
do not try to behave in the same way because then there would be a risk of a 
non-provision outcome. It is also possible to choose another strategy: if the 
respondent is sure that the authorities will not be able to collect the individually 
stated payment, it is strategically worthwhile to overstate the individual WTP in 
order to increase the possibility of the public good provision. 
Strategic bias can be interpreted through the framework presented in Figure 
5.1. First, we have to assume that the ethical values and moral norms of the 
respondent allow him to act in a misleading way. Second, the respondent must 
have either considerable cognitive capacity or previous experience and knowl-
edge about similar valuation situations because he can recognize a good oppor-
tunity to free-ride. In other words, the information content of the valuation 
scenario is likely to be at least somewhat familiar to the respondent. Ali this 
means that he is able to identify those elements in the valuation scenario which 
make it possible for him to state misleading preferences without a risk of being 
made responsible for them. When an environmental public good is in question, 
the respondent has a clear picture about existing property rights and he knows 
that in this case property rights cannot be defined in a nonattenuated manner. 
Therefore, his actions do not depend only on the phrasing and design of the 
valuation scenario but also on his knowledge about the general institutional 
valuation framework. Third, the respondent needs to have a positive attitude 
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towards to the valuation process because he is willing to participate in the 
process, even if his intentions are not what the researcher expects them to be. 
The general opinion among CVM researchers seems to be that strategic bias 
should not be a significant problem in carefully designed CVM instruments and, 
as a consequence, there is not much empirical evidence for free-riding based 
behavior. One reason for this is that most CVM instruments do not offer obvi-
ous opportunities or incentives for the outcome manipulation (Freeman 1986). It 
is also likely that a deliberate choice to act with guile in the valuation process is 
intellectually a very demanding task, which probably requires that the respond-
ent is quite well aware of ali aspects of the valuation process. This is not usually 
the case in most CVM studies. Bateman and Turner (1992, p. 42) suggest that 
environmental public goods are themselves a major explanatory factor regard-
ing the apparent lack of free-riding problem. Nonuse and altruistic values at-
tached to environmental public goods act as a counter-incentive to free-riding 
tendencies. However, the existence of altruistic motives can easily produce the 
same outcome as purely selfish motives. If the respondent is convinced that a 
certain environmental resource should be preserved, for instance, for the next 
generations, his stated WTP is probably even higher than it would be in the case 
where he would only attempt to secure the provision of the environmental 
resource for his own use. Apparently, it is possible that altruistic motives also 
lead to misrepresentation of preferences. Goal-oriented behavioral motives are 
not an exclusive right of a rational and selfish economic man. 
In both cases described above the strategic behavior of respondents can 
produce individual WTPs exceeding remarkably the realistic budget constraint9. 
In most CVM applications it is routinely checked whether the stated WTP is in a 
reasonable magnitude range compared to the budget constraint of the respond-
ent. Implausibly high WTPs are usually rejected as indicators of strategic behavior 
(see e.g. Mäntymaa 1993, p. 52). However, although this practice may be 
appropriate when the respondent' s behavior is guided by self-interest, it may not 
be appropriate when the respondent is driven by altruistic motives. It is essential 
to recognize that monetary resources are not the only ones that count in the 
policy-making process. Although the altruism-motivated inflated individual WTP 
cannot be immediately realized in monetary terms, the altruistic respondent is 
probably more willing to use his other resources to promote the preservation of 
environmental resources. The selfish respondent is not inclined to act after he 
has noticed that his inflated strategic bid did not work as expected. In other 
words, the altruistic respondent's stated WTP is a stronger indicator of his 
9 	Of course, in theory, altruistic motives can also lead to the understatement of willingness to 
pay. A respondent may consider the proposed valuation scenario beneficial to him, but 
harmful to the society as whole. In this case a truly altruistic respondent would understate his 
willingness to pay in order to secure the best of the society. 
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behavioral intentions and future actions than the stated WTP of the selfish 
respondent. 
This imaginary example shows again the central role behavioral motives 
play in CVM survey responses. It also illuminates the connection between 
design and response behavior. It is possible to eliminate the incentive for strate-
gic behavior by introducing a WTP elicitation question that does not give the 
respondent an obvious possibility to overstate his WTP. A dichotomous choice 
question format would do that. However, we can ask whether the use of the 
dichotomous choice format would introduce a bias of another kind. When a 
respondent with altruistic goal-oriented motives can state his WTP in an open 
manner, his response conveys information about his preferences and, especially, 
about the intensity of his preferences. By eliminating certain kind of informa-
tion through alternative design of a valuation question, the researcher may 
destroy essential knowledge. It depends heavily on the policy-making context 
what pieces of information are the most valuable. 
It was possible to explain strategic bias as a result of goal-oriented response 
motives. A similar connection can also be made between hypothetical bias and 
well-intentioned response motives. Hypothetical bias is usually defined as the 
difference between the stated payments in response to a hypothetical opportu-
nity to pay and actual payments when individuals are presented with the oppor-
tunity in reality (Jakobsson and Dragun 1996, p. 84). The main problem is that 
hypothetical bias is very difficult to test because of the lack of benchmark 
material. In the CVM literature, a keen discussion has evolved about the issue, 
but no conclusive view has been presented so far. In some recent experimental 
studies, considerable differences between actual and hypothetical payments 
have been found. For instance, in Cummings et al. (1995) the researchers state 
that in their experimental setting values elicited by the real dichotomous choice 
question were significantly different from the values elicited by the hypothetical 
dichotomous choice question. Similar results are referred to in Neill et al. 
(1994) where it is shown (based on controlled experiments in laboratory condi-
tions) that hypothetical WTP is consistently and significantly higher than WTP 
that reflects real economic commitment, and the difference between hypotheti-
cal and actual WTP is not attributable to different provision rules of the hypo-
thetical and real valuation institutions. However, there are also opposite opin-
ions. Mitchell and Carson (1989) reject the entire notion of hypothetical bias, 
referring instead to situations of low model reliability. Freeman (1986) declares 
that the hypothetical nature of the CVM instrument is more likely to lead to 
random measurement error than to actual bias. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that there can be a difference between stated prefer-
ences and actual behavior. Cummings et al. (1986, pp. 67-68) emphasize the 
fact that when the whole valuation scenario is hypothetical, it takes time to 
search preferences for the scenario which is likely to be unfamiliar to the 
90 
respondent. Thus, there is also a need for information as well as additional time 
to process that information involved. In these circumstances, it is not surprising 
that there is a risk that individual perceptions related to the CVM scenario 
would not be consonant with the intentions of the researcher. Different indi-
viduals will perceive, and therefore value, different commodities (consider the 
observation and perception process depicted in Chapter 2.2). In addition, WTP 
measures will be influenced by the context within which the scenario is de-
scribed and framed. Therefore, the cylvrwill elicit responses reflecting atti-
tudes rather than intended behavior, and attitudes do not perform too well as 
indicators of intended behavior. Consequently, careful design of a CVM study 
can considerably reduce the gap between what the researcher means and what 
the respondent perceives. However, it is not wise to reject prematurely the 
proposition that choices involving actual payments are substantively and signifi-
cantly different from choices involving hypothetical payments. This is in an 
illuminating manner explained by Ajzen and Fishbein (1977). 
The Ajzen-Fishbein model postulates that individuals have both positive and 
normative beliefs in relation to behavior. These beliefs in turn create attitudes 
and subjective norms conceming behavior, which combine as an intention to 
perform specific behavior. This intention will then influence the specific behavior 
actually exhibited. The actual behavior will lead into the modification of posi-
tive and normative beliefs. Therefore, each stage of the process influences the 
next. However, this influence is not perfect, for example, intentions may not 
perfectly predetermine actions. Similarly, feedback loops provide a dynamic 
adjustment system so that, for example, a recent visit to the countryside may 
well affect the respondent's WTP to preserve the rural environment (Bateman 
and Turner 1992, p. 44). It is apparent that information has a pivotal role in this 
process, which is actually a learning process. The respondent is not likely to 
encounter the valuation situation with fixed preferences. The information con-
veyed by the valuation scenario and the whole valuation process can have a 
significant impact on the normative and positive beliefs of the respondent. As a 
consequence, the respondent's attitudes conceming the appropriate actions and 
behavior may be reassessed and intentions become modified. However, any 
additional piece of information or even additional considering time may make 
the cycle continue. Thus, even in the case where intentions would perfectly 
predetermine actions, beliefs, attitudes, and intentions can alter so rapidly that 
an outside observer (like the researcher) is forced to conclude that the stated 
WTP is not the same as the real WTP. Nevertheless, this kind of observation 
obstacle occurs in every valuation situation and does not necessarily pose a 
special problem for the CVM technique. 
A mental process like this indicates that respondents' preferences are at least 
partly created during the valuation situation. Schkade and Payne (1992), for 
example, are in favor of the view that people have well-defined values only for 
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very familiar topics. Under this presumption, respondents in a CVM survey 
must derive specific valuations for less familiar topics through some inferential 
process. This view leads to the conclusion that, in many cases, people must 
construct their responses at the time they are asked an elicitation question, 
rather than retrieve a previously formed value or preference. Thus, this idea of 
constructive preferences goes beyond a mere denial that observed preferences 
result from retrieving the appropriate value from a mental master list in memory. 
This is to say that people are not as rational in their choices as they are assumed 
to be. Their ability to process information is limited, and so is their cognitive 
capacity. This can be perceived to be the fundamental argument for the exist-
ence of constructed preferences and beliefs (Simon 1955). 
Hanemann (1994b) defends the CVM by asking what "true economic prefer-
ences" are. He asserts that if an individual responds with thought to a question 
about voting to raise taxes for a public good, how can somebody judge that the 
individual's stated preference is not to a valid one. In the light of evidence from 
neuroscience and psychology, it is obvious that ali cognition is a constructive 
process. People construct their memories, attitudes, and beliefs, and there is 
considerable variation among people in this respect. In addition to the person, 
the construction process depends on the item and the context. A general percep-
tion in survey research and in other sciences dealing with cognitive issues is that 
people are cognitively somewhat incompetent: they tend to resolve problems of 
reasoning and choice in the simplest way possible. Hanemann (ibid.) concludes 
that the real issue is not whether preferences are a construct of limited human 
cognitive capacity but whether they are a stable construct. ,According to him, 
even though this surely varies with circumstances, the evidence for contingent 
valuation is quite strong (see e.g. Carson et al. 1994). 
The interesting point is that both opponents and supporters of the CVM seem 
to share the notion of constructed preferences, but they do not agree on their 
implications. The opponents consider the existence of constructed preferences 
as a fatal flaw that makes a sound economic analysis impossible because the 
basic postulate of rational economic behavior is seriously violated. On the other 
hand, the supporters insist that it is not relevant when and how the preferences 
are formed, if they are stable, consistent, and detectable. Both views are prob-
ably correct in some respect. Despite the nature of the construction process of 
preferences, they no doubt convey useful information. Another question is, how 
this information should be interpreted. The mean willingness to pay may be too 
restrictive a standard to be used as the only measure to express the variety of 
motivations that are inherent in a valuation survey. However, it is quite clear 
that hypothetical bias is strongly related to cognitive issues and it is present in 
every survey. 
Again, if hypothetical bias is examined through the framework depicted in 
Figure 5.1, we can see that well-intended response motives and misinterpreting 
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behavior can be used to explain hypothetical bias. The starting point is that 
response behavior leading to hypothetical bias is not intentional. The respond-
ent attempts to act according to what he thinks is the researcher's intention. He 
considers the valuation scenario and responses to the valuation question within 
his capacity. There is no guarantee that the researcher's intentions will be 
interpreted correctly among respondents. The problem is that there is no reliable 
way to trace the respondents' cognitive process. However, the respondent must 
have both, a favorable attitude towards the valuation scenario and ability to 
process the information offered. Because the valuation scenario cannot be too 
detailed, the respondent is required to have previous knowledge about relevant 
social institutions that frame the valuation process. It is not surprising that many 
critics of the CVM find these demands too overwhelming for ordinary people 
(see e.g. Shavell 1992). Of course, cross-checks on understanding and accept-
ance can and should be made as recommended by Arrow et al. (1993). However, 
there is a risk involved that the survey instrument becomes too complex, being 
far beyond the ability or interest of many participants. 
In most cases, however, we can probably trust that in carefully planned and 
designed CVM surveys well-intentioned response motives produce WTP an-
swers that at some accuracy reflect meaningful preferences. Still, there is, in 
addition to hypothetical bias, another distorting impact that can result from 
well-intentioned response motives. It is called "warm-glow of giving"1° or the 
purchase of moral satisfaction. Kahneman and Knetsch (1992a) argue (based on 
a CVM study that they have conducted) that responses to the CVM question 
express a willingness to acquire a sense of moral satisfaction by a voluntary 
contribution to the provision of a public good. In attaining this satisfaction, the 
public good is a means to an end; the consumption is the sense of moral 
satisfaction associated with the contribution. Thus, the respondent does not 
really consider the valuation scenario that is presented to him; he is more 
interested in being in a situation where he can show his positive attitude towards 
a good cause. In this sense, the WTP stated by the respondent is not dependent 
on the valuation scenario as such, even though the good being valued has an 
impact on the magnitude of the moral satisfaction felt. However, the existence 
of purchase of moral satisfaction is a controversial issue. For instance, Smith 
(1992) has strongly attacked the conclusions drawn by Kahneman and Knetsch 
(1992a). He considers the design of their CVM study fiawed and inadequate in 
many respects. Harrison (1992) finds the "moral satisfaction" hypothesis mean-
ingless. According to him, it is totally unimportant whether one calls utility 
"moral satisfaction", "economic benefits", "jolly", or something else. 
Harrison (1992) may be right in a very narrow methodological sense when 
he judges the "moral satisfaction" hypothesis meaningless. People's behavior is 
1° Andreoni (1990) has introduced the concept of "warm-glow of giving". 
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based on a large variety of motives (i.e. they have many variables in their utility 
functions), and in this respect labeling them with different names is only a 
source of greater methodological confusion. However, from the point of view of 
policy-making, the issue is more complicated. Again, we can hypothesize that 
different motives lead to different actual behavior despite relatively similar 
WTPs. Respondents expressing preferences derived from the feeling of moral 
satisfaction may be very passive citizens when the valuation issue is taken into 
the political agenda. If the interest towards the issue is not as keen as the 
valuation exercise has suggested, it may happen that no further actions will be 
carried out after the preparatory stage. Common resources will be wasted. 
It is easy to see that some forms of interviewer bias also fall into the category 
of well-intentioned response motives and misinterpreting behavior. In such a 
case the respondent tries to please the interviewer by giving answers that he 
assumes the interviewer to expect. The response situation itself and the interac-
tion between the respondent and the interviewer become more important than 
the information included in the valuation scenario. It is also possible that the 
respondent will feel pressure to give a "correct" answer because he believes that 
he is obliged to act according to the wishes of the interviewer. Of course, it can 
happen, too, that the interviewer irritates the respondent. Consequently, the 
respondent hides his preferences, stating zero WTP instead of the "tru.e" WTP. 
This can be regarded as a form of protest behavior. It is essential to notice that 
the response situation can function as a source of bias-creating behavior, like 
the valuation scenario. Nevertheless, the use of professionally trained interview-
ers is usually considered to guarantee that the response situation related biases 
stay in control. 
The respondent can also be misled by the elicitation procedure. He may think 
that the valuation question asked by the interviewer (or found in the question-
naire in mail surveys) includes essential information on the "right" value of the 
good being offered. This is a problem especially when the bidding game or the 
payment card elicitation formats are applied (starting point bias). The same is 
true, but to a lesser extent, when the dichotomous choice question is used 
(anchoring bias). In both cases, the respondent is inclined to say "yes" as a 
result of misinterpretation of information conveyed by the valuation question. 
However, the behavior of the respondent is based on well-intentioned motives 
because he acts without any ulterior motives to satisfy the interviewer. 
The ramifications of well-intentioned response motives cannot be completely 
eliminated in CVM surveys. According to Jakobsson and Dragun (1996, p. 84), 
the elimination of hypothetical bias can be attempted by making both the good 
being valued, the provision structure, and the payment vehicle as credible and 
realistic as possible. This helps to reduce the gap between expressed preferences 
(WTP) and actual behavior (real payment). It is also important to present the 
valuation scenario in a way that makes it clear to the respondent that the interest 
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lies in his intentions, not in his attitudes only. Ali this naturally helps the 
respondent in his demanding cognitive task to become aware of what the re-
searcher is after. Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that even though a 
careful survey and scenario design can improve the communication between the 
respondent and the researcher, it does not remove the fact that people possess 
different abilities regarding perceiving and processing information. It is not 
likely that a heterogeneous sample of respondents can be made to act cognitively 
homogeneously. 
There is always a fundamental problem to be encountered when an attempt is 
made to reduce hypothetical bias by a more realistic scenario specification. The 
CVM has been developed to cope with valuation situations where there is 
neither market solution nor information about revealed preferences available. 
The hypothetical nature of the CVM is the price that has to be paid for its ability 
to also produce estimates for nonuse values involved. The complete exclusion 
of the hypothetical element in the CVM scenario would lead to value estimates 
that would be more or less limited to use values. There is also a possibility that 
the attempt to reduce misinterpreting behavior by making the contingent valua-
tion scenario as realistic as possible may induce strategic behavior. Becoming 
better informed may direct the respondents' thoughts to strategic choices in 
preference expression. As mentioned earlier, this is the main characteristic of 
internal biases. Behavioral and design biases cannot be eliminated jointly and 
simultaneously. There is in most cases a bias trade-off involved. Well-intentioned 
response motives can transform into goal-oriented response motives if circum-
stances are favorable. 
The comprehension of the various forms of response behavior is also highly 
useful when we attempt to understand the discussion that has taken place 
concerning the embedding effect (or part-whole bias, problem of scope, sym- 
bolic bias, mental account bias, disaggregation effect). This effect or bias re-
sults, in general terms, when respondents value some larger entity than the 
entity actually in question. However, there a number of different issues related 
to the embedding effect, which has resulted in some confusion over the nature 
of the problem. Kahneman and Knetsch (1992a, p. 58) introduced the concept of 
the embedding effect. According to them, embedding takes place when "the 
same good is assigned a lower value if WTP for it is inferred from WTP for a 
more inclusive good rather than if a particular good is evaluated on its own". 
Later, Kahneman and Knetsch (1992b) developed their definition further. Em-
bedding is perfect if the same WTP is observed for nested commodities. Regular 
embedding occurs if the WTP for a particular commodity varies depending on 
whether the commodity is assessed on its own or as a part of a more inclusive 
commodity. 
Hanemann (1994b) is rather critical towards the concept of embedding ap-
plied by Kahneman and Knetsch (1992a; 1992b). He argues that there are three 
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distinct notions combined when it is claimed that by using the CVM the same 
WTP is received despite the number of environmental assets being valued. First 
assertion, which arises if the object of valuation is thought to be the number of 
assets, is that WTP varies inadequately along with changes in the scale or scope 
of the asset being valued. This can be called a scope effect. Secondly, if each 
asset is regarded as a separate argument in the utility function, then the implica-
tion is that a given asset has a quite different value depending on its placement 
in the argument order. This can be called a sequencing effect. Thirdly, with 
either preference structure, the WTP for a composite change in a group of 
public goods may be less than the sum of the WTP for the individual changes 
separately. It can be called a sub-additivity effect. Both the sub-additivity effect 
and the sequencing effect are certainly present in contingent valuation responses. 
They can be explained in terms of substitution effects and diminishing marginal 
rates of substitution, i.e. by concepts derived from the standard economic theory. 
The main source of concern is the scope effect. Theoretically, there is some 
evidence that people may be inclined to be insensitive to the scale of the good 
being valued. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) suggest that people tend to think 
in terms of "mental accounts" when making budgetary decisions. This means 
that people see groups of goods, rather than specific goods, as the basis for their 
utility maximization. This is related to the idea depicted by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980). They suggest that consumers have a two-stage budgeting 
scheme where total income is first allocated to various broad categories of 
expenditure and then subdivided within categories among specific items. An-
other explanation can be found in research evidence indicating that respondents 
tend to ignore information not mentioned in the questionnaire that has to be 
logically inferred or created by mental transformation. Therefore, respondents 
use only information directly available to them when making judgments about 
uncertain events. Thus, individuals, when making decisions under conditions of 
uncertainty, seem to use inferential rules, called "heuristics", to reduce difficult 
mental tasks to simpler ones (Hoevenagel 1991). This simplification process 
may cause people to become insensitive to the scope of the commodity being 
valued. Kahneman and Knetsch (1992a) argue that moral satisfaction due to a 
contribution for a good cause can create embedding (see the "warm glow" 
discussion earlier in this Chapter). 
Convincing empirical evidence about the existence of embedding in the form 
of the scope effect is missing. Carson (1994) reviewed 27 studies that had 
included an external test (split-sample) of the scope effect, and he found that 
only two studies exhibited statistically significant documentation about the 
presence of embedding. These were the studies conducted by Kahneman and 
Knetsch (1992a) and Desvousges et al. (1992). However, for instance, Smith 
(1992), Harrison (1992), and Hanemann (1994b) have criticized both of them 
heavily. Moreover, Boyle et al. (1994) have concluded, based on their empirical 
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findings, that part-whole bias is a possible explanation for contingent valuation 
estimates that are insensitive to marginal changes in environmental commodi-
ties. They emphasize that it is an extremely difficult task to value marginal 
changes of natural resources when such changes represent small proportions of 
the total environmental asset in question. Part of this difficulty is due to the 
respondents' inability to process small changes and their general lack of famili-
arity with the commodity being valued. 
Bateman and Turner (1992) assert that although the part-whole issue is a 
potential problem which can be exacerbated by poor CVM instruments, with the 
appropriate design of CVM surveys it can be reduced to acceptable levels. 
Jakobsson and Dragun (1996) share this view and state that, if a survey is 
properly designed and appropriately implemented, the scope effect does not 
seem be an inherent problem of the CVM. Two design issues should especially 
be taken into account. First, both the relevant larger entity and the commodity 
being valued should be described, with a clear warning not to confuse the 
commodity with the larger entity. Second, respondents should be asked to value 
the larger entity and then to allocate a portion of its value to the particular 
commodity of interest (Willis and Garrod 1993). Recently, CVM researchers 
have also developed tests, like the test of component sensitivity, to detect the 
possible existence of embedding (Carson and Mitchell 1995). 
/ The embedding question is still open. Although there is a number of poten-tial solutions or explanations, they are only partly complementary and occasion-
ally competing. Randall and Hoehn (1996), in turn, argue that embedding ef-
fects are standard economic phenomena induced by substitution relationships 
and constrained endowments, and they are also present in market demand sys-
tems. These effects can be of substantial magnitude and are usually more 
pronounced in the case of quantity-rationed goods, which implies that embed-
ding effects may be greater for public goods than for market goods. However, it 
is essential to note that Randall and Hoehn (ibid.) do not prove the existence of 
perfect embedding in the sense meant by Kahneman and Knetsch (1992a), even 
though the presence of small discretionary budgets relative to total wealth, 
combined with scarcity impacts and sequential effects, can create a situation 
where the value measures seem to be insensitive to the scope of the commodity 
being valued. In principle, the results achieved and the argumentation presented 
by Randall and Hoehn (1996) merely show that regular embedding is and 
should be a common and detectable economic phenomenon in both market and 
nonmarket environments. This is not to say that the CVM does not play any 
role: there may be a tendency that the CVM amplifies embedding effects, 
especially in cases of poor survey design. 
The embedding effect clearly falls into the category of misinterpreting behavior 
and well-intentioned response motives. Respondents are willing to express their 
true preferences, but they are unable to do it because of communication prob- 
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lems, bounded rationality, and limited ability of information processing. The 
origin of embedding is very much the same as that of hypothetical bias, indicat-
ing that embedding can he reduced through appropriate survey design. How-
ever, there may he a simultaneous inherent risk of promoting goal-oriented 
response motives. Respondents who fully comprehend the valuation scenario 
are also likely to perceive their possibilities to influence the survey outcome. 
Like in the case of hypothetical bias, the elimination of one source of error can 
create another. In certain contexts, the embedding effect may also he related to 
protest behavior. The respondent may have strong ethically motivated feelings 
towards the ohjeet of valuation. That is why he can react to the object's sym-
bolic meaning instead of the specified provision level (symbolie bias, see e.g. 
Mitchell and Carson 1989). By refusing to express values different from the 
value of the entity of the goods, the respondent manifests his disagreement with 
the valuation scenario as a whole. 
5.4. Protest Behavior in Relation to Weakly Comparable and 
Noncompensatory Preferences 
Protest behavior can be seen as a phenomenon that borrows features from both 
misinterpreting and strategic behavior. In misinterpreting response behavior the 
source of bias is that the respondent does not perceive correctly the valuation 
situation presented by the researcher. This is also true to some extent when 
protest behavior is concerned. The difference is, however, that a protesting 
respondent may perceive the presented scenario correctly but he is not willing to 
buy it. In this respect, a protesting respondent conducts himself like a strategi-
cally behaving respondent. Nevertheless, the difference is that when acting 
strategically the respondent attempts to make the researcher believe that he is 
expressing his true preferences. In the case of protest behavior, the respondent 
does not have that kind of incentive. The respondent has a value-based reason to 
protest. As explained previously, he may oppose the property rights structure 
inherent in the valuation scenario or the idea of trade-off between money and 
environmental quality. 
Protest behavior can appear in many ways in practical CVM surveying 
situations. Especially in mail surveys questionnaires are not returned as a result 
of protest behavior. Nonresponse bias is usually considered to exist if the 
respondents and nonrespondents differ in observable characteristics that influ-
ence WTP (Whitehead et al. 1993). In this case, the treatment of the 
nonrespondents can he straightforward if we assume that their WTP follows the 
same pattern as that of the respondents. The trick is to employ bias functions 
(Blackburn et al. 1994). If the respondents' age, income, gender, or any other 
observable socio-economic variables correlate with their WTP, the estimates 
can he calibrated to apply to the whole target population. Another possible bias 
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related to nonresponse is sample selection bias. It can take place if individuals 
who have strong positive or negative attitudes towards the commodity being 
valued are more likely to respond (or alternatively not to respond) than those 
who have different or opposite attitudes. This bias should not be confused with 
extemal biases like sampling bias, which is technical of its nature and has 
nothing to do with possible biases due to response behavior. The dilemma is that 
it is difficult to analyze nonrespondents beyond the match of socio-economic 
variables between those who retum the questionnaire and the target population 
as a whole. Even if the pattems of socio-economic characteristics may be 
similar among the respondents and across the target population, this does not 
necessarily indicate that there is no bias inherent. There is no reason to believe 
that nonresponses should be correlated with socio-economic characteristics. 
They can also correlate with attitudes that are independent of most common 
background variables. 
According to Jakobsson and Dragun (1996, p. 91), several researchers have 
recently tested for nonresponse and sample selection biases. However, the re-
sults of this research have been mixed so far. Whitehead et al. (1993) found in 
their combined telephone-mail survey no significant sample selection bias but 
there was some evidence of nonresponse bias. Dalecki et al. (1993) also de-
tected a nonresponse effect. Fredman (1995) and Mattson and Li (1994) tested 
for nonresponse bias by using mail surveys with follow-ups. The conclusion 
was that there was no nonresponse bias inherent, and that people who responded 
were representative for the whole population. Bostedt and Bohman (1995), who 
concluded that nonresponses were mainly due to general reasons, made approxi-
mately the same assessment. Of course, the manifestation of protest behavior 
through selective response needs not to be present in every CVM study. The 
hypothesis indicates that the risk of protest behavior increases when the valua-
tion scenario includes a major change of prevailing property rights or issues 
with considerable ethical and moral dimensions, like nonuse values. 
In-person interviews constitute a slightly different problem in relation to 
protest behavior. If the respondent is interviewed face-to-face, it is more diffi-
cult to refuse to answer. In most cases the respondent is pressed to give an 
answer and, as a consequence, the respondent may choose a zero WTP response 
to the valuation question as a means to signal his disagreement towards the 
valuation scenario or some of its components. However, it is also possible that a 
respondent gives a zero WTP response although he is not really protesting and 
has in principle a positive WTP towards the issue being valued. In this latter 
case, the question is about misinterpreting behavior, not actual protest behavior. 
Examining altemative preference structures that may be represented among 
respondents in more detail can illuminate this. 
Lockwood (1997) argues that meaningful response behavior can be based on 
three types of preference expressions: weakly comparable, noncompensatory, 
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and exchange. If weakly comparable preferences are involved, it means that an 
individual can choose between different alternatives, although he is not able to 
produce a general ranking across them. According to O'Neill (1993, pp. 102-
122), weak comparability is a sign of incommensurability between two objects. 
However, this does not have to mean the same as incomparability. There is a 
possibility of rational choices between two objects, even though plurality of 
values and context specificity of the choice may make the choice situation too 
complicated for a straightforward assessment by utilizing simplified monetary 
valuation framework. The rational decision can be made, but only after thor-
ough consideration of the situation. 
In case preferences are noncompensatory or exchangeable, they are always 
strongly comparable, indicating that different alternatives can be completely 
ranked on the basis of their value. Exchangeable preferences represent the 
common economic preference concept relying on characteristics like continuity, 
reflexivity, nonsatiation, and completeness. The continuity condition in essence 
means that any change in one good can be compensated for by a change in 
another good (Lockwood 1997). 
An individual with noncompensatory preferences can produce a value rank-
ing of the alternatives such that one alternative can be said to be better than 
another, even though the individual is still unwilling to make trade-offs between 
the alternatives. As a consequence, noncompensatory preferences indicate that a 
reduction in the quantity or quality of the valued entity cannot be compensated 
for by a change in another entity. Lexicographic preferences are probably the 
best known form of noncompensatory ordering. Lexicographically ordered pref-
erences provide the basis for a rational mode of noncompensatory choice de-
rived from the possession by the valued entity of certain properties that consti-
tutes value referents. Furthermore, these properties are hierarchically ordered 
such that the possession of a higher-level property results in a preference for 
that entity compared with another entity which only possesses lower level 
properties. Such an ordering requires strong comparability between entities, i.e. 
ali relevant entities can be ranked based on their value (strongly lexicographic), 
even if different types of value possessed by the entities are incommensurable. 
Correspondingly, a ranking may be partial if there are insufficient properties to 
generate a ranking which discriminates between all relevant entities (weakly 
lexicographic) (Lockwood 1997). 
What are the ramifications of preference structures inconsistent with the 
standard neoclassical model? Lockwood (1996, p. 277) writes that "1f some 
persons ' values are better represented by noncompensatory preferences, or are 
only weakly comparable or noncomparable, then economic methods do not 
provide a comprehensive evaluation of alternatives. At best, economics pro-
vides an assessment of those values which persons express according to com-
pensatory preferences. At worst, economic data may contain value expressions 
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that are structurally incompatible with the underlying economic theory." This 
kind of situation can arise in a CVM survey when respondents have to cope with 
a valuation scenario with a design that is based on the assumption of exchange-
able preferences, even though respondents possess noncompensatory or weakly 
comparable preferences. This is particularly likely when a CVM survey is 
concerned with the valuation of environmental commodities of irreplaceable 
nature or large policy packages. 
There is also some empirical evidence of the existence of noncompensatory 
as well as weakly comparable preferences. Stevens et al. (1991) conducted a 
CVM study to estimate the existence value for four wildlife species of New 
England. Based on the respondents' WTPs and on answers to certain attitudinal 
claims they concluded that only 30 percent of ali respondents gave answers that 
appeared consistent with the neoclassical model of behavior. They also rea-
soned that approximately 25% of the respondents had lexicographic prefer-
ences. However, the definition of lexicographic preferences that Stevens et al. 
(ibid., p. 397) used was not quite standard. According to them, lexicographic 
preferences mean that above a certain level of minimum income (1711 ) the envi-
ronmental good is always preferred to income, and below that level more 
income is always preferred to the environmental good. The difference between 
the normally used definition and Stevens et al.'s (ibid.) definition is, as Spash 
and Hanley (1995) point out, that Stevens et al. (ibid.) allow individuals to 
either care solely about income (until 	or solely about wildlife. Lexico- 
graphic preferences, however, allow increases in income to augment welfare as 
long as wildlife is unaffected. 
Spash and Hanley (1995) note another interesting feature of lexicographic 
preferences, which can be called preference irreversibility. People with lexico-
graphic preferences who regard themselves as having the minimum standard of 
living, with the corresponding minimum income (Y.), will not be willing to pay 
anything for an increase of the environmental commodity (Z), because they 
cannot afford to do so, but will give an infinite valuation of a decrease in Z. 
Consider a situation where an individual is assumed to start at point A(Zi, 171 ) 
(Figure 5.2). Now, because 11.1  is higher than Y., the individual is willing to give 
up some income (I') in order to receive more Z. Thus, the individual accepts the 
move from point A(Zi, 171) to point E(Z2, Y2) because Y2 is still higher than the 
minimum level m (remember that Z by definition has priority over Y as long as 
Y> 	). Consequently, this means that U[E(Z2, Y2)] > U[A(Zi, Y/)]. However, 
once the move to E has been made, there would be no way to go back to A 
without reducing utility, and the reduction in Z that this implies would be given 
an infinite valuation. In this way, Z2 becomes now the new reference point 
above which Z must be maintained. More generally, if Z is increased from Z1, 
the individual is willing to pay the entire amount — 	to receive the increase, 
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Figure 5.2. Irreversibility of Lexicographic Preferences (Spash and Hanley 
1995, p. 195). 
but if this is reversed, the compensation required becomes infinite. This is what 
is meant by irreversibility of lexicographic preferences. 
Spash and Hanley (1995) also found empirical evidence of the existence of 
lexicographic preferences when the preservation of biodiversity is concerned. 
The survey included two different samples, a sample of 125 students, and a 
sample of 200 randomly chosen people. Face-to-face interviews were used. The 
two different samples were included because the authors wanted to compare if 
there are significant differences related to knowledge about biodiversity. It 
appeared that 23% of the respondents in the public sample stated that animals / 
plants / ecosystems should be protected irrespective of the costs and refused to 
give a WTP amount (category 1). Furthermore, 75% of the respondents also 
stated that animals / plants / ecosystems should be protected irrespective of the 
costs but they, however, expressed positive but rather low WTP (category 2). 
Spash and Hanley (ibid.) argue that the respondents in category 1 can be 
identified as having lexicographic preferences. It is also possible that at least 
some of the respondents in category 2 have lexicographic preferences, but this 
cannot be known for sure without further investigation. Another possibility is 
that the respondents in category 2 expressed weakly comparable preferences. 
The nature of noncompensatory preferences is further illustrated in Figure 
5.3. There are two income levels 	IT) and two commodity levels (Zrn , Z5 ). Yin 
is reference income which an individual needs in order to have a minimum 
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standard of living. m  is, of course, a relative quantity and culturally as well as 
subjectively determined. Y is an amount of income that is needed to have a 
"satisfactory" standard of living. At this income level and above the individual 
is able to satisfy most of his reasonable needs. Again, the actual level is cultur-
ally and subjectively determined. Zrn refers to the quantity of Z that is required 
to fulfill the individual's most urgent needs in relation to Z. Z, in turn, is the 
"satisfactory" level of Z. After Z, the amount of Z loses its significance as a 
source of increasing welfare. Now, we can assume that 	 and Zs. 
represent thresholds on which preferences change their nature. 
Consider first the situation where Y < Y 1. Following the reasoning of Stevens 
et al. (1991) we can argue that as long as the individual's income is lower than 
what is required for the minimum standard of living, he categorically prefers Y 
to Z, i.e. manifests noncompensatory preferences. After income has risen over 
the threshold Y., the individual again expresses noncompensatory preferences 
until the amount of Z exceeds the critical minimum level Z.. Then, on condition 
that Y still stands between Y. and Y ,  a switch in preferences occurs (see e.g. 
Edwards 1986). Having a fair amount of Z and Y for a reasonable quality of life 
the individual is willing to make trade-offs between them (exchangeable prefer-
ences). A move from point A to point B is possible if the individual thinks that 
an increase in Z compensates for a decrease in Y or vice versa. The question is 
about the rate of marginal substitutability between Z and Y. In contrast, a move 
Figure 5.3. Preference Changing Thresholds in Relation to Income (19 and 
Environmental Commodity (Z). 
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from C to A is not possible, because it would result in a decrease in both Y and 
Z. The next horizontal threshold is achieved when income exceeds the level of 
satisfactory income (Ys). The interest in trade-offs between Y and Z diminishes 
because the individual is affluent enough to neglect the utility of additional 
income and to express more concern in relation to Z. Thus, he switches back to 
noncompensatory preferences until the amount of Z becomes so much bigger 
that the satisfactory level Z will be exceeded. Therefore, beyond the satisfac-
tory levels of both Y and Z, preferences again switch from noncompensatory to 
exchangeable. 
However, as Bromley (1996) points out, reference levels or thresholds are 
highly arbitrary by their nature. Thus, the existence of preference switching 
thresholds is problematic from the researcher' s point of view because thresholds 
are highly subjective and depend on cultural, social, and economic characteris-
tics of prevailing institutions. It is not possible to identify them in the aggre-
gated sense and, consequently, each individual reference level becomes a norm 
against which a change provided by a policy will be evaluated. 
The idea of preference switching thresholds or reference levels may appear 
to be somewhat unfeasible, but it can be explained by analyzing people's behavior 
in complex choice situations. The concept of bounded or limited rationality is 
essential (Simon 1955). In a multi-dimensional valuation situation, the respond-
ent is forced to process unfamiliar information in rather a short time. It is quite 
natural that this leads to the use of mental practices which reduce the difficulty 
of decision-making. The respondent is tempted to favor a simplified decision 
rule instead of thorough consideration of ali possible alternatives and their 
outcomes. This may lead to, for instance, satisfying behavior, which means that 
the respondent chooses an alternative that just meets a minimal set of require-
ments (Harris et al. 1989). 
Because the identification of individual preference switching thresholds is 
very demanding in empirical applications, the researcher may regard responses 
demonstrating noncompensatory or weakly comparable preferences as indicators 
of irrational or at least indifferent response behavior. Consider, for instance, a 
valuation situation where the individual is asked how much he is willing to pay 
for preventing a decrease in Z from Zc to ZA. Assume that point C(Yc , Zc ) 
represents the current, subjectively interpreted position of the individual. It can 
be easily seen that the maximum willingness to pay to prevent the decrease is 
Y — Ym  and the minimum WTP is Y — A' Y• Then, consider a valuation situation c 	 C  
where the individual is asked how much he is willing to pay for preventing a 
decrease in Z from Zc to ZD, the interpretation of C being as above. Because this 
valuation situation involves crossing of the preferences switching quantity 
threshold Zm, the individual starts to exhibit noncompensatory preferences. As a 
result, he refuses the suggested trade-off because he feels that this time it is an 
inappropriate way to cope with the values involved. If the refusal is interpreted 
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as zero WTP, a very peculiar situation emerges. From the researcher's viewpoint, 
the behavior of the individual looks very strange because it appears that he is 
willing to pay something to prevent the smaller decrease Zc — ZA but nothing to 
prevent the larger decrease Zc — ZD. 
If any conclusions for policy-making purposes are derived, they will prob-
ably be misleading, because despite the refusal to state WTP the individual 
places a great value on preventing the decrease Zc, — ZD. The approval of zero 
WTP as a valid answer considerably undermines the true valuations involved. 
The individual will most likely demonstrate his preferences in another manner, 
for instance, by attempting to directly influence politicians and other decision-
makers. In this case, the individual's willingness to pay will be expressed 
through his actions, which obviously has a welfare effect because some re-
sources will be used to facilitate them. 
At this point it may useful to consider again what the difference between 
noncompensatory (lexicographic) and weakly comparable preferences actually 
is. In the case of noncompensatory preferences, the trade-off between Y and Z is 
unacceptable because one of them is considered immeasurably valuable com-
pared to the other. When weakly comparable preferences are concerned, the 
negative attitude towards the trade-off can be explained by the complexity of 
the choice situation. The respondent is not ready to reduce the multiple at-
tributes of the choice situation into a simplifying comparison between only two 
aspects. Therefore, the ranking across different alternatives becomes ambigu-
ous, although the individual is able to make choices between two or more 
different alternatives. Consider again Figure 5.3. When noncompensatory pref-
erences rule, it is easy to rank alternatives D, E, and F. F is always preferred to 
D and E, and D is always preferred to E because, by definition, the only element 
affecting the ranking is the amount of Z. Now, assume that noncompensatory 
preferences are replaced by weakly comparable preferences. The result is that 
the individual still declines to make trade-offs between Y and Z but, in addition, 
he is unable to rank D, E, and F unambiguously. He may prefer E to D, D to F, 
and F to E, causing a cycle to emerge. The fundamental reason for this is that 
the individual does not do the ordering based only on Z and Y, but other 
variables are included, too. The more complex the valuation situation is, the 
more likely weakly comparable preferences are demonstrated among respond-
ents. 
It is difficult to say what the origin of weakly comparable preferences actu-
ally is. MacLean and Mills (1988) suggest that some moral rights cannot be 
reduced to exchangeable property rights. However, it is not a rule that the 
presence of moral aspects always leads to lack of ability to make monetary 
trade-offs. Many people may be inclined to believe that some environmental 
assets are either priceless or beyond market-like transactions because of inter-
generational, spiritual, or ethical reasons (Rekola 1997). Jakobsson and Dragun 
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(1996, p. 95) note that most contingent valuation literature has regarded re-
spondents as consumers. It is possible that respondents will support a policy that 
will reduce their personal income if they believe that it is beneficial to the 
community as a whole. Following the terminology of Blamey and Common 
(1992), people will then act as "citizens" for the public interest, rather than as 
selfish "consumers". If this is the case, it is inappropriate to make "citizen" and 
"consumer" valuations commensurate because they are based on different 
behavioral motivations. 
Obviously, both noncompensatory and weakly comparable preferences pro-
duce survey responses that can be interpreted as indicators of protest behavior. 
There is, however, an essential difference, as already explained earlier. Noncom-
pensatory preferences create response behavior, which only resembles protest 
behavior but is actually misinterpreting behavior. Respondents with noncompen-
satory preferences do not oppose the property rights structure of the valuation 
scenario or they do not reject the idea that there can be a trade-off between 
environmental quality and money. They just do not want to rank on the cardinal 
scale the different combinations of environmental quality and income. The 
policy-making implication of ali this is obvious. Even though both preference 
structures in practical valuation situations produce refusals to make trade-offs 
between income and Z, noncompensatory preferences make it possible to order 
different alternatives as the basis of the amount of Z. Moreover, respondents 
with noncompensatory preferences accept the idea that the ranking is closely 
related to the use of money as a yardstick. In this respect, it is critical how zero 
WTP responses are interpreted. Noncompensatory preferences as such do not 
challenge the use of money as a commensurable unit of value, they only ques-
tion applications that rely on the idea that people express their willingness to 
pay in a continuous manner. 
There is no doubt that the possible existence of weakly comparable prefer-
ences poses an even more serious threat to the CVM than noncompensatory 
preferences. The disapproval of the use of comparisons based on monetary 
valuation means that different kinds of techniques should be applied when 
information is acquired about people's preferences for the purposes of policy-
making. In certain cases, we just have to accept that the complexity of the 
valuation situation cannot be compressed into easily comparable and commen-
surable dimensions. Therefore, preferences of the respondents demonstrating 
weakly comparable preferences can be expressed in a form that goes beyond the 
methodological reach of monetary valuation methods. However, this should not 
be a worrying conclusion because, as O'Neill (1993) points out, it should be 
perfectly natural that people have preferences that are comparable in a larger 
social decision-making context but become incommensurable in a narrow mon-
etary valuation framework. 
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5.5. Role of Information in CVM Surveys 
Although information issues reviewed in this section are related to the use of the 
CVM in the valuation of nonmarket goods, they are also relevant in market 
situations. It is apparent, however, that in nonmarket cases the role of informa-
tion becomes even more critical because of the unfamiliarity of the valuation 
situation and the complexity of nonmarket commodities being valued. 
Information bias has been an object of interest, especially in the early CVM 
literature. It has been defined in different ways. Freeman (1986) concludes that 
there are actually two kinds of information biases. One refers to the effect of 
providing information on values and costs related to factors that may have 
relevance in the evaluation process of the good being valued. The second type 
of information bias is considered to result from changes in the information 
provided to individuals about the good itself. In other words, information bias 
originates from respondents' varying reactions towards information presented 
in a CVM survey. For instance, the sequence in which different kinds of infor-
mation are provided may influence respondents' stated WTPs. The general 
amount and quality of information is also significant, particularly if the total 
cost of the nonmarket good improvement is included in the information. Unfor-
tunately, the tests for such bias are difficult to construct, and they usually 
involve either withholding information from one group and supplying it to 
another, or measuring the degree of information thought to be held by respond-
ents (OECD 1989, p. 37). 
Randall (1986a, p. 120) connects the information bias with policy evalua-
tion. A contingent valuation survey offers the respondents a public policy pro-
posal for approval or disapproval. From the respondents' perspective any such 
public policy proposal is a bunch of commodities delivered and payments 
exacted. Thus, the rational respondent bases his contingent market decision on 
the value of the commodity or amenity offered, the rule by which the agency 
decides whether or not to provide the commodity, and the rule that determines 
the payment exacted from the respondent. Ali three aspects are relevant to 
policy evaluation, and a change in any of them could alter WTP results. In this 
sense, the information given to the respondent plays a pivotal role. Conse-
quently, responses that are acquired without specifying the essential features of 
the related policy instrument likely to be introduced are certainly misleading if 
the whole policy-making process is concerned. 
There have been studies detecting significant information effects and studies 
that have not been able to confirm their existence. Boyle (1989) investigated 
how the different descriptions of the item being valued (brown trout fishery) 
affected the resulting WTP estimates. He found no significant difference be-
tween mean WTP statements for three levels of information, although the vari-
ance fell significantly as information increased. However, Boyle (ibid.) reminds 
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that his study was designed to estimate use values, not existence values. Bergstrom 
et al. (1985) found in their study concerning the preservation of prime farmland 
in South Carolina that additional information given to the respondents about the 
major benefits of prime land protection had a statistically significant increasing 
effect on the mean WTP. We can hypothesize that WTP estimates related to 
objects of valuation expressing considerable nonuse value potential might be 
more sensitive to changes in the information content. 
By applying a theoretical model, Bergstrom et al. (1990) developed a hy-
pothesis concerning the effect of additional information on the magnitude of 
willingness to pay for wetland protection. The additional information given 
consisted of the description of consumption services or attributes associated 
with recreational trips to the wetland study arca. Their results indicate that 
additional information about services provided by the wetland area increased 
WTP for wetland protection. However, they argue that the identified informa-
tion effect should not be considered an undesirable bias. On the contrary, 
Bergstrom et al. (ibid.) emphasize that additional information in fact increased 
the completeness and accuracy of wetland protection valuations and therefore 
induced a desirable information effect. They conclude that information may be 
an important determinant of perceived values that consumers place upon envi-
ronmental commodities. 
Bergstrom et al.'s (1990) argument about the usefulness and even necessity 
of additional information inevitably raises the question how much information 
should be provided to individuals if a public agency is interested in their 
revealed or stated preferences. In terms of the neoclassical theory, additional 
information should be provided to individuals as long as the expected value of 
the information is greater than its cost. Because of many practical problems, it is 
not possible to assess ex ante when the costs of providing additional information 
become greater than the expected utility related to it. There is also the problem 
how much information of complex environmental resources individuals can be 
expected to assimilate and perceive. However, Spash and Hanley (1995) also 
support the view that more information is better than less information. They 
conclude in relation to the valuation of biodiversity that uninformed preferences 
are likely to underestimate the social value of biodiversity protection. In addi-
tion, if preferences for biodiversity protection are to be sought as a guide to 
policy decisions, individuals need to be given as much information on biodiversity 
protection as they can reasonably be expected to comprehend. 
Considering the ubiquitous role of information and the arguments made by 
Bergstrom et al. (1990) and Spash and Hanley (1995), it is not surprising that 
many researchers have abandoned the term "information bias". Jakobsson and 
Dragun (1996) point out that the valuation process will depend on ali the 
elements of the contingent valuation scenario, including the payment mecha-
nism, information, likelihood of actual provision, etc. The concept of informa- 
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tion bias was largely based on the notion that respondents were assumed to be 
concerned only with the value of the good in question, ali other elements of the 
hypothetical market being neutral. Thus, the influence of different amounts of 
information and different payment vehicle arrangements was interpreted as bias. 
However, now most CVM researchers assume, probably more correctly, that 
variation in information will and should produce different value estimates. 
What is important is to ensure that information given is seen to be true, constant 
across the sample, and not designed to induce bias towards a particular result 
(Bateman and Turner 1992). 
Vatn and Bromley (1994) are also interested in the role of information, 
although their approach is somewhat different. They are concerned with the 
compression of information that takes place during a CVM survey. They point 
out that it is not likely that the consumer can consider a particular object, with a 
particular price attached to it, and make a truly informed decision. This is 
mainly because of the complexity of the choice situation related to environmen- 
tal goods and services. Consequently, reliance on the compact information 
produced by the CVM may produce natural resource use decisions that are in 
fact inferior to decisions made without hypothetical monetary valuation. Thus, 
their recommendation is that the most fundamental environmental choices should 
be made without artificially created monetary values. The vast amount of infor-
mation inherent in natural resource use decisions is better taken into account by 
applying collective decision procedures instead of monetary valuation. 
Apparently, the information content of a CVM survey is an essential and 
influential element. It can reduce biases, but it can also induce them. In many 
cases, well-intentioned behavior originates from insufficient information. The 
researcher does not describe the valuation process and its meaning clearly and 
accurately enough. By increasing the amount of information, respondents' views 
and the researcher's intentions would become closer to each other. Unfortu-
nately, there is no way to determine what the correct amount of information is. 
The researcher's judgment is decisive in this respect. From the point of view of 
policy-making, the information effect is quite important. If value estimates for 
the proposed policy are extremely sensitive to the information content of the 
valuation scenario, it is likely that their applicability diminishes. It is a sign of 
the fact that the policy proposal is perceived in an ambiguous way and needs 
clarification at its various stages. 
Generally, CVM researchers assume that the total WTP rises when the 
amount of conveyed information increases in the survey. If the WTP responses 
are very sensitive to the amount of information provided, it is a very difficult 
task to deflne what the "right" amount of information that should be given in a 
contingent valuation survey is. It is also possible that a respondent flnds himself 
in a situation where he is overloaded by information. This means that, when the 
valuation issue is controversial and the additional information (Ia) provided is 
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not consistent with the prior information (Ip) held by the respondent, the addi-
tional information no longer increases the WTP. On the contrary, the WTP can 
even diminish. A related but a somewhat different problem arises when the 
additional information increases the variability of the WTP estimates. If some 
of the respondents find the additional information inconsistent with their prior 
information, then the variance of WTP is likely to increase as more information 
is introduced. Correspondingly, if the additional information is consistent with 
the prior information, the variance of WTP might decline (Romstad 1991). Both 
of these phenomena are illustrated in Figure 5.4. 
Now it is possible to classify different impacts that information has on 
respondents' WTPs. However, it is essential to notice that if the respondent can 
judge whether or not the additional information is in conflict with the prior 
information, the respondent has already attached certain characteristics to the 
commodity being valued. In other words, the respondent is more or less aware 
of his preferences and expresses a positive or negative attitude towards the 
quality/quantity change of the nonmarket commodity being valued. Assume that 
the respondent has some prior information (I v) about the valuation issue, and 
that some additional information (Ia) is provided. Furthermore, let A denote 
that the resulting action is based on the prior information, and let Aa denote that 
the resulting action is based on the additional information provided. The action 
can be, for instance, the respondent's actual participation in a conservation 
program that is carried out as a consequence of very high stated WTPs ex-
pressed in a contingent valuation survey. 1n addition, let WTPp denote the 
Figure 5.4. Effect of Consistent and Inconsistent Additional Information (in 
Respect of Prior Information) on WTP and on Variance of WTP (Romstad 1991, 
pp. 2-3). 
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willingness to pay at the prior information level Ip, and let WTPa denote the 
willingness to pay after the respondent has received additional information Ia 
through the CVM survey instrument. 
It is very likely that when the additional information is part of the prior 
information already held by the respondent, WTPp equals WTPa regardless of 
the nature of the initial attitude. It is also likely that when the respondent agrees 
on the additional information this strengthens his initial attitude based on the 
prior information. Thus, if the initial attitude towards the nonmarket commodity 
being valued is positive, WTPa  is greater than WTP, and if the initial attitude is 
negative, the reverse is true or WTPa  is less that WTP. As it can be seen, this is 
a potential explanation for the information effect since, if the CVM instrument 
conveys information that extensively lists both pros and cons of the nonmarket 
commodity being valued, the variance of WTP increases. This is mainly be-
cause those who have a positive initial attitude reject ali negative information 
and, correspondingly, those who have a negative initial attitude refuse to take 
into account any positive information. The tendency to reject that part of addi-
tional information that is in conflict with the prior information dominates espe-
cially when there is an opportunity to receive information that strongly supports 
the initial attitude. 
A more complicated situation emerges when the received additional infor-
mation strikingly deviates from the prior information. The respondent has two 
choices. He can totally neglect the additional information indicating that WTPa 
would again equal WTP. On the other hand, the respondent can reassess his 
initial position. The problem is that the conflicting additional information may 
lead the respondent to change his initial view as well as to make him stick to his 
initial view even more categorically. Thus, depending on the quantity and 
quality of the additional information, unconditionality of preferences and atti-
tudes, and relative importance of the issue, WTPp can he greater than, less than, 
or equal to WTPa. Certainly, this feature increases the variance of WTP. Conse-
quently, the information effect is most likely when the issue at hand is contro-
versial or when the respondents' level of knowledge is rapidly changing over 
time (Romstad 1991, p. 6). 
Ajzen et al. (1996) have also examined the relationship between information 
and willingness to pay. They support the conclusion that CVM measures are 
sensitive to the quality and quantity of information provided in the valuation 
scenario. They also present empirical evidence that information about a public 
or private good can function as a means of persuasive communication. The 
magnitude of this effect depends on the level of motivational priming, personal 
relevance of information, and quality of arguments. When a public good type 
commodity is being valued under conditions of priming of altruistic motives as 
well as arguments strongly emphasizing the positive sides of the commodity 
being valued, personal relevance (i.e. will the respondent he able to consume the 
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commodity) of the valuation situation does not significantly affect WTP. How-
ever, if the motivational priming promotes individualistic or egoistic motives 
and strongly positive arguments are presented, high personal relevance has a 
clear impact on WTP. In this case WTP for the commodity of a public good type 
is much higher if it is readily available for the respondents in the near future. 
The situation becomes even more interesting when strongly positive argu-
ments are replaced by rather neutral information about the beneficial features of 
the commodity. In the case of the altruistic motivational priming, high personal 
relevance of commodity consumption produces lower WTP than low personal 
relevance. Ajzen et al. (1996) explain this seemingly paradoxical result by 
arguing that, under low personal relevance, WTP and attitudinal judgments can 
be influenced by implicit motivational orientations that are unrelated to the 
contents of the commodity description. As a result, subtle contextual cues in the 
valuation scenario can seriously bias WTP under conditions of low personal 
relevance. In these circumstances priming of altruistic motives can lead part of 
the respondents to express WTP answers that reflect, for instance, a sense of 
moral satisfaction instead of actual monetary values (see e.g. Kahneman and 
Knetsch 1992a). 
Siikamäki (1997) has investigated how additional positive information af-
fects respondents' WTP for reduced use of pesticides. There were two different 
scenarios introduced, a complete ending of pesticide use, and a 50% reduction 
of pesticide use. Both scenarios were divided into two subsamples, the first of 
which contained rather neutral information about environmental and health 
effects of pesticide use and the second one strongly emphasized the advantages 
resulting from reduced use of pesticides. It appeared that additional positive 
information was a statistically significant explanatory variable in a logistic 
regression model where the other explanatory variable was the dichotomous 
bid. Siikamäki and Aakkula (1996), who furthered the analysis by examining 
the relationship between attitudes and WTP, have used the same data. By using 
the factor and cluster analysis, the respondents were divided into three attitudinal 
groups, and mean WTP was estimated for each group. It was possible to detect 
significant mean WTP differences between some of the groups. For instance, 
the group labeled as "environmentalists critical of conventional agriculture" 
(46% of the respondents) had a three times higher mean WTP for the 50% 
reduction of pesticides use than the group labeled as "admirers of technological 
progress" (28% of the respondents). The mean WTPs were FIM 2,006 and FIM 
617, respectively. However, the study could not answer the question whether 
additional information influenced the mean WTP inside the attitudinal groups. 
Clearly, the testing for the information effect is somewhat complex. If a 
CVM survey design is used where respondents face varying amounts of infor-
mation the tests for differences in mean WTPs can be performed. However, as 
indicated above, respondents' reactions to additional information depend on 
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their initial attitudes. Thus, it would probably make sense to compare separately 
the change in WTP due to increased information among those who have a 
positive initial attitude and among those who have a negative initial attitude. 
Assuming that the additional information given includes clearly favorable as-
pects for the commodity being valued, and that at least some of the respondents 
with positive attitude are not familiar with the additional information, there 
should he a greater difference in the mean WTPs between the less informed and 
the more informed supporter groups than between the less informed and the 
more informed opponent groups. This kind of information is also more interest-
ing from policy-makers' viewpoint because it gives a more detailed picture of 
the interest groups involved. 
5.6. Choice of the Elicitation Method 
The CVM survey must also contain a mechanism for eliciting value or a choice 
from the respondent. The bias review also showed that the choice of the elicitation 
method has an important role in bias elimination. Mitchell and Carson (1989) 
list in their typology of CVM elicitation methods nine different alternatives. 
The categorization is carried out along two dimensions: whether the actual 
maximum WTP for the good is conclusively obtained through a valuation ques-
tion, and whether a single valuation question or an iterated series of questions is 
asked (for a single level of the public good being valued). 
In the beginning, CVM researchers applied continuous or open-ended ques-
tions. The idea was to ask directly a how-much question, and the response was 
expected to reveal the actual maximum WTP of the respondent. However, CVM 
researchers soon realized that respondents had problems to relate themselves to 
open-ended WTP questions. They felt that the whole questioning situation was 
unfamiliar and out of the context of everyday life experiences. In essence, many 
respondents reacted by refusing to state their WTP. Therefore, the open-ended 
question was soon replaced by a procedure called a bidding game. Mäntymaa 
(1993, pp. 68-69) depicts the idea of the bidding game in the following way. 
First the interviewer asks if the respondent is willing to pay a certain amount of 
money, x, to receive a change in a quantity or quality of a resource. If the answer 
is "yes", the interviewer adds an incremental amount k on x. In case the answer 
is "no", the interviewer subtracts the same amount k from x. After this, the 
interviewer asks the same question again using a new amount of money, x + k or 
x — k. The process will he repeated until the respondent accepts the amount 
offered and does not want to increase or decrease it any more. 
The bidding game imitates the characteristics of a real-life auction and, 
therefore, it is likely to he familiar to respondents. The nature of the choice 
required (yes/no) is also very simple. There are some other virtues, too. The 
likelihood of capturing the maximum actual WTP is high, and it is likely that the 
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process of iteration will enable the respondent to consider the value of the 
amenity as fully as possible. The same is true in the case of a payment card 
approach, which is an alternative to the bidding game. In the payment card 
elicitation method, the respondents receive a visual aid, a payment card, which 
contains a large array of potential WTP amounts, ranging from zero to some 
large amount. Thus, the payment card method also provides the respondent 
more context to make up his mind than the plain open-ended questioning (Mitchell 
and Carson 1989). However, both the bidding game and the payment card are 
prone to starting point bias, meaning that the stated WTPs will correlate heavily 
either with the initial bid in the bidding game or with the range of bids men-
tioned in the payment card (Bateman and Turner 1992). 
The next step was the development of the dichotomous choice approach 
(also referred to as discrete choice or take-it-or-leave-it approach). In dichoto- 
mous choice applications, respondents are asked to accept or to reject a sug- 
gested cost (or compensation) for a given environmental change. Each respond-
ent is inquired if he is willing to pay (receive) one of these costs (compensa-
tions) for the change on all-or-nothing basis, with no further iteration. The 
prices are randomly assigned to respondents so that each price is administered 
to an equivalent subsample (Kriström 1990a). As a modification of the dichoto-
mous approach, a version with a follow-up question or even two follow-up 
questions has been developed. In this scenario, the respondent is asked a ques-
tion requiring a "yes" or "no" answer about whether he or she would pay a 
specified price. If the respondent says "yes", another WTP question is asked 
using a higher price randomly chosen from a prespecified list. If the answer is 
"no", a follow-up question with a lower price is asked (Hanemann et al. 1991). 
The most significant advantage of the dichotomous choice is that it mimics 
respondents' day-to-day market decisions much more closely than any other 
elicitation scenario. However, because the data collected is binary-type, willing- 
ness to pay amounts are statistical estimates and, thus, they are dependent on the 
statistical techniques applied. Another advantage of the dichotomous approach 
is that it reduces the incentive for strategic behavior (i.e. stating WTPs that 
differ from the true WTPs in order to receive some extra benefits) and other 
kinds of goal-oriented behavior. It is more difficult for the respondent to influ-
ence the mean willingness to pay within the dichotomous approach than within 
other approaches, for obvious reasons. 
However, there are also some shortcomings involved in the dichotomous 
choice approach. The binary-type data conveys, of course, a limited amount of 
information. Thus, more observations are needed for the same level of statistical 
precision in sample WTP estimates. Furthermore, because of the nature of the 
data acquired, advanced statistical procedures are required in order to derive 
any useful summary statistics on WTP. Unfortunately, no real consensus exists 
regarding how to obtain these summary statistics (Kriström 1990a). A good 
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example of the effects of different statistical estimations can he found in Bowker 
and Stoll (1988). They investigated people's willingness to pay concerning the 
preservation of living-sites of one endangered species or whooping cranes. They 
applied three different theoretical models and both logit and probit estimation 
with different truncation points. Depending on the specification, their mean and 
medium estimates for WTP ranged from USD — 61.56 to USD 148.54. 
It may also happen that some respondents decide not to invest any effort at 
ali in identifying their true WTP. Several researchers have been concerned 
about the fact that a proportion of respondents in dichotomous choice applica-
tions is prone to "yea-saying". A strict yea-sayer would answer "yes" to a 
dichotomous choice question regardless of whether the bid value asked is larger 
or smaller than his true WTP. The ramification is that yea-saying would bias 
dichotomous choice estimates of mean WTP upwards (Ready et al. 1996). 
However, it is hard to say what the magnitude of yea-saying is. Kanninen (1995) 
has developed a statistical approach for double- or multiple-bounded dichoto-
mous data to estimate the proportion of respondents that are yea-sayers. In her 
study concerning the valuation of wildlife and wetland habitats she concluded 
that as much as 20 percent of respondents were yea-sayers. 
The motives behind yea-saying are somewhat unclear, but Brown et al. 
(1996) provide a reasonable explanation. People may have two objectives in 
responding to a WTP question. First, they may want to truthfully answer the 
question asked about their actual willingness to pay. Second, they may want to 
indicate how favorably they view the good being valued, or at least whether 
they view the good favorably or not. The problem with a value elicitation 
question of the dichotomous choice type is that only a "yes" response indicates 
a positive attitude towards the good being valued. If the bid amount offered to 
the respondent is more than the respondent thinks he would be willing to pay, 
the respondent must choose between two objectives. If it is more important to 
indicate a favorable impression of the good being valued than to indicate a 
truthful WTP, the respondent will say "yes". 
A general observation is that when respondents have to cope with preference 
uncertainty and they are ambivalent about their answers, they are more likely to 
provide a positive response. This is probably because if respondents have some 
small, positive value for the good being valued, but are not able to express it 
explicitly in monetary terms, they feel more comfortable with the "yes" answer. 
To respond "no" in such a case would more likely he incorrect for persons who 
have determined that they attach some value to the good in question (Cook 
1998). Furthermore, preference uncertainty is a source of the anchoring phe-
nomenon, which creates problems in the dichotomous choice format, too. Like 
in the bidding game or in the payment card, it is possible that the bid acts as a 
starting point or an anchoring point of value formation when respondents are 
115 
uncertain about their true willingness to pay and need cues in order to provide 
an answer that they assume to be appropriate and satisfactory. 
A further development of the dichotomous choice format is the so-called 
(policy) referendum approach. This involves constructing an artificial or simu-
lated public referendum over a proposed policy or program which would affect 
the provided quantity or quality of some environmental commodity (Bergstrom 
1990). The respondent should believe that certain policy decision rules pertain. 
The policy is implemented if a majority of citizens approves it, and for each 
voting citizen, approval is conditional on a level of individual cost, which is 
specified at some point in the referendum scenario. The difference between the 
dichotomous choice format and the policy referendum approach is one of princi-
ple: instead of market behavior voting behavior is imitated. Hoehn and Randall 
(1987) point out that the policy referendum model with individually defined 
costs promotes truth-telling as the individually optimal response strategy. 
The discussion about the superiority of different elicitation methods has not 
led to a unanimous conclusion so far. The NOAA Panel (Arrow et al. 1993) 
supported very strongly the use of the referendum format. The imitation of the 
real referendum means that a "no-answer" option should also be included be-
cause in a real referendum it is also possible to skip voting. However, the 
attempt of the NOAA Panel to advocate the referendum format is a part of their 
overall demand for conservative design. This includes the use of WTP instead 
of WTA and the choice of summary statistics that tend to underestimate WTP. 
The NOAA Panel argues that a conservative design increases the reliability of 
the estimates by eliminating extreme responses that could enlarge estimated 
values implausibly. Not ali the CVM researchers have been satisfied with this 
assertion because it may lead to approaches that are in contradiction with 
theoretically correct guidelines of design, one example being the selection be-
tween WTP and WTA (Harrison 1993). Nevertheless, the use of the referendum 
format makes it theoretically correct to apply the median instead of the mean as 
the principal summary statistics. This is in most cases a more conservative 
choice. 
It may be useful to examine the starting point bias in more detail because it 
illuminates the possibility that different elicitation formats may induce different 
kinds of response behavior. As already mentioned, the general cause of starting 
point bias is that the initial bid suggests a reasonable final bid to respondents. 
This occurs because people are being asked to value items they are not used to 
valuing and they are not familiar with the valuation situation. Thus, respondents 
may interpret the initial bid to convey some relevant information that they 
should take into account in their answers. Respondents may assume that the 
researcher, who probably is an expert in his specific field, has somehow in 
advance estimated the true value of the item and is now using the value as a 
starting bid. So respondents tend to adjust their answers to reflect the value 
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given in the starting bid. It is also possible that respondents just want to please 
the interviewer and suppose the starting bid to represent the kind of answer that 
the interviewer is looking for. In this respect respondents express well-intentioned 
response motives. 
There are also a few possible sources of starting point bias. It may happen 
that the starting bid is significantly different from the respondent's actual will-
ingness to pay, and the respondent becomes bored with the iteration process and 
truncates the process before his actual WTP is revealed. Thayer (1981) presents 
a model where the utility derived from participating in a CVM survey is an 
argument in the respondent's utility function. This argument expresses the 
potential trade-off a respondent must face between taking time to provide an 
honest final WTP answer and giving a dishonest WTP answer in order to 
terminate the boring bidding process. However, it is highly questionable if 
boredom can play a major role when respondents choose their answering strate-
gies (although the possibility of indifferent response behavior should he remem-
bered). First, there is no need for a respondent to provide a dishonest answer; he 
can directly jump to his best guess of his actual WTP. According to Boyle et al. 
(1985), the respondents take this strategy when they wish to end the bidding 
process. Nevertheless, the boredom explanation is apparently not valid when the 
starting bid is given without subsequent iteration process or additional valuation 
questions (anchoring in the dichotomous choice approach). 
The advantage of the bidding game technique is, as already explained above, 
efficiency in obtaining WTP estimates. We can also hypothesize that the itera-
tion process makes it possible for the respondent to consider thoroughly his 
preferences and true willingness to pay. Ali this indicates that, if it were some-
how possible to remove or neutralize the confusing impact of the starting bid, 
the bidding game technique would again he a potential elicitation method. 
Randall and Farmer (1992) make a very interesting contribution in order to 
restore the validity of the bidding game approach. They consider the possibility 
that a continuous WTP data set influenced by a starting bid may contain infor-
mation about the "true" value of the mean WTP. 
Randall and Farmer (1992) have developed four different models to explain 
the effect of the starting bid (see Figure 5.5). In all these models, the relation-
ship between the expected value of the stated WTP, or E(WTP), and the starting 
bid, or SB, is of interest. If E(WTP) were determined only by the "true" WTP 
and were not affected by SB, the relationship between E(WTP) would be a 
horizontal line, such as that labeled WTP t  (the "true" WTP) in Figure 5.5a. If, to 
illustrate the other extreme, E(WTP) were equal to SB, and were therefore not 
influenced by the "true" WTP, the relationship between E(WTP) and SB would 
he a straight line of slope 1 passing through the origin (Figure 5.5b). This line is 
labeled UNIT in ali the subfigures. 
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Both models are in a way very informative, but it is likely that they very 
seldom exist in reality. In 5.5a there is no starting point bias present, and in 5.5b 
the data set is completely useless because the starting bid is the only explanatory 
variable indicating that it is impossible to extract any information about the 
"true" WTP. To make the situation more relevant and real world like, assume 
that the respondent, i, believes that SBt, the starting bid randomly presented to 
him, contains some meaningful information about the value of the commodity 
being offered. This kind of assumption is usually motivated by the respondent's 
confidence in the researcher's competence. The respondent believes that the bid 
he is facing bears some relationship to something relevant, e.g. to answers other 
respondents have been giving, or to expert estimates of the value of the com-
modity being offered. 
While the respondent is assumed to believe that SBt conveys some informa-
tion about the value of the commodity, he is also aware that his WTP, deviates 
somewhat from SBt. His first task is to determine whether his WTP i is greater or 
less than SBt. Knowing, for instance, that WTPt is greater than SBt and believ-
ing that SBt  contains some information about the value that some people at-
tribute to the commodity being offered, he must formulate WTPi. Assume that 
the respondent conducts a search for WTPt. If the search were complete and the 
respondent made a complete adjustment, he would formulate E(WTP), = WTPt. 
Thus, the complete adjustment would generate the horizontal plot of E(WTP) = 
WTPt  illustrated in Figure 5.5a, where respondents with low SBt would adjust 
ali the way up to WTPt, and those with high SBt would adjust ali the way down 
to WTPt. Nevertheless, searching for one's true WTPt is a difficult task. An 
adjustment process that started at SBi and stopped before reaching WTPt would 
most likely generate a curve such as WTPtca in Figure 5.5c, a straight line of 
slope s, where 0 < s < 1, intersecting the line UNIT. A data set exhibiting this 
kind of incomplete adjustment process would probably produce a statistically 
significant starting point bias. The data set would contain useful information 
about the respondents' WTPt. Taking into account the incomplete nature of the 
adjustment process, the mean WTPt would be located at the intersection of 
WTPica  and UNIT, where obviously no adjustment on the average occurs. 
Assume again that the respondent, 1, provides a valid answer to the initial 
starting bid. Furthermore, assume that the respondent believes that SBt contains 
information about the costs per household of the commodity proposed. In addi-
tion, assume that the respondent's motivation is rational and selfish, but he does 
not intend to make a strategic misstatement of the WTPt. In this case, the 
respondent will seek to adjust toward WTPt, but always subject to a simple rule: 
E(WTP) WT131. This way, if WTPt > SBt, he will adjust upward at least part of 
the way toward WTPi but never beyond it; if WTPt < SBt, he will adjust 
downward at least as far as WTPt. This is an attractive adjustment rule for a 
respondent seeking to provide a response to encourage proposals beneficial to 
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himself but, at the same time, to take particular care to avoid endorsing policies 
that would yield his household smaller benefits than costs. A sample of respond-
ents ali following this adjustment path would generate a trace of E(WTP) 
similar to the curve WTPmm (Figure 5.5d). The curve WTPmm would have a 
positive slope, intersect UNIT, and become asymptotic to the horizontal line 
estimating the mean WTP (labeled WTPm) somewhere to the right of the inter-
section. Statistical tests would again likely show a significant starting point bias 
but the data most likely contains useful information about the "true" WTP. The 
logic of the incomplete but rational adjustment model implies that the horizontal 
asymptote to WTPmm, or WTPm, is a valid estimate of the mean WTP. 
There are also some other researchers defending other elicitation formats 
than the dichotomous choice. Ready et al. (1996) conducted a CVM study 
conceming willingness to pay for food safety improvements. In particular, they 
tested for differences between continuous and discrete contingent valuation 
estimates by using split-sample design. They found out that the dichotomous 
choice elicitation method consistently generated much larger estimates of WTP 
Figure 5.5. Relationship Between the Expected Value of the Stated WTP and the 
Starting Bid (Randall and Farmer 1992). 
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than a continuous method (payment card). They also concluded that few of 
these differences were due to bias introduced by the statistical estimation tech-
niques related to the analysis of the dichotomous data. According to them, most 
or ali the differences were created by the differences in response behavior. In 
addition, the continuous WTP responses showed a significant scope effect, 
while the dichotomous responses did not. Based on their results, Ready et al. 
(ibid.) wonder whether the CVM researchers have been too quick to abandon 
continuous methods in favor of dichotomous choice methods. In addition, Boyle 
et al. (1996) found some evidence that WTP estimates based on continuous data 
were lower than estimates derived from dichotomous data. Their conclusion 
was that either open-ended questions underestimate values or dichotomous choice 
bid structures may lead to systematic overestimates. However, Boyle et al. 
(ibid.) consider that the NOAA Panel's (Arrow et al. 1993) endorsement of 
dichotomous choice questions is perceivable and acceptable, but they point out 
that other questioning formats should not be completely neglected. For instance, 
open-ended data are likely to yield smaller standard errors if not highly skewed 
toward high values. 
Bateman et al. (1995) conducted a CVM survey that tested for the effects of 
altering the method of eliciting willingness to pay responses. One of their ideas 
was to assess the applicability of the guidelines endorsed by the NOAA Panel 
(Arrow et al. 1993). They employed three WTP elicitation methods: open-ended 
questions, dichotomous choice questions, and iterative bidding questions. Their 
results indicated that respondents experienced significant uncertainty when they 
answered open-ended questions. They may also have exhibited free-riding or 
overbidding tendencies. When answering dichotomous choice questions, re-
spondents seemed to experience much less uncertainty, although the suggestion 
that bid levels affected the responses was not ruled out. The iterative bidding 
questions appeared to provide a medium approach with respondents exhibiting 
certain of the characteristics of both other formats. Their overall conclusion was 
that the level of uncertainty induced by open-ended formats is a major concern, 
and that further research is required to detect behavioral motivations behind 
individuals' responses to iterative bidding and dichotomous choice questions. 
It seems that any design detail of a CVM survey has produced an extensive 
literature of arguments and counter-arguments. Bearing this in mind, the discus-
sion about the "correct" elicitation method is not surprising. However, it is 
obvious that no elicitation alternative can be better than the others in ali re-
spects. The choice of the elicitation format depends on the goals of the CVM 
survey. If legitimacy and credibility are required for litigation purposes, the 
recommendations of the NOAA Panel (Arrow et al. 1993) should be taken very 
seriously. The problem is, nevertheless, that no CVM design can be completely 
bias-free. There is always a trade-off included: a choice of a certain elicitation 
method reduces some biases but most likely induces a few others. This is not to 
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say that careful survey design is not of great importance. There is no question 
about this, although its purpose is not to attempt to remove ali biases but make 
the researcher aware of their existence and their impacts on the survey outcome. 
5.7. Previous CVM Studies on the Value of Rural Amenities 
In recent years there have been a number of contingent valuation applications 
that have estimated people's willingness to pay in relation to economic values 
somehow connected to agricultural landscape. Cultural and institutional con-
texts, commodities being valued, valuation scenarios, and elicitation techniques 
have varied so much that no universally applicable conclusions can be derived. 
However, the mere existence of a considerable number of this kind of CVM 
surveys indicates that the issue has been regarded worth studying. This shows, 
at least indirectly, that benefits derived from agriculture-related resources have 
certain significance. 
Bergstrom et al. (1985) estimated the willingness to pay for protecting 25%, 
50%, 75%, or 100% of the agricultural land in Greenville County, South Caro-
lina, USA. They used a payment card and a mail survey. Their observation was 
that local households were willing to pay annually ca. USD 9 for the mainte-
nance of the whole 72,000 acres area of prime agricultural land. Converted into 
an annual payment per acre, this resulted in USD 13. Bergstrom et al. (ibid.) 
also noted that the relatively low WTP may have been an indication of zero or 
negative net benefits from public programs aiming to preserve agricultural land. 
Halstead (1984) estimated willingness to pay for avoiding residential develop-
ment on agricultural land in three counties in Massachusetts, USA. The chosen 
elicitation method was the iterative bidding game. The mean annual WTP for 
avoiding high-density development ranged from USD 70 to USD 176. Of course, 
it is somewhat difficult to say if people's willingness to pay resulted from true 
appreciation of agricultural landscape or from dislike towards urban develop-
ment and the interest groups behind it. It is interesting that despite the quite 
similar valuation scenarios of these two US studies the mean WTPs differed 
significantly. 
Drake (1987; 1992; 1993) has reported WTPs related to the maintenance of 
Swedish agricultural landscape. Based on a personal interview survey of 1,089 
respondents and using a payment card procedure he concluded that the mean 
annual WTP per person for preserving agricultural land in its current use was 
SEK 470. Because 12% of the respondents refused to answer the WTP question, 
a regression procedure was applied in order to estimate a WTP for those who 
declined. The corrected WTP appeared to be somewhat higher, SEK 541 per 
person and year. Drake (1992) also calculated an estimate for the total annual 
WTP for ali Swedes and the average annual WTP per hectare of agricultural 
land. The figures are SEK 3.36 billion per year and SEK 975 per hectare and 
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year, respectively. A few questions measuring attitudes were also included. The 
most important motives for the maintenance of agricultural landscape among 
the respondents were the conservation of nature (47%), aesthetic values (22%), 
recreational use (13%), and cultural-historic values (12%). 
Hanley (1989) has applied the CVM to the valuation of rural recreation 
benefits derived by visitors of the Queen Elizabeth Forest Park in Central 
Scotland. Even though the forest park cannot be considered to be an organic part 
of agricultural landscape, it provides similar recreational and scenic values 
whose existence is to some extent dependent on the surrounding countryside. 
The target population was the on-site users of the forest park, and 1,148 ques-
tionnaires were collected, partly by means of interviews and partly the respond-
ents filling them in themselves. The study consisted of several WTP questions, 
but the payment vehicle used in ali of them was an entry fee. WTP was inquired 
separately for wildlife, recreational services, and landscape. In addition, WTP 
was inquired for combining ali the aspects of the site. The latter scenario was 
constructed by asking visitors how much they would be willing to pay for an 
entry to the park, per person per visit, if these entry fees prevented the govern-
ment from selling the forest park to a private forestry company. In this case, the 
mean WTP appeared to be GBP 1.25 per person per visit. Assuming that the 
total number of visits per year is 145,000, the total WTP at the annual level 
would be GBP 181,000. 
However, as Hanley (1989) points out, the total WTP represents only use 
and nonuse values of actual site visitors. Possible nonuse values of non-visitors 
are not included. In addition, the contingent valuation estimates may be biased 
downwards. Some respondents may have objected the scenario presented, en-
gaged in free-riding, or valued the forest less under the hypothetical market 
situation (private ownership) than the current situation (public ownership). It is 
also possible that an alternative payment vehicle such as a payment to a trust 
fund would have resulted in higher WTP amounts. The study also included 
WTP estimates produced using the travel cost method, but the comparisons of 
the results of the two methods is difficult because the travel cost estimates 
varied from GBP 73,949 to GBP 1,497,858 depending on the functional form 
employed. 
Willis and Garrod (1993) have carried out a CVM study valuing possible 
future landscapes in the Yorkshire Dales National Park. The assessed land-
scapes comprised images of the range of possible future landscapes: today's 
landscape, abandoned, semi-intensive agricultural, intensive agricultural, planned, 
conserved, and wild landscapes. The CVM survey encompassed both residents 
and visitors of the national park arca. The sample size was 600 (300 + 300). The 
questionnaire design was somewhat dependent on whether the questionnaire 
was aimed to visitors or residents. However, both subsamples received identical 
questions on recreational activities undertaken, attitudes towards congestion, 
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preferences over a range of landscape features, expenditures towards country-
side causes, and willingness to pay to maintain landscape. Two variants of the 
questionnaire were used in the resident subsample to test for part-whole bias. 
It appeared, not surprisingly, that the most preferred landscape was today's 
landscape, followed by conserved landscape and wild landscape. The authors 
explain this by referring to known psychological preferences for the status quo 
and to the choice heuristics of individuals based on representativeness, avail-
ability, and anchoring. The mean willingness to pay for the most preferred 
landscape varied from GBP 7.67 to GBP 34.96 depending on the landscape type 
and the status of the respondents (visitor or resident). The willingness to pay to 
preserve today's landscape in the Yorkshire Dales across ali visitors and resi- 
dents amounted to some GBP 42 million per year. No part-whole bias was 
detected. According to them, their analysis indicated that the landscape benefits 
produced by today's landscape justify the use of further public expenditure for 
the maintenance of landscape. 
Willis et al. (1995) have conducted a CVM study in order to estimate 
benefits related to the Environmentally Sensitive Area (ESA) scheme. This 
originated in England in the 1980s from concems about the adverse impact of 
more intensive agricultural practices on the countryside. There was a need to 
support the continuation of traditional farming practices in areas where these 
practices had contributed to a distinctive landscape, wildlife habitat, or preser- 
vation of archeological and historical features. The target population consisted 
of the three groups who were likely to benefit from the ESA scheme: residents 
in the ESAs, visitors to the ESAs, and the rest of the public. Personal interviews 
were used and the questions for each group were designed to be as similar as 
possible. Taken ali together, 3,077 interviews were conducted. Both an open- 
ended payment card and a dichotomous choice format were applied to elicit 
WTPs. In addition to their WTP for the ESA scheme, the respondents were 
asked how much they currently spend on countryside activities. 
Because of the rather complex design of their study, Willis et al. (1995) 
produced a large number of estimates for the mean WTP. The payment card 
format created a range from GBP 11.84 to GBP 36.65, where the WTP varied 
according to the ESA area (Somerset Levels and Moors, South Downs) and 
status of the respondents (resident, visitor, general public). The dichotomous 
choice format was applied only in the case of the public. It gave a substantially 
higher mean WTP, GBP 138.37 per household per year (a logit model was used 
in estimation), which is roughly 3.8 times that elicited by the open-ended 
payment card format (GBP 36.65). The same observation has been made in 
several other CVM studies. The median WTP derived from the dichotomous 
choice data appeared to be GBP 48.51. 
As a conclusion, Willis et al. (1995) note (based on their own study and other 
major UK CVM studies) that the CVM estimates of WTP by individuals or 
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households per year for nature conservation vary enormously. Many of the 
differences between estimates from various studies can be accounted for or 
explained by differences in the populations of reference, different values held 
by users compared to nonusers, and the different number of benefit issues 
estimated by the study. In addition, differences can be attributed to whether a 
marginal change in quantity is being valued, whether the total value of the good 
is being assessed, whether the change is irreversible, and whether substitutes are 
available and considered in the valuation of the specific good. They want to 
note that, when the object of valuation (like the ESA areas) consists of many 
distinct and different goods, the complexity of the entire valuation situation will 
be reflected in the variation of estimated WTPs. 
Pruckner (1995) has taken a somewhat differing approach. Although he has 
also referred to the value of agricultural landscape, his purpose has been to 
evaluate "the economic benefits associated with agricultural landscape-cultivat-
ing services". The target population was tourists spending vacations in Austria, 
and a sample of 4,585 were personally interviewed. In addition to the WTP 
question, other questions dealing with links between the countryside, the agri-
cultural sector, and tourism in Austria were included. The central elements of 
the valuation scenario were an informative introduction, in which it was pointed 
out what is meant by agricultural landscape-cultivating activities, the descrip-
tion of the payment vehicle (an earmarked fund in order to carry out the 
depicted landscape-cultivating activities), and the actual WTP question, in which 
it was inquired how much a tourist party would be willing to pay per day into 
the earmarked fund to guarantee the provision of landscape-cultivating activi-
ties. The mean and median WTPs recorded were ATS 9.20 and ATS 3.50 per 
person per day, respectively. The author stated as a conclusion that, although 
the results revealed a considerable total willingness to pay, the amount would 
not probably suffice to maintain farmers in mountainous regions. He also em-
phasized that the results facilitate the making of agricultural policy conclusions 
conceming direct compensation to farmers for the provision of nonmarket goods. 
In this study, the good being valued is an agricultural production practice, 
pro-environmental farming, the value of which is assumed to be derived from its 
positive impacts on the quality of the rural environment. None of the previous 
studies on the subject has applied a similar valuation scenario. However, valua-
tion objects, value dimensions, and inherent valuation motives are more or less 
the same in ali the described CVM studies conceming rural amenities. The 
maintenance of agricultural land or agricultural landscape is a central dimension 
of the object of valuation in this study, as it is also in Halstead (1984), Bergstrom 
et al. (1985), Drake (1987) and Willis and Garrod (1993). On the other hand, the 
pro-environmental farming scenario resembles Pruckner's (1995) approach be-
cause of its instrumental nature. Pruckner' s "landscape-cultivating activities" 
have a similar role in the maintenance of agricultural landscape as the pro- 
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environmental farming practices have in the maintenance of the rural environ-
ment. 
It is also clear that ali the described CVM studies concerning rural amenities 
promote the view that the countryside provides significant nonuse values in 
addition to use values. Studies having agricultural landscape as the object of 
valuation (Drake 1987, Willis and Garrod 1993) emphasize values related to 
agricultural tradition and aesthetic issues. Hanley (1989) and Willis et al. (1995), 
in turn, are more inclined to underline values that have environmental or eco-
logical origin. The focus of this study is more environmentally-oriented, too. 
The rural environment has an ecological dimension which should be given to at 
least the same weight as to the landscape dimension. 
However, the main difference between this study and the previous CVM 
studies valuing rural amenities is the viewpoint taken on the social decision- 
making. Although in this study, too, a monetary value estimate is derived in 
relation to the rural environment and rural amenities, the emphasis is on assess-
ing the feasibility and applicability of the value estimates that are meant to be 
used in the social decision-making context. Thus, the idea is not only to indicate 
that certain nonmarket amenities and services can have a monetary value but 
also to show that the concept of monetary value is prone to serious misperceptions 
if people's responses are interpreted in a valuation framework which does not 
pay enough attention to the complexity of the valuation situation, different 
forms of response behavior, and the plurality of preferences. 
The general observation based on ali these CVM studies conceming the 
valuation of rural amenities is that people in both the USA and in Europe 
appreciate agricultural landscape, farming, and the rural environment. Because 
the sources of benefits and the groups of beneficiaries examined vary consider-
ably across studies, it would be inappropriate to develop any further conclusions 
about the aggregate monetary value of the elements of the rural environment. 
Furthermore, the reliability and validity of monetary value estimates of single 
studies may be questionable, but not the joint evidence provided by these 
studies. The maintenance of the rural environment seems to be a socially desir-
able measure. 
6. Willingness to Pay for Pro-Environmental Farming 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the central issues related to the imple-
mentation of the empirical part of this study and principal willingness to pay 
results conceming the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-environ-
mental farming. First, the essential design and substance issues conceming the 
valuation instrument, the choice of sample and sampling method, and overall 
questionnaire design are elaborated in more detail. This is followed by an 
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introduction of different approaches to the estimation of mean and median 
willingness to pay. Then, the actual estimates for mean and median WTP are 
calculated, and a demand curve for pro-environmentally cultivated agricultural 
land is derived. Finally, it will be examined to what extent the data is plagued by 
the starting point bias and effects of varied information levels. 
6.1. Survey Design 
The design of the survey instrument was guided by three goals. The primary 
quantitative goal was to gather information about people' s mean willingness to 
pay for the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farm-
ing, the second goal was to test the various effects of information on people's 
WTP, and the last goal was to identify people's attitudes related to certain 
agricultural and environmental issues. The purpose of this was to produce a data 
set that would make it possible to analyze how the interplay of information and 
attitudes affects people's WTP for pro-environmental farming. Consequently, 
this dictated the choice between different possible options related to the overall 
survey design. 
When the object of valuation is a policy measure that affects country-wide, it 
is natural that the target population of surveying is ali those people who can be 
considered capable of making sovereign choices. Thus, the target population 
was 3,603,852 Finnish people between 16 and 69 years of age. The choice of 
sampling method is the next relevant step. Although random sampling is always 
preferred in theory, practical viewpoints like the costs created by the surveying 
process may lead to the choice of an alternative sampling approach. In this case, 
for reasons that will be explained later, a rather large sample based on face-to-
face interviews would have been required, which means that the use of random 
sampling would have made the costs of the survey much too high. To avoid the 
excessive surveying costs, a sample of 671 persons was selected for face-to-face 
interviews" by using a sampling method that was a combination of stratified 
and clustered sampling techniques. The chosen sampling method set a lower 
limit to the sample size. The purpose of this was to achieve adequate statistical 
correspondence between the sample and the target population. 
The stratification was carried out in order to obtain a sample in which the 
distribution of the population corresponded to the distribution across Finnish 
provinces. Then a certain number of districts in both towns and sparsely popu-
lated areas of a province were randomly selected (taking into account the 
proportion of city-dwellers and country people in the province in question). In 
these districts, the interviewers made the assigned number of interviews. The 
11  A group of 53 trained and experienced interviewers from Tutkimustieto Oy conducted the 
interviews between April 26 and May 19, 1991. 
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interviewers selected respondents following the prevailing distribution of sex 
and age in the district (see Appendix A for further details). The interviews were 
conducted either at a respondent's home or in the proximity of a shopping 
center. If a potential respondent refused to be interviewed, the interviewer 
randomly chose another respondent who fulfilled the sex and age criteria. 
The motivation behind the choice of face-to-face interviews was their suit-
ability for complex valuation situations where the respondents may need the 
assistance of the interviewer in order to perceive correctly ali the requirements 
of the valuation process. Although this involves a risk of interviewer bias, the 
potential advantages of face-to-face interviews no doubt outweigh the possible 
disadvantages. Of course, the precondition is -that the interviewers are well-
trained. Another important factor that also favors the use of face-to-face inter-
views is that people are more likely to attend a survey when they are personally 
interviewed. 
In the questionnaire the core element was the actual valuation instrument 
that was used to reveal people's willingness to pay for the conversion from 
conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming. It consisted of the de-
scription of the good being valued, its provision structure, the payment vehicle, 
and the actual WTP elicitation procedure. In order to define to ohjeet of valua-
tion more precisely, a brief summary depicting the essential features of pro-
environmental farming was given. The idea of the description was to introduce 
pro-environmental farming as a suitable alternative cultivation method to miti-
gate the current environmental and economic problems caused by conventional 
agriculture12. The detailed provision structure of pro-environmental farming 
was not specified, but it was assumed that appropriate and adequate agricultural 
and environmental policy measures supporting and promoting pro-environmen-
tal farming practices would be implemented by the agri-environmental authori-
ties. Furthermore, it was assumed that people's stated WTP amounts would be 
collected in the form of tax-like payments. In addition, no estimate for the 
amount of agricultural support at that time was given13. 
The actual WTP elicitation procedure was two-fold. After the presentation of 
the valuation scenario, the questioning proceeded by asking how large a propor-
tion of the• agricultural land should be converted from conventional agriculture 
to pro-environmental farming (the scope question). The idea was to allow each 
12 The exact wordings of the description and other questionnaire elements can be found in 
Appendix B where the different sequences of the questionnaire are reproduced. 
13 The estimate for the amount of agricultural support was not included into the valuation 
scenario, because at that time there was a considerable disagreement of the true amount of 
agricultural support. If the amount had-been included, then we should also have included the 
estimate for agricultural support needed after the conversion from conventional agriculture to 
pro-environmental farming would have taken place. This was considered to be beyond the 
scope of this study. 
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respondent to define by himself an appropriate share of the agricultural land to 
be converted from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming. This 
design made it possible to derive a demand function for the acreage to be 
converted from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming. 
When each respondent is allowed to choose the acreage to be converted from 
conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming, the characterization of 
the object of valuation becomes more ambiguous. The critical question is whether 
people would still be willing to pay the amount that they have stated when they 
recognized that pro-environmental farming practices would be carried out in a 
larger or smaller magnitude than they have considered to be appropriate and 
essential. However, because one of the objectives of this study was to assess the 
social desirability of the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-envi-
ronmental farming, it was considered policy-relevant to apply a valuation sce-
nario where the acreage of pro-environmentally cultivated agricultural land was 
not fixed. This was assumed to reduce, at least to some extent, the rejection of 
the valuation scenario because of scope reasons. Thus, the aim was to produce a 
monetary estimate that provides information about the overall magnitude of 
benefits assigned to the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-envi-
ronmental farming, and, consequently, not an average WTP measure solely 
estimated for a certain pre-specified acreage to be converted from conventional 
agriculture to pro-environmental farming. 
Next, the respondent was asked the actual WTP question: "How much would 
you be willing to pay annually in order to secure that the pro-environmental 
farming would be carried on in the magnitude that you stated in your previous 
answer? Would you be willing to pay a tax-like annual payment of FIM 	 ?„ 
Three different starting point bids, FIM 100 (ca. USD 20), FIM 500 FIM (ca. 
USD 100), and FIM 1,300 (ca. USD 260), were used. The choice of the starting 
point bids was based on a small-sample pre-testing, which gave an idea about 
the likely lower and upper bounds of individual WTP responses. 
The elicitation method applied was a combination of the bidding game and 
payment cards (BG-PC). For instance, if the starting bid was FIM 500 and the 
respondent refused to pay that much, the interviewer asked if the respondent 
would be willing to pay FIM 100. In case the respondent still refused to accept 
the offer, the interviewer inquired whether the respondent would be willing to 
pay at least FIM 50 or whether he would rather not pay at ali. In case the 
respondent was willing to accept the FIM 100 offer, he was shown a payment 
card in which amounts ranging from FIM 150 to 450 were printed, the interval 
being FIM 50. A similar technique was used in the case of other starting bids. 
However, the FIM 50 precision in WTP elicitation was maintained only up to 
FIM 1,000. After that, the required precision changed to FIM 100. In case the 
respondent was willing to pay more than FIM 2,500, he was asked an open- 
128 
ended WTP question. The iterative questioning process is described in more 
detail in Appendix C. 
The choice of the applied WTP elicitation method was based on the follow-
ing reasoning. On the one hand, the use of the open-ended valuation question 
was rejected because the respondents might have felt it too difficult to state 
directly their willingness to pay because of the rather complex nature of the 
good being valued. On the other hand, the use of the dichotomous choice 
valuation question as the only means of WTP elicitation would have led to 
estimation problems in the analysis of the mean WTP of the attitudinal groups 
(see Chapter 7) where mean WTP estimates were calculated for several 
subsamples. In order to achieve the same statistical explanatory power and 
precision as in the BG-PC based estimation, the sample size should have been 
considerably larger, which, in turn, would have raised the surveying costs too 
high. 1n addition, the advantage of the BG-PC elicitation method was that it 
made it possible to apply the simultaneous dichotomous choice estimation in 
those cases where there were enough observations. 
The questionnaire also contained elements that were designed in order to 
examine the possibility of some information related biases. As the use of differ-
ent starting bids indicates, one of the goals was to test the existence of a starting 
point bias. In addition, the purpose was also to test the effects of additional 
information. To make the comparison of different starting bids and information 
levels possible, six slightly different questionnaires were used. The question-
naires were randomly assigned to the respondents. A brief information package 
describing the characteristics of the rural environment was included in half of 
the questionnaires, and the sequence of some other items of the questionnaire 
was dependent on whether the information package was included or not. Thus, 
there were two distinct questionnaires from the perspective of the information 
content. The questionnaires with differing information content had, as already 
mentioned above, three levels of starting bids. To check the suitability of the 
questionnaire, the market research institute responsible for the face-to-face in-
terviews tested it in the field conditions. Some minor design improvements were 
made in order to clarify the interviewers' role in the WTP elicitation process. 
In the questionnaire there were also questions conceming the attitudes and 
values of respondents. They were mainly claims about the state of the Finnish 
agriculture and environment and the relationship between them. The idea of the 
set of attitudinal questions was to identify how people relate themselves to the 
environmental and economic consequences of conventional agriculture. In addi-
tion, the attitudinal questions were aimed to reveal how people feel about 
certain environmental and ecological issues relevant to sustainable develop-
ment. The respondent had to indicate, by applying a five-point scale, how 
strongly he agreed or disagreed with the presented claims14. Attitudinal ques- 
14 See Appendix B, Question 3-7, for the actual attitudinal questions. 
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TYPE I QUESTIONNAIRE 	 TYPE II QUESTIONNAIRE 
Questions about basic 
socio-economic factors 
y 
Scope question 
WTP question with 
different starting bids 
FIM 100 FIM 500 FIM 1300 
Scope question 
WTP question with 
different starting bids 
FIM 100 FIM 500 FIM 1300 
v 
Questions revealing 
attitudes and values 
Questions about basic 
socio-economic factors 
•  
Information 
package 
Questions revealing 
attitudes and values 
v 
Additional questions about 
socio-economic factors 
y 
Additional questions about 
socio-economic factors 
tions were formulated in a manner that would have produced clearly identifi-
able, somewhat polarized attitudinal dimensions in respect of agricultural and 
environmental issues. The formulation was meant to facilitate the use of the 
attitudinal questions in the further statistical analysis, i.e. in the factor and 
cluster analyses. 
The structure of the different questionnaires is depicted in Figure 6.1. In the 
beginning of every interview, questions were asked about basic socio-economic 
factors like age, gender, marital status, etc. Then, depending on the type of the 
questionnaire, the interviewer proceeded to the WTP question (type II question-
naire), or he briefly gave some more information to the respondent about the 
rural environment and its characteristics (information package) (type I question-
naire). The following section in type I questionnaire consisted of the attitudinal 
questions. The actual WTP question was asked after these two sections. The 
respondents who answered type II questionnaire never received any additional 
information about the rural environment and were asked to answer the claims 
measuring attitudes after they had already responded to the WTP question. 
Figure 6.1. Sequence of Sections in the Questionnaires. 
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The overall quality of responses appeared to be of good standard. Only eight 
questionnaires had to be rejected because of insufficient answers to the willing-
ness to pay question. Thus, the number of observations that is used as the basis 
for most of the analysis is 663. There were accidental missing values for certain 
socio-economic background variables like, for instance, income (16% of the 
respondents refused to reveal their approximate before-tax income) but in most 
cases the data was very close to complete. This is probably due to the use of 
face-to-face interviews. However, the shortcoming of the sampling method is 
that there is no data available from those who refused to participate in the 
survey. 
6.2. Modeling and Estimation of Willingness to Pay When Using the 
Dichotomous Choice Questioning Format 
In this section, we review in more detail the three approaches that are applied in 
the WTP estimation from the dichotomous basis. The standard case is based on 
Hanemann (1984). It is a random utility model with a logit specification acting 
as the cumulative distribution function. The simple spike model follows the 
guidelines set by Hanemann and Kriström (1995). In addition, a non-parametric 
estimation technique is elaborated (see e.g. Kriström 1990b). 
The dichotomous choice approach in its different variations is nowadays the 
most commonly applied elicitation format in contingent valuation surveys. Its 
major advantage is to make the valuation situation resemble a market transac-
tion. The respondent faces a simple decision: Does he want to or does he not 
want to pay a fixed amount of money for a specified change in environmental 
quantity and/or quality? Of course, there are also several problems involved. In 
theory, an anchoring effect may be present in the sense that the respondent 
assumes that the offered amount somehow indicates the "true" value of the 
environmental improvement and thus feels obliged to answer in the affirmative. 
However, if the possible biases related to the response situation and other 
details of the valuation scenario are neglected, there is still a serious problem to 
cope with: How to derive a meaningful mean or median willingness to pay 
estimate from a large amount of "yes" and "no" answers that are given to a 
number of different offers, AB = A1, .., A., (known as the bidding vector) and 
distributed across n1, .., nk individuals? At each offerAi (i = 1..m) there will be 
hi (i= 1..k) people accepting the offer for the suggested project and ni —h. 
rejecting to pay the specified amount (Kriström 1990a, p. 61). 
There are a few alternative approaches to solve the problem. One that is 
often referred to is the model developed by Hanemann (1984). The principal 
merit of Hanemann's model is that it cleverly combines economic theory and 
statistical estimation procedures. It is based on the so-called random utility 
model (RUM). The basic postulate of the RUM is that a consumer makes 
131 
rational and utility maximizing discrete choices the exact grounds of which are 
not known by anyone but himself. If an observer, like a CVM researcher, wants 
to model the consumer's or the respondent's behavior, he has to accept that 
there will be inherent a certain amount of randomness because the consumer's 
utility functions are not known. From the researcher's point of view, imperfect 
information means that, although the respondents in their responses maximize 
their individual utility, the researcher does not know exactly how the offer 
relates to the respondents' utility. 
Thus, individual respondents are assumed to know their utility function (V), 
which have as arguments income (Y), an environmental commodity (Z), and a 
socio-economic conditioning factor (5). Other arguments, like prices of market 
goods, which are not supposed to change, are suppressed for simplicity. A 
crucial assumption is that, even though the respondent knows his utility function 
(V) (see e.g. Johansson et al. 1989) 
(6-1) 	 V = V(Y,Z;S) 
with certainty, it contains some components that are unobservable to the re-
searcher who, consequently, treats them as stochastic. Thus, the utility function 
observed (V0) by the researcher can be written 
(6-2) 	 V, =V, (Y, Z; S)-1- 
where e is a random variable or an error term with zero mean. The term E 
expresses how much the utility observed by the researcher differs from the 
respondent's actual utility. Of course, it is not possible to define the true 
characteristics of the random variable. However, if we attempt to analyze the 
dichotomous choice situation confronted by the respondent, some assumptions 
must be made about the distribution of the random variable. In practice, these 
assumptions dictate what the dichotomous WTP estimation model will be like. 
Assume that the supply of the environmental commodity increases from Z0 
to Z1. The change in utility (AV) experienced by the respondent can be de-
scribed in the following way: 
AV = V(Y, Z1 ; S)—V(Y,Z o ; S) 
(6-3) 	 = V, (Y, Z ] ; S)+81 —[V0 (Y,Z0 ;S)+e0 ] 
where V() and V.") are consistent with Equations 6-1 and 6-2, respectively. If 
the respondent has to face a choice situation where he is supposed to decide 
whether to pay or whether not to pay for the proposed quantity and/or quality 
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change of the environmental commodity Z, the respondent weighs benefits and 
costs in the spirit of Equation 6-3. If the utility increase is large enough when Z 
rises from Z0 toZ1, the respondent is likely to be willing to pay a certain amount 
of money, A p for the increase: 
(6-4) V(Y 	
S)—V(Y ,Z0.; S)0 
<=>V(Y — A1 , Z; S)V(Y,Z o ; S) 
According to Equation 6-4, the respondent approves the offer A1 if the utility 
produced by the increase of Z is greater than the utility lost when paying the 
amount A1.When the respondent is inquired his willingness to pay for, say, pro-
environmental farming, his response is affirmative only if the inequality de-
picted in Equation 6-4 becomes satisfied and the amount 4  is his maximum 
willingness to pay for the change in the magnitude of pro-environmental farm-
ing (Z) from Zo (existing initial level) to Z1 (proposed subsequent higher level). 
Furthermore, Equation 6-4 indicates that the respondent's maximum willingness 
to pay can now be expressed as has been done in Equation 6-5: 
(6-5) 	 V(Y —ES,Z1 ; S)=V(Y ,Z ; S) 
where ES is as great as the highest possible offer Ai satisfying the inequality 
depicted in Equation 6-4. As a welfare measure, ES represents the equivalent 
suiplus or the amount of income Y that should be given to the respondent 
instead of the quantity change from Z0 toZ1 to leave the respondent as well off 
as with the change in the environmental commodityZ. 
Furthermore, we can assume that respondents' willingness to pay is distrib-
uted along some distribution function Gwtp. In this case the probability of the 
"yes" answer to the WTP question based on the offer Ai can be defined in the 
following way (Hanemann 1984): 
(6-6) 	P[WTP Ai l= 1 — 	( A)= P[71V ( • ) gi= F e ( AV ) 
where AV = V(Y — A„ Z1; S)—V(Y, Zo ; S), E = Eo — and FE is the cumulative 
distribution function for the random term or error (E). 
To compute the expected value, i.e. the mean value of willingness to pay, 
E(WTP), we can use the fact that for any random variable belonging to the set 
of real numbers (R) with a cumulative distribution function F, it can be shown 
that (Kriström 1990a, pp. 65-66): 
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(6-7) 	 E( x ) = $(1 — F(x)) dx — $F() dx 
and as a logical implication, we can write 
(6-8) 	 E(WTP) = — G(A))dA — Gmp(A)dA 
or alternatively 
0 
(6-9) 	E (WTP ) = f Fe (i1V (A))dA — 	— F s(AV(A)))dA 
At this point, we have to make two choices before we can actually estimate 
E(WTP). First, we must select the functional form for FE . Second, we have to 
decide how to specify utility functions contributing to AV. The choice of Fg is 
usually made from a somewhat restricted set of alternatives. The applicable 
binary choice models include the linear probability model (LPM), the logit 
model (LM), and the probit model (PM). Because of problems related to 
heteroskedasticity (Maddala 1983, p. 16) and especially because of the possibil-
ity of probability predictions outside the [0..1] range (Kennedy 1992, p. 229), 
the LPM is not suitable for the estimation of E(WTP). The selection between 
probit and logit models is a matter of taste because the standard normal cumula-
tive distribution function does not differ much from the standard logistic cumu-
lative distribution function (c.d.f.). However, because the standard logistic c.d.f. 
is numerically simpler, it is usually preferred among CVM researchers. In most 
CVM applications both logit and probit models produce similar E(WTP) esti-
mates (Bowker and Stoll 1988). 
The standard logistic cumulative distribution function, F(x), is also used in 
this study for the estimation ofE(WTP). We can write 
(6-10) F(x)= 	Lv,A , =Fe 
1 + e 
Hanemann's (1984) model offers an intuitively appealing and theoretically 
interpretable derivation for AV. Assume a simple linear-in-income utility func-
tion 
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(6-11) 	 = 
where i = 0 or 1 (referring to either Zo or Z1 supply situation), oci is a constant, 13 
is the marginal utility of income, and Y is income. 
Consider Equation 6-4 and replace the utility functions by using the specifi-
cation given in Equation 6-11. As a result, 
(6-12) AV = V(Z1 )— V(Zo )= +P(Y —A)—(ao +PY) 
= 	— ao -RA 
where ai — ao  can be denoted as a to simplify the notation. Now it is possible to 
give parameters a and (3 a theoretically sound interpretation. Parameter a shows 
the effect of the change in supply of Z from Zo to Z1 on the respondent's utility. 
In other words, parameter oc represents the marginal utility of environmental 
improvement. Correspondingly, parameter f3 indicates the respondent's mar-
ginal utility of income in relation to the environmental commodity Z. 
Applying Equations 6-9, 6-10, and 6-12, we can now write 
oc) 	 o 
(6-13) 	E(WTP)=  dA 
I+ e-a± fiA j 	1+e1 a-fiA j
dA 
0 
The simplifying computations show that E(WTP) = a/13. The proof is given 
in Kriström (1990a, pp. 153-154) and is not reproduced here. 
Also the median WTP, M(WTP), can be derived. The median WTP is a cost 
such that the probability of acceptance of a Certain offer, A*, is 50%. In a case 
like this the median respondent will be indifferent between paying A* to acquire 
a higher level of environmental quality (Z1 ) or remaining at the level of prevail-
ing environmental quality (Z0 ). Thus, A* can be considered to be M(W7'P). We 
can denote 
(6-14) 	P[V(Y —A*,Z1 ; S)+E I V(Y,Zo ; S)+Eo l= 0.5 
and using Equations 6-10 and 6-14, it is possible to write 
(6-15) 1  
I + e-a±fim" ) = 0.5 
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where solving in respect of M(WTP) gives M(WTP) = a/13. As a conclusion we 
can state that, if a symmetric cumulative distribution function is used and the 
applied range of integration is 	then E(WTP) = M(WTP) = a/13. 
However, there are different views about the correct limits of integration. 
The use of the range 	which is also followed in this presentation, is 
based on the reasoning given by Johansson et al. (1989). Their argument for 
extending integration to is that some respondents are willing to pay more than 
the bidding vector's (A13 ) highest bid Am. Correspondingly, their argument for 
extending integration backwards to 	is that some respondents are not willing 
to pay the lowest bid level (A1 ) and so it can be argued that some of these 
respondents would, rather than pay for an increase in the provision, prefer to 
receive an increase in their income in exchange for a reduction in the provision. 
Sellar et al. (1986), on the other hand, argue that there should be truncation 
following the limits of observable data, i.e. [0..A.]. Their main argument is that 
beyond the highest bid level Ani the extrapolation is dependent upon the distribu-
tional assumptions being made (Bateman et al. 1995). Hanemann (1989) points 
out, however, that the approach of Johansson et al. (1989) produces the correct 
formula to employ when measuring the mean WTP for dichotomous choice 
CVM models that admit the possibility of negative WTP values. Nevertheless, 
as Hanemann (1989) shows, it is not possible to say if truncated E(WTP) is 
greater or smaller than non-truncated E(WTP). It depends on the magnitudes of 
1 — P["yes" to 4 = 01 and P["yes" to 
Parameters a and f3 can be estimated by using either generalized least squares 
or maximum likelihood techniques. For estimation problems having enough 
"yes" and "no" responses per each offer, either method of estimation is accept-
able. In the case of few responses per each offer, maximum likelihood tech-
niques are usually preferred (Bowker and Stoll 1988). In this study, the maxi-
mum likelihood technique is used. In practice, the idea of the maximum likeli-
hood technique is to maximize the likelihood function or its natural logarithm 
ln(L), which in this case can be noted as (see e.g. Judge et al. 1988, p. 791): 
(6-16) 	in (L)= ' [Ti ln(1—G,p(A))+ (1 —Ti )(lnG,p(A))1 
i=1 
where 7', is a variable that indicates the response to the dichotomous valuation 
question. is equal toi if the respondent has accepted offer A, and otherwise 
is equal to 0. 
It is also possible to calculate the variance of E(WTP) = a/13. This can be 
done by applying a formula (see e:g. Kriström 1990a, p. 86): 
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2 
(6-17) Vai{ a— •=-; 	
var(a)' var(fl)- 2cov(a,fl)  
fe ) ce
2 	162. 	' a ji  
The model developed by Hanemann (1984) "is not the only alternative to 
analyze dichotomous data. There are also some other estimation approaches that 
are based on the use of parametric distribution functions. l3ishop and Heberlein 
(1979) suggested that the mean willingness to pay can be approximated by an 
area under a logistic function by using the highest bid (A.) of the bidding vector 
as a truncation point and applying the• specification AV = a + [31nA instead of 
AV = a —13A. However, this kind of approximation lacks theoretical support 
because, as Hanemann (1984) notes, no explicit specification of V(Y— Ai, Z ]; S) 
— V(Y, Zo ; S) can create a utility difference AV = a + 131nA. Therefore, Bishop 
and Heberlein' s (1979) approach is not strictly compatible with the utility 
maximization hypothesis. 
Cameron (1988) has pointed out that Hanemann' s (1984) approach becomes 
computationally complicated if one wishes to employ a general type utility 
function and a general type distribution function. She proposes an approach that 
focuses on the distribution of WTP instead of the random (error) term E. Conse-
quently, the main advantage is that it is possible to circumvent the computation 
of utility differences for more complex specifications of utility functions. Nev-
ertheless, Cameron's (1988) approach is not as convincing as Hanemann's 
(1984) model in terms of theoretical merit. Sellar et al. (1986), in turn, have 
shown that certain specified logarithmic approximations for AV outperform 
Hanemann's (1984) suggestions if goodness-on-fit statistics is taken as a yard-
stick. However, because the specifications that Sellar et al. (1986) have applied 
are not directly derived from utility functions, they have more empirical than 
theoretical weight as evidence. Thus, Hanemann's (1984) model clearly has 
more advantages than the competing approaches. 
When dichotomous data is used, the central problem of estimation is that the 
amount of information extracted from each response is rather meager. If the 
respondent does not accept the offer A, we only know that his WTP is lower 
than the offer A. A step forward would be taken if it were possible to detect 
whether the respondent's WTP is true zero, and not just lower than the offer Ai. 
This kind of innovation poses an estimation problem because standard logit and 
probit models do not allow the respondent to have zero willingness to pay for an 
environmental improvement. So there is room for development of estimation 
techniques. However, some theoretical aspects should also be taken into consid-
eration. We can argue that the zero WTP is just a sign of free-riding and not a 
legitimate piece of evidence of true zero WTP. Nevertheless, it should be 
perceivable that there are people who are not ready to pay for environmental 
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improvements if they consider the improvements meaningless to themselves. 
The spike model developed by Hanemann and Kriström (1995) allows this kind 
of behavior. 
Relying on the notation employed above, we can now write the distribution 
function F of WTP or the random (error) term E (Kriström 1995, p. 4): 
(6-18) 
	
10 
	if A< 0 
Fe = p 	if A=0 
if A>0 
where p E [0, 1] and G(A)  is a continuous and increasing function such that 
Gwtp(0) = p and lim G(A) = 1 when A 	00. The probability that a person is 
willing to pay a positive sum of money not exceeding A is therefore Gwtp(A)—p, 
indicating that there is a jumpdiscontinuity in zero. As we can see, the spike 
model is a variation of the random utility model, the only difference being that 
the fonnulation of FE  also allows the discontinuity caused by the approval of 
zero WTP responses. In practice there appears to be three major differences 
when a logit spike model is compared to a logit random utility model. First, 
because the cumulative distribution function employed in the spike model is not 
symmetric, the equality between E(WTP) and the median WTP no longer holds. 
Second, the dichotomous valuation question becomes two-fold. Third, the asym-
metry of the distribution function and the two-fold valuation question together 
produce a more complicated likelihood function to be maximized (which is true, 
of course, only if the parameter estimation is carried out by using the maximum 
likelihood technique). 
Consider the calculation of E(WTP). In the case where FE  is chosen to be a 
normal logistic cumulative distribution function and the AV specification of 
Hanemann (1984) is applied, it can be shown that (Kriström 1995, p. 12) 
(6-19) 	 E(WTP) = jr 	1 A dA= 1 —lny+ea ) 1 
0 1+ e-a+ fi 	fi 
The median WTP can still be expressed as M(WTP) = cc/I3 if at least half of 
the respondents have WTP greater than zero. Otherwise M(WTP) will be zero. 
This is the main difference between an ordinary RU model and the spike model, 
because these results indicate that in the spike model bothE(WTP) and M(WTP) 
are always 0. This not the case when Hanemann's standard approach is 
applied (see e.g. Bowker and Stoll 1988). 
CO 
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The two-fold valuation question goes as follows: first the interviewer asks 
whether the individual would want to contribute at ali to the project. If the 
answer is "no", no further questions will be asked. If the answer is "yes", then 
the interviewer asks a conventional dichotomous choice valuation question with 
some offer Ai. Unfortunately, there is a potential correlation between the two 
questions asked. There might be an ordering effect, such that the ordering of the 
valuation questions has an impact on the reported answers. However, it is not 
likely that the problem is as severe as when the double-bounded dichotomous 
choice question is applied. In that case there is the risk that an incentive-
compatibility problem may arise (see e.g. Cummings et al. 1995). 
Based on the two answer categories of the valuation question and on Equa-
tion 6-18, the maximum likelihood function or its natural logarithm ln(Ls ) for 
the spike model can be formulated (Kriström 1995, p. 6): 
(6-20) 
n 
ln( Ls ) = [sTi 112(1 — 	( A))+ S ( 1 — )1n(G( A)—G,„,p  
+ 
where 	is a variable that indicates the response to the conventional dichoto- 
mous valuation question. T = 1 if the respondent has accepted the offer A and 
otherwise = 0. Variable S, describes the answer to the first question. If the 
respondent is willing to contribute to the project, i.e. his WTP > 0, then S1 = 1 
and otherwise S1 = 0. The data analyzed in this study is suitable for the spike 
model application because the bidding game helps to identify the respondents 
whose expressed WTP is zero. Of course, it is possible to argue that at least 
some of these zeroes are due to the bidding process because some of the 
respondents may have stated a zero response in order to end the bidding game 
prematurely. This would mean that the E(WTP) estimate given by the spike 
model is an understatement. 
Hanemann' s (1984) model as well as the approaches suggested by Bishop 
and Heberlein (1979) and Cameron (1988) are based on a parametric distribu-
tion assumption. Thus, there is always the risk of misspecification of the distri-
bution function involved because an assumption is made about individual utility 
functions that cannot really be observed by the researcher. It is well known that, 
in general, the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters in FE will be 
inconsistent if the distribution assumption is incorrect. Consequently, this moti-
vates a search for methods where the distribution function is not critical (Kriström 
1990b). 
Responses of a standard dichotomous choice application can be expressed as 
a ratio between "yes" answers (hi ) and ali the answers (ni ) related to each offer 
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Ai belonging to the bidding vector AB = A1, , A. This gives a sequence of 
proportions: 
(6-21) 	 = 
where n = hi / ni. Ayer et al. (1955) show that if Ir forms a monotone non-
increasing sequence of proportions, this sequence provides a distribution free 
maximum likelihood (DFML) estimator of the probability of acceptance. 
In case the sequence is not monotonic, Ayer et al. (1955) propose the follow-
ing algorithm (also known as the pool-adjacent-violator algorithm): If 7ri < 
for some i (i = 1..m-1), then n = 	where the dot denotes the maximum 
likelihood estimates. The proportions Jrj and 7r are replaced by (h,+111,1 )1 
(z i + zi,i ) and the procedure is repeated until the sequence is monotonic in i.lt 
is possible to show that this estimator has the desirable consistency property, i.e. 
under the conditions provided by Ayer et al. (1955) the estimated probabilities 
converge in probability to the true probability for acceptance (Kriström 1990b). 
Because there will be at most m estimates for the probability of acceptance, a 
rule must be developed in order to interpolate between the proportions. Usually 
linear interpolation is applied but there is no elaborate theoretical reasoning 
behind this. Furthermore, it is customary to assume that if A1 = 0, then ali 
respondents accept the offer. This gives the starting point of the empirical 
survival function, as the sequence of proportions 2r is sometimes called. How-
ever, this kind of assumption is not theoretically completely valid because it 
rules out the possibility of negative WTP. In this respect, the non-parametric 
approach resembles the simple spike model. The more serious problem related 
to the non-parametric estimation is that there is no theoretically correct model to 
define the specific offer A7  that would produce a 100% rejection rate. Thus, it is 
somewhat vague what should be used as the end point of the empirical survival 
function. This has a crucial meaning because the area under the empirical 
survival function approximates the mean WTP. In most cases, linear extrapola-
tion is employed. It is based on the proportions zni_i and Irm. 
Because the non-parametric estimation is rather sensitive to the choice of the 
offer A, that produces the 100% rejection rate, it is reasonable to argue that the 
median WTP should be preferred to the mean WTP. This recommendation can 
be given despite the fact that in most cases the median WTP must also be 
estimated through interpolation. Nevertheless, if the bidding vector has been 
constructed correctly, the median should be a more robust estimate than the 
mean. The median WTP will be located between offers which satisfy the condi- 
tion 7r1 > Tri 0.5 	?En,. After the offers zi and 7r,±1 have been located, 
the linear interpolation (or other kind of interpolation) between them makes it 
possible to define the exact offer A* that gives lv = 0.5. 
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6.3. Mean and Median Willingness to Pay for Pro-Environmental 
Farming 
In Tables 6.1 and 6.2, mean and median WTPs are reported in three categories, 
for the whole sample, for those who have not received additional information, 
and for those who have received additional information. Mean and median 
WTPs have been estimated by using two elicitation methods, the combined 
bidding game-payment card format and the dichotomous choice format. The 
mean and median WTP elicitation based on the combined bidding game-pay-
ment card technique is carried out in two slightly divergent versions. The first 
version covers ali the 663 observations, and leaving out observations in which 
the expressed WTP was equal to or higher than RIVI 2,500 produces the second 
one. The reasoning behind this practice is to eliminate responses that can be 
considered outliers. However, an elimination process of this kind has not its 
roots in any unambiguous postulate of economic theory. It merely illuminates 
the fact that mean WTP can be quite sensitive to a small number of deviating 
individual WTPs. 
It is also possible to utilize the dichotomous choice format because the 
starting bids used in the combined bidding game-payment card (BG-PC) tech-
nique form a bidding vector consisting of offers FIM 100, 500 and 1,300. 
Concerning the dichotomous choice, two different, although closely related, 
model specifications of parametric nature are applied. The starting point is a 
random utility model with the logit specification acting as the cumulative distri-
bution function. The standard model is based on the approach introduced by 
Hanemann (1984). In the application of the standard model, the effect of differ-
ent truncations is tested. The simple spike model in turn follows the guidelines 
set by Hanemann and Kriström (1995). In addition, a non-parametric estimation 
technique that is based on dichotomous choice data is also used (Kriström 
1990b). Ali these approaches were reviewed in detail in Chapter 6.2. 
There is some variation in the average figures depending on the chosen 
elicitation method or model specification. Mean WTP for the whole sample 
ranges from FIM 290 to FIM 615 and median WTP for the whole data from FIM 
150 to FIM 379. This supports the common notion that median is a more robust 
estimate than mean. It is a matter of taste if the observed variation in mean and 
median WTPs is considered significant from the policy-making perspective. 
The highest mean WTP estimate is approximately four times bigger than the 
lowest median WTP estimate. If the monetary estimate is the only criterion for 
decision-making, the differences in average figures can be regarded as worry-
ing. However, if the monetary estimate is taken as auxiliary information the 
purpose of which is to facifitate the decision-making process and not to dictate 
its outcome, the situation becomes less restricting. 
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Table 6.1. Mean WTPs Estimated by Using Different Elicitation Methods and 
Statistical Models, FIM/Person/Year. 
BG-PC N=663 Standard model 
(BG-PC w/o 	(Standard model 
outliers N=647) [Standard model 
Non-param. model 0..A 
(Non-param. model 0..4+500) 
[Non-param. model 0..A-500] 
Simple spike 
model 
Without additional 357 207 507 542 
info (315) (402) (554) 
[319] [460] 
With additional 446 384 633 635 
info (354) (325) (694) 
[262] [573] 
Whole sample 402 297 562 587 
(334) (362) (615) 
[290] [509] 
Table 6.2. Median WTPs Estimated by Using Different Elicitation Methods and 
Statistical Models. 
BG-PC N=663 
(BG-PC w/o 
outliers N=647) 
Standard model 
(Standard model 
[Standard model 0..A.] 
Non-param. model 0..A 	Simple spike 
(Non-param. model 0..A+500) 	model 
[Non-param. model 0.A-500] 
Without additional 150 207 218 333 
info (150) (207) (218) 
[207] [218] 
With additional 150 384 323 429 
info (150) (384) (323) 
[384] [323] 
Whole sample 150 297 281 379 
(150) (297) (281) 
[297] [281] 
Consider first the apparent sensitiveness of the combined bidding game-
payment card format in relation to the highest bids. The removal of 16 highest 
individual WTPs (2.4% of the sample) reduces the mean WTP by 16.9% (from 
FIM 402 to FIM 334). If the same removal of observations is done concerning 
the standard model [_cx0..00] and the non-parametric model [0.A], the mean WTP 
changes somewhat less, 11.4% (from FIM 297 to FIM 263), and 8.2% (from 
FIM 562 to FIM 516), respectively. A corresponding comparison of changes in 
median WTP produces exactly the opposite order of magnitude changes. There 
is no alteration when the combined bidding game-payment card format is in 
question (FIM 150 - FIM 150), 11.4% (from FIM 297 to FIM 263) for the 
standard model Foo....] and 7.5% (from FIM 281 to FIM 260) for the non-
parametric model [0.A]. 
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The estimation of the standard error of the mean WTP is another way to 
assess the sensitivity related to the exclusion or inclusion of the highest bids. In 
the BG-PC model, the standard error of the mean WTP diminishes from FIM 
24.7 to FIM 17.8 (28%) when the 16 highest WTP responses are eliminated. In 
the standard model 	the approximate estimate for the standard error of 
the mean WTP decreases from FIM 66.5 to FIM 63.5 (4.4%). Thus, based 
purely on the statistical properties of different models, the dichotomous choice 
format seems to be more reliable in terms of the mean WTP estimation, al-
though the BG-PC approach seems to be in this context more robust in terms of 
the median WTP estimation. 
Although it is possible to suggest that the highest bids in the BG-PC format 
are outliers and should be left out because of this, the elimination should always 
be based on sound theoretical arguments. In other words, the question is about 
the validity of WTP responses. If the highest bids are eliminated, the argument 
must be that the highest bidders do not reveal their "true" WTP. This may be the 
case, for instance, because of some sort of goal-oriented response motives. A 
much-used strategy is to compare the expressed individual WTP to individual 
income. If the individual WTP is implausibly high in relation to income, we can 
conclude that the respondent behaves strategically. However, it is very difficult 
to define what is an "implausibly high" proportion of income, because income 
may be an inadequate indicator of ali the resources that the respondent is ready 
to sacrifice to match his expressed willingness to pay. Especially when environ-
mental values are at stake, many people are willing to make considerable efforts 
in order to promote their views. Thus, a comparison between expressed WTPs 
and income levels may appear to be a too simplifying choice as a screening 
criterion. 
Table 6.3 presents an analysis of whether the 16 highest bids can be deemed 
the results of strategic behavior. Of course, it is not possible to derive an 
assessment criterion that would unambiguously show if a certain response was a 
misstatement of the "true" WTP. Consider first the ratio between WTP and pre-
tax income. As already argued in the previous paragraph, there is no clear-cut 
way to define when this ratio becomes "implausibly high". If one-percent level 
is chosen, then 14 observations are dubious of their nature. If five-percent level 
is chosen instead, then only one observation looks suspicious. Ali the responses 
are also consistent in the sense that ali but one respondent are willing to convert 
at least 25% percent of total agricultural land under pro-environmental cultiva-
tion. In addition, ali but one respondents have a clearly positive attitudel5 
towards sustainable development, which can be perceived to be a strong indica- 
15 The methods that were applied to identify attitudinal groups are explained in Chapters 7.1, 
7.2, and in Appendix F. 
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Table 6.3. Some Characteristics of Possible "Outlier" Observations. 
Number of 
observation 
Individual WTP 
FIM/year 
Pre-tax income 
FIM/year 
Individual WTP / 
pre-tax income, % 
Attitude towards Proportion of pro- 
sustainable 	environmentally 
development*) 	cultivated land 
should be 
69 2 500 350 000 0.7 % + + + 50 % 
100 5 000 100 000 5.0% +++ 100% 
121 3 000 65 000 4.6% +++ 50% 
292 2 500 180 000 1.4% +++ 60% 
317 2 500 35 000 7.1 % +++ 25% 
435 2 500 n.a. n.a. 10 % 
442 2 500 65 000 3.8 % + + 50 % 
454 5 000 n.a. n.a. + + 85 % 
497 3 000 350 000 0.9 % + + 25 % 
560 2 500 225 000 1.1 % + + 50 % 
584 3 500 225 000 1.6 % + + + 100 % 
592 2 500 180 000 1.4% + 25% 
609 3 000 100 000 3.0 % + + 100 % 
655 5 000 350 000 1.4 % + + + 100 % 
685 2 500 225 000 1.1 % + + 25 % 
689 2 500 225 000 1.1 % + + 25 % 
*) The more `+' signs, the more positive attitude towards sustainable development. The more `—' signs, the 
more negative attitude towards sustainable development. 
tor that the respondents truly prefer pro-environmental farming to conventional 
agriculture. 
Observation number '592 and especially observation number 435 qualify as 
potential strategic responses because at the first glance there appears to be some 
inconsistency. Observation number 435 expresses high WTP but is not in favor 
of sustainable development, which is a central concept closely related to pro-
environmental farming. However, a closer look reveals that respondent number 
435 has a very positive attitude towards conventional farming. He is also a 
farmer and his father has been a farmer. Because he also wants to convert only 
10% of the total agricultural land to pro-environmental farming, the conclusion 
is obvious. Respondent number 435 considers pro-environmental farming a 
means to guarantee that there will also be conventional agriculture left in the 
future. Thus, the answer is strategic in the sense that the respondent values 
something else than what is meant to be valued in the valuation scenario. 
However, it does not mean that the respondent misstates his WTP because he 
would probably be willing to pay the amount he has mentioned if it really 
secured the future of conventional agriculture. It is likely that respondent number 
592 represents rather similar views. He does not have a farming background, but 
he has a very positive attitude towards conventional agriculture and a positive 
attitude towards pro-environmental farming, too. The result is that there is not 
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enough substantiated evidence to prove that the highest bidders conceal their 
"true" WTP and express exaggerated values. 
This example clearly shows that, although the dichotomous choice format 
can be more desirable in terms of statistical properties, it lacks the wider 
analytic power of the BG-PC format. The motivations behind expressed WTPs 
and some other not so obvious relationships in the data are more easily detect-
able when an elicitation format which directly gives the individual WTP is 
applied. In this respect this study supports the view presented by Boyle et al. 
(1996), who argue that the prevailing endorsement of the dichotomous choice 
format should not lead to a complete rejection of other questioning formats. 
Although the estimation results of mean and median WTPs achieved through 
different methods and specifications are consistent with certain theoretical and 
statistical properties that they are supposed to fulfill, one anomaly deserves a 
closer inspection. When mean and median WTPs are compared, ali but two 
pairs of estimates follow the hypothesis that mean or median WTP for those 
who have received additional information is higher than for those who have not. 
The exceptions occur when the mean WTP is estimated by using the standard 
models [0....] and [0..A.]. The reason for this phenomenon is that the logit 
model behind the standard models is statistically somewhat inappropriate when 
the subsample of those who have not received additional information is in 
question. The estimation results can be found in Appendix D, and they show that 
the t-value for the parameter ci (INTERCEPT) is statistically questionable 
(0.1081). In addition, the result of the likelihood ratio test (X2 = 0.39) indicates 
that it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that a = = 0, meaning that the 
applied logit model severely lacks explanatory power. 
As an overall conclusion, we can state that any of the applied elicitation 
techniques and model specifications seems to be reliable enough when mean or 
median WTPs are estimated for the whole sample. The observed variation in the 
average figures is due to different presumptions behind alternative models, not 
inadequate reliability of the CV method as such. However, reliability cannot be 
separated from validity. It is clear that different valuation questions and other 
details of the valuation scenario considerably influence the outcome. This will 
be illuminated in more detail in Chapter 6.5, where possible starting point bias 
and information effects are examined. 
6.4. Demand Function for the Pro-Environmentally Cultivated 
Agricultural Land 
Individual WTP responses can also be used in another way to depict total WTP 
for pro-environmental farming. It is possible to derive a demand function for 
acreage under pro-environmental cultivation. As already explained above, the 
actual WTP question was preceded by an inquiry the purpose of which was to 
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define the proportion of agricultural land that the respondents considered appro-
priate to be converted from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farm-
ing. There were six pre-specified alternatives ranging from 0% to 100%, and the 
respondents were allowed to state some other percentage figure if they desired 
to do so. However, some of the respondents were not able or willing to specify 
the appropriate proportion. Ali in ali, 610 respondents out of 663 (92%) an-
swered this question. 
The idea is to derive a total demand function (DT ) for acreage under pro-
environmental farming among Finnish citizens. First, WTPAi is calculated. It is 
willingness to pay (aggregated across the Finnish population) per hectare per 
year for the respondent-stated-proportion (r1; rie [0..1]) of the total agricultural 
land in 1991 (Q) to be converted to pro-environmental farming 
(6-22) 
where 
WTPAi = 
( 
WTP 
\ .1=1  
Qri 
i = 1..k 
j= 1..m 
N = total amount of the respondents 
P = Finnish population in 1991 (15-69 years old) 
WTP.= individual willingness to pay for ri 
By applying the aggregation procedure developed above it is possible to 
acquire a set of k observations (OBS) that depict total willingness to pay per 
hectare for a certain amount of Q: 
k 	 r k 
(6-23) OBS = 	WTPA1 ,Qr1 , 	WTPAi ,Qr2 ,...,(WTPAk ,Qrk ) 
i=1 	1 \i=2 
Because the set OBS expresses a price-quantity relationship, the total de-
mand curve (DT ) can be obtained by fitting an appropriate function to the set of 
points. In this case, an exponential function of the form 
(6-24) 	 D : 	Y = Ce-dx 
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was used where 
Y = 	total willingness to pay per hectare per year for acreage under pro- 
environmental farming (TWTP/ha) 
X = 	acreage under pro-environmental farming, ha (ACREAGE) 
c, d = parameters to be estimated 
The estimation procedure was carried out by using SAS Statistical Package 
and its NLIN procedure, resulting in parameter values c = 2811.34 and d = 1.71 
(R2 = 0.9733). 
The total demand function (DT ) is inverse because it is more logical to view 
the TWTP/ha as a function of the total quantity of acreage under pro-environ-
mental farming. That is, for each level of the demand for pro-environmental 
farming the inverse demand function measures how much people are willing to 
pay for that amount. Consequently, the cumulative total willingness to pay 
(TWTP) for a conversion to pro-environmental farming can be calculated by 
integrating the total demand function over the area [0 .. 2.578960]. This gives 
2.578960 
(6-25) TWTP = 	2811.34 • e-1.71.ACREAGE dACREAGE =1.624 • 103 
and when the appropriate units are taken into account, the cumulative TWTP is 
FIM 1.624 billion per year. As we can easily see, the derivation of the total 
demand function for pro-environmental farming and its integration over the area 
[0..2.578960] should produce approximately similar total willingness to pay to 
the multiplication of mean willingness to pay times the target population (which 
is in this case FIM 1.449 billion per year). In essence, the estimation of the total 
demand function is an attempt to distribute the mean willingness to pay in a 
more informative way. 
In Figure 6.2, where the total demand curve is depicted, we can see that the 
cumulative total WTP accumulates rather rapidly. For the first 50% of acreage 
under pro-environmental farming the cumulative total WTP is FIM 1.462 bil-
lion. Thus, for the latter 50%, the increase is only FIM 162 million A fifty-
percent increment in the total acreage raises the cumulative total WTP less than 
10 percent. A brief calculation shows that 50% of the cumulative total WTP 
becomes accumulated when acreage under pro-environmental farming reaches 
398,000 hectares. The corresponding average WTP/ha is FIM 1,423. 
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Figure 6.2. Total Demand Function for Acreage under Pro-Environmental Farm-
ing. 
6.5. Existence of Starting Point Bias and Information Effects 
When information is perceived in a broad sense, the starting point bias can also 
be regarded as a certain type of information effect. If the respondent believes for 
some reason that the starting bid contains information about the "correct" value 
level of the valuation object, then this information will influence his WTP 
response. The same applies to virtually ali CVM design issues: any change in 
any element of the valuation instrument can be considered to alter the informa-
tion content. This should be kept in mind when the effects of information are 
analyzed, because it may be difficult to identify how much different changes in 
questionnaire design have influenced the information content and further the 
individual WTP. However, although the exact sources of information effects 
could not be localized, the overall information sensitiveness of the mean WTP 
would indicate that people's valuations are highly dependent on the information 
provided. This should somehow be reflected in the interpretation of results. 
As explained previously, six slightly different questionnaire formats were 
used in order to detect the possible starting point bias and information effects. 
There were three different starting bids and two different information levels, 
which were created by changing the sequence of questions and including a very 
148 
brief package of additional information. The mean WTPs of each questionnaire 
category are printed in Table 6.4. The reported mean WTPs were calculated by 
using the combined bidding game-payment card elicitation method. 
The type of the questionnaire has a recognizable influence on the mean. The 
higher the starting bid, the higher the average WTP. In addition, there appears to 
be a connection between additional information and higher mean WTPs. Statis-
tical significance of the differences among the mean WTPs is examined in 
Table 6.5 by using a t-test, which is an appropriate method to compare group 
means when variables with continuous values are in question. 
The t-test results give support to the existence of the starting point bias. 
Especially, if a closer look is taken to the pairwise comparisons between Q1 and 
Q3 or between Q4 and Q6, this becomes obvious. In both cases, the difference 
between means is statistically significant, the risk of falsely rejecting the null 
hypothesis being much less than 5%. Thus, a large increase in the starting bid 
(from FIM 100 to FIM 1,300) raises WTP responses. There is also some indica-
tion of the existence of the information effect, but the evidence is not statisti-
cally significant enough. If the pairwise comparisons Q1-Q4, Q2-Q5, and Q3-Q6 
are taken under inspection, we can see that the risk of falsely rejecting the null 
hypothesis is in each case higher than 5%. This is also true in the pairwise 
comparison between no-additional-info and additional-info. Of course, in the 
latter case not even a t-value less than 0.05 would be a convincing piece of 
evidence because of the joint-effect of information and starting bids. Corre-
spondingly, comparisons between SB 100, SB 500, and SB 1,300 do not pro- 
Table 6.4. The Mean WTPs of Different Questionnaires and Their Combina-
tions in Respect of the Starting Bid and Additional Information. 
Type of the questionnaire Mean WTP, FIM 
Q1 (SB=100 / no add. info) 116 17.5 272 
Q2 (SB=500 / no add. info) 109 16.4 333 
Q3 (SB=1300 / no add. info) 107 16.2 474 
Q4 (SB=100 / add. info) 118 17.8 316 
Q5 (SB=500 / add. info) 109 16.4 495 
Q6 (SB=1300 / add. info) 104 15.7 544 
No add. info (Q1+Q2+Q3) 332 50.0 357 
Add. info (Q4+Q5+Q6) 331 50.0 446 
SB100 (Q1+Q4) 234 35.3 294 
SB500 (Q2+Q5) 218 32.9 414 
SB1300 (Q3+Q6) 211 31.8 509 
Ali 663 100.0 402 
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Table 6.5. T-test Values of Pairwise Comparisons of Different Questionnaires 
and Their Combinations. 
Pairs under comparison Prob>IT1 Pairs under comparison Prob>ITI 
Q1 -Q2 0.2968 Q3 - Q6 0.4845 
Q1 -Q3 0.0145 Q4 - Q5 0.0545 
Q1 - Q4 0.5383 Q4 - Q6 0.0098 
Q1 - Q5 0.0110 Q5 - Q6 0.6372 
Q1 -Q6 0.0009 
Q2 - Q3 0.0779 No add. info - Add. info 0.0719 
Q2 - Q4 0.7924 
Q2 - Q5 0.0585 SB100 - SB500 0.0299 
Q2 - Q6 0.0076 SB100 - SB1300 0.0004 
Q3 - Q4 0.0742 SB500 - SB1300 0.1486 
Q3 - Q5  0.8431 
duce unambiguous evidence for the support or rejection of the null hypothesis 
because it is not possible to separate the influence of additional information 
from the starting bid. Thus, this kind of examination does not necessarily 
confirm or falsify the hypothesis about information effects. 
The same ambiguous conclusion about the possible existence of information 
effect can be made when the logit standard model 	is applied. The rather 
big difference in mean WTP between those who received additional information 
and those who did not (FIM 384 — FIM 207 = FIM 177) seems to suggest that 
information has an identifiable effect. However, if the standard deviations of the 
mean WTPs (87 and 103, respectively) are taken into account, the approximate 
"confidence intervals" (384+87 —> [297..471]) and (207±103 —> [104..310]) 
slightly overlap, indicating that the difference between mean WTPs is not 
statistically significant. 
However, the combined effect of additional information and starting bids 
indicates that the changes in the information content do affect people's willing-
ness to pay. For instance, the pairwise comparison between Q1 and Q6 shows 
this very clearly (t-value = 0.0009). Although we cannot really explain the 
influencing mechanism, we can assume that the information provided has had 
an impact through two channels. On the one hand, additional information has 
increased people's knowledge about positive ramifications of the conversion 
from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming. It is quite conceiv-
able that when people learn more about the advantages of a policy proposal, 
they are also more willing to contribute to it. On the other hand, people may feel 
uneasy when confronted by the interviewer because they are not previously 
familiar with the context of the valuation method or situation. Consequently, 
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they do not really know how they are expected to act. Then, it is natural that any 
information given by the interviewer is considered valuable. In this kind of 
situation, the starting bid easily transforms into a benchmark that becomes an 
indication of the "correct" answer. 
Because there exists preliminary although not properly confirmed evidence 
that information may have a considerable effect on WTP responses in certain 
occasions and conditions, it is meaningful to examine in more detail the rela-
tionship between respondents' WTP and the information content delivered 
through the survey instrument. This is done in the next chapter by introducing 
an attitudinal dimension. 
7. Attitudes, Information, Preferences, and Willingness to 
Pay 
The evidence presented in the previous chapter was inconclusive in relation to 
the existence of information effects. One reason for this may be that attitudes 
play a central role when people are confronted with new information. The 
purpose of this chapter is to examine whether attitudes appear to be a useful 
source of explanation when people' s willingness to pay is analyzed in connec-
tion with possible information effects, as well as whether attitudes can help to 
identify that kind of response behavior that can be considered to have its origin 
in a preference structure different from the standard neoclassical one. Through 
this, both reliability and validity of willingness to pay responses can be assessed 
in a complex valuation situation where several elements make it difficult for the 
respondent to produce sound and consistent monetary value statements. 
First, the empirical results acquired through the factor analysis are repre-
sented. By means of the cluster analysis, respondents are divided into groups 
based on the attitudinal dimensions revealed in the factor analysis. Then, a 
hypothesis on the effect of additional information is constructed and this hy-
pothesis is tested in connection to individual WTP responses. Finally, the differ-
ent attitudinal groups and individual WTP responses are used in order to assess 
the nature of preferences manifested through survey responses. 
7.1. Attitudinal Factors Among Respondents 
When an attempt is made to summarize a large body of data including many 
variables by means of relatively few parameters, a number of different statistical 
methods in the field of multivariate analysis can be applied. In the case at hand, 
where the aim is to find certain identifiable differences in attitudes towards 
agriculture and the environment, the question is about an analysis of interde- 
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pendence in the sense that the set of attitudinal variables taken under closer 
inspection are assumed to have an equal status. This means that the variables, 
although expected to be interdependent, cannot be classified as dependent vari-
ables and explanatory variables (Chatfield and Collins 1980, pp. 7-8). The 
factor analysis (FA)16 applies for this kind of approach. Its idea is to derive new 
variables called common factors, which are expected to give a better under-
standing of the data. 
The empirical analysis of respondents' attitudes was based on 22 attitudinal 
questions included in the questionnaire. They measured respondents' views 
regarding agriculture, the environment, and sustainable development (question 
3-7 in Appendix B, claims from a to v). Ali the questions were presented in the 
form of claims and the respondents had to agree or disagree with them by 
expressing their opinion on a five-point scale. These questions were the same in 
ali the questionnaires, although their placement varied to some extent depending 
on the type of the questionnaire (see Figure 6.1 in Chapter 6.1). In one half of 
the questionnaires attitudinal claims were asked after the actual WTP question 
and in the other half before the actual WTP question. 
It appeared that there was significant correlation between most of the 
attitudinal variables. When testing pairwise Pearson correlations, 18 variables 
out of 22 variables had at least one correlation coefficient higher than 0.3. This 
strongly indicated that it was worthwhile to proceed with the application of the 
factor analysis. 
The factor analysis was executed by using the FACTOR procedure that is 
included in the SAS/STATTm software package. The main option chosen was 
the principal factor analysis that is based on an orthogonal common factor 
model. The prior communality estimates were calculated by using squared 
multiple correlation (SMC)17 (Method I). In addition, two other factor analyses 
were carried out, a principal factor analysis in which the prior communality 
estimates were calculated by using maximum absolute correlation of a variable 
with any other variable (Method II), and a maximum likelihood factor analysis 
where the prior communality estimates were calculated by applying the SMC 
(Method III). These two additional analyses were used in order to confirm the 
results. The rotation method chosen in ali three analyses was the varimax 
method. 
16  The statistical theory behind the factor analysis is not reviewed in this connection, but it can 
be found in Appendix F. 
17  The SMCs may be obtained, for instance, as one minus the reciprosals of the corresponding 
elements of the inverse factor score matrix. Using the SMCs as communalities limits the 
analysis to the variance a given variable actually shares with other variables in the data set. 
Consequently, variance not shared with the specific set of variables is treated as unique 
(Bernstein et al. 1987, p. 189). 
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From the 22 original attitudinal claims 10 were included in the final analysis. 
The other variables were excluded because of too low values of pairwise Pearson 
correlation coefficients or too low estimates of final communality. The rule of 
thumb was that the exclusion of a variable took place if the highest pairwise 
correlation coefficient was less than 0.2 or the final communality estimate was 
less than 0.3. According to Child (1990, pp. 34-35), if the final communality is 
too low, in the region of 0.3 or less, the increasing existence of unique variance 
makes the analysis unreliable because it is not possible_ to reject the hypothesis 
that the major part of unique variance is created by error variance. 
In the factor analysis, the most important decision to be made is probably the 
choice of the number of common factors. Most often, the final choice of the 
number of common factors is based on some combination of the proportion of 
sample variance explained, subject matter knowledge, and the general reasona-
bleness of the results (Johnson and Wichern 1982, p. 437). In this case, the 
plausible number of common factors was found to be three, although the appli-
cation of different selection criteria did not produce unambiguous results. Occa-
sionally, a rule is recommended that only factors which have eigenvalues greater 
than one should be included. However, this criterion is more suitable for the 
principal component analysis than for the factor analysis (Child 1990 pp. 37-
38). According to this criterion, the maximum number of factors to be extracted 
would have been from one (Method I) to two (Methods II and III). 
Another way to decide the number of factors is to use the so-called Cattell's 
scree test. The idea is to derive the number of factors from the relations among 
successive eigenvalues. This inference is usually made graphically by present-
ing eigenvalues along the Y-axis and their serial positions along the X-axis. The 
goal is to separate the overall curve into two functions with the early eigenvalues 
representing factors that are more important and the later ones representing 
factors that are less important (Bernstein et al. 1988, p. 174). The Cattell's scree 
test plots produced by each of the three methods are shown in Appendix E. The 
conclusion was that the recommended number of factors to be extracted varied 
from two (Method III) to three (Methods I and II). 
It is also possible to use the so-called chi-square test when the maximum-
likelihood factor analysis (Method III) is applied. The aim is to determine if the 
correlation matrix with unity diagonals differs significantly from the identity 
matrix and if the residual matrix differs significantly from the null matrix 
because of the extraction of one or more common factors. The problem with the 
chi-square test is, however, that with large samples a matrix containing trivial 
residual variance can still differ from a null matrix, resulting in the extraction of 
trivial factors (Bernstein et al. 1988, pp. 174-175). In this case, the chi-square 
test indicated that the correct number of factors should be four. When the null 
hypothesis was that three factors construct a sufficient solution, then the null 
hypothesis could be rejected at the 0.01% level of significance. Nevertheless, 
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when the null hypothesis was that four factors construct a sufficient solution, 
then the risk of rejecting a true null hypothesis increased to almost 15%. Thus, 
based on the chi-square test, the recommendation was four factors to be ex-
tracted. 
Although the criteria guiding the factor selection process proved not to be 
unambiguously interpretable, the rotated factor pattems were very similar in 
each case. Based on general knowledge about the subject matter and on certain 
aspects of the applied selection criteria, especially Cattell's scree test, a three-
factor solution was considered to have the most desirable features. It offered an 
illuminating explanation that did not actually alter when a fourth factor was 
included. The rotated factor pattem produced by Method I is presented in Table 
7.1 
When the results presented in Table 7.1 are interpreted, we can see that the 
percentage variance is quite low. This value tells how large a portion of the total 
variance is explained by the common factors. In this case, the portion is approxi-
mately 43%. Thus, about 57% of the total variance is due to specific or error 
variance. However, the inclusion of a fourth factor would have increased the 
common variance only by 0.3%. This fact also supports the selection of the 
three-factor model. However, the main purpose of Table 7.1 is to give informa-
tion that makes it possible to develop meaningful descriptions for each factor. 
Table 7.1. Variables, Factor Loadings'8, Communalities, Eigenvalues, and Per-
centage Variance in the Varimax-Rotated Principal Factor Solution of Three 
Factors (Method I). 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 112 
X136 0.683 0.282 0.258 0.613 
X137 0.593 0.182 0.224 0.435 
X135 0.526 0.384 0.269 0.497 
X138 0.509 0.209 0.373 0.441 
X144 0.207 0.672 0.009 0.495 
X141 0.313 0.501 0.166 0.377 
X140 0.272 0.478 0.182 0.336 
X145 -0.068 -0.608 0.114 0.387 
X133 0.245 0.071 0.577 0.398 
X134 0.183 -0.053 0.573 0.365 
Eigenvalues 1.667 1.613 1.063 4.343 
Percentage variance 16.672 16.128 10.629 43.429 
18 Factor loadings higher than 0.3 are in bold. The criteria for the detection of significant or 
salient factor loadings are somewhat vague. However, a rule of thumb, very widely used by 
factor analysts, is that factor loadings having values of ±0.3 or greater are usually regarded as 
significant, on condition that the sample size is greater than 100 (Child 1990, p. 39). 
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The following variables received significantly high positive loadings on Fac-
tor 1: X136, X137, X135, X138, and X141. 
X136: The use of fertilizers and pesticides is at too high a level in Finnish 
agriculture 
X137: The intensification of Finnish agriculture deteriorates the environ-
mental quality and food safety 
X135: Environmental problems caused by agriculture are already signifi-
cant 
X138: Conventional agriculture should quickly be developed into the di-
rection of organic farming 
X141: Agriculture has to carry its fair share of the environmental taxes 
The following variables received high positive loadings on Factor 2: X144, 
X141, and X140. In addition, variable X145 had a high negative loading and 
variable X135 received a significantly high positive loading on Factor 2. 
X144: Agricultural subsidies financed by taxpayers must be cut down if 
agriculture is not able to pioduce foodstuffs at competitive prices 
X141: Agriculture has to carry its fair share of the environmental taxes 
X140: Conventional agricultural subsidies can be cut down if the cone-
sponding amount of money will be used to promote environmental 
investments and environmentally related subsidies in agriculture 
X135: Environmental problems caused by agriculture are already signifi-
cant 
X145: It is a right thing to allocate tax money for the maintenance of 
agriculture because the viability of the countryside and the pleas-
antness of the environment depend on agricultural activities 
The following variables received high positive loadings on Factor 3: X134, and 
X133. In addition, variable X138 received a significantly high positive loading 
on Factor 3: 
X134: The present generation must take better care of the environment 
that will be left to the coming generations 
X133: Environmental conservation should have greater_emphasis, even at 
the expense of economic growth 
X138: Conventional agriculture should quickly be developed into the di-
rection of organic farming 
The interpretation of the three factors is the following: 
Factor 1: This factor represents an attitude the leading argument of which is 
that adverse environmental impacts of conventional farming prac-
tices constitute the most severe problem in Finnish agriculture. The 
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most preferable solution is to develop current farming practices 
into the direction of organic farming, and in this process it is even 
acceptable to use economic instruments. 
Factor 2: This factor can be seen to represent an attitude the core element of 
which is dislike towards conventional agriculture on the grounds of 
additional tax burden caused by agricultural subsidies. The empha-
sis is not on adverse environmental effects of agriculture, although 
environmentally beneficial farming practices are not opposed. How-
ever, a high positive loading of variable X140 and a high negative 
loading of variable X145 seem to contradict to some extent. The 
valid interpretation is probably that the promotion of environmen-
tally beneficial farming practices is acceptable only if the govem-
ment can simultaneously guarantee that the total amount of tax 
money allocated to agricultural subsidies decreases. Nevertheless, 
adverse environmental effects of farming are more like an excuse 
to criticize agriculture than a source of true concem. 
Factor 3: This factor expresses an attitude, which emphasizes the importance 
of sustainable development in agriculture. Environmental issues 
have a high ranking. The major source of concem is the damage 
that might already have been caused to sustainable development 
and future generations because of the undiscriminating admiration 
of economic growth. As a part of this general framework, organic 
farming is seen to he a preferred altemative when the future of 
agricultural production is concemed. 
The factors differ in respect of both economic and environmental issues. 
Factor 1 and Factor 2 represent views that are clearly critical towards conven-
tional agriculture, although for different reasons. 'When it comes to Factor 2, it 
seems that the resistance culminates on the grounds that are most probably 
derived from standpoints related to income distribution and income transfers. 
The bottom line is that the society should subsidize farmers only if this leads to 
detectable efficiency gains. This view mainly concentrates on economic aspects 
and is quite insensitive in terms of environmental concems. Factor 1 conveys a 
more pragmatic approach. The use of taxpayers' money to support agriculture is 
not undesirable as such, but it becomes undesirable when the outcome is nega-
tive in the form of adverse environmental effects. However, the expression of 
environmental concem is not as genuine and fimdamental as it is in the case of 
Factor 3. It is more like a signal of discontent with an investment the profits of 
which have not been as large as expected. Thus, Factor 3 is the only factor that 
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represents a true environmental concem, while agricultural subsidies and their 
effect on social welfare is ali but ignored. 
7.2. Further Division of Respondents into Clusters Based on Attitudes 
The factor analysis sheds some light on the general attitudinal dimensions that 
can be found in the data. However, the factors carmot be attached to single 
observations without further manipulation. This can be done by means of factor 
scores which express how the observation is ranked in respect of a certain 
factor19. If the factor scores are normalized into the form of a standard normal 
distribution, then we can easily see what the relative position of the observation 
on the factor in question is. By using the so-called cluster analysis, it is possible 
to use the information that is inherent in the factor/ scores. The idea of the 
cluster analysis is to divide observations in such a inanner that observations 
with a similar factor score pattem will be grouped together. More generally, the 
cluster analysis aims to allocate a set of observations to a set of such clearly 
identifiable groups in which observations within a group are similar to one 
another while observations in different groups are dissimilar (Chatfield and 
Collins 1980, p. 212). 
The clustering process can be conducted in various ways. It is possible to 
group variables instead of observations (in this respect, the cluster analysis has 
quite similar goals as the factor analysis). The groupings can be disjoint, hierar-
chical, overlapping, or fuzzy. Disjoint clusters place each object in one and only 
one cluster. Hierarchical clusters are organized so that one cluster may be 
entirely contained within another cluster, but no other kind of overlap between 
clusters is allowed. Overlapping clusters can be constrained to limit the number 
of objects that belong simultaneously to two clusters, or they can be uncon-
strained, allowing any degree of overlap in cluster membership. Fuzzy clusters 
are defined by a probability or grade of membership of each object in each 
cluster. They can belong to any of the cluster categories mentioned above, i.e. 
they can be disjoint, hierarchical, or overlapping (SAS 1987, p. 47). In this 
study, the cluster type chosen was the disjoint cluster because otherwise the 
analysis of the relationship between attitudes and willingness to pay would have 
become too complicated. 
The clustering analysis was conducted by using the FASTCLUS procedure 
that is included in the SAS Statistical Software Package. The FASTCLUS 
procedure finds disjoint clusters of observations by means of a k-means method. 
This method was developed by MacQueen (1967), who suggested the term 
k-means for describing his algorithm that assigns each item to the cluster having 
19 See Appendix F for a more detailed explanation of the nature of factor scores. 
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the nearest centroid (mean). In its simplest version, the process is composed of 
three steps. First, the observations are partitioned into k initial clusters (k is 
defined by the researcher). Then, the algorithm proceeds through the list of 
observations, assigning an observation to the cluster whose centroid (mean) is 
the nearest (distance needed in this process is usually computed using Euclidean 
distance with either standardized or unstandardized observations). Next, the 
centroids for the cluster receiving the new observation and for the cluster losing 
the observation are recalculated. This procedure is repeated until no more 
assignments take place (Johnson and Wichem 1982, pp. 555-556). The 
FASTCLUS procedure does not start by the partition of ali observations into k 
preliminary groups, but a corresponding approach is applied. A set of points 
called cluster seeds is selected as a first guess for the centroids (means) of the 
clusters. Bach observation is then assigned to the nearest seed to form temporary 
clusters (SAS 1987, p. 494). 
The FASTCLUS procedure does not automatically recommend a certain 
number of clusters, but it prints two statistical criteria, the pseudo-F or the 
Calinski and Harabasz index and the cubic clustering criterion (CCC), which 
can be used in the identification process of clusters. The pseudo-F value is 
computed as [trace B/(k-1)] / [trace W/(n—k)J where n and k are the total 
number of observations and the number of clusters in the solution, respectively. 
The B and W terms are the between and pooled within cluster sum of squares 
and cross product matrices. The CCC is a product of two terms. The first term is 
the natural logarithm of [1--E(R2)] / (1--R2) where R2 is the proportion of vari-
ance accounted for by the clusters, and its expected value is determined under 
the assumption that the data have been sampled from a uniform distribution 
based on a hyperbox. The second term is (np/2)" / [0.001+E(R2)11 2 where p is 
an estimate of the dimensionality of the between cluster variation. The constant 
terms are chosen based on extensive simulation results (Milligan and Cooper 
1985). There is no unambiguous way to interpret the pseudo-F and CCC criteria, 
but usually the recommendation is to look for consensus between the two 
statistics. The idea is to find simultaneous local peaks for both test statistics. 
When calculating the pseudo-F and the CCC, we also assume that the variables 
which the clustering process is based on do not correlate with each other (SAS 
1993, p. 98). In this case, the noncorrelation is guaranteed because the factor 
scores used in the cluster analysis were created through an orthogonal factor 
analysis. 
In Figure 7.1 the results that the test criteria produce are represented graphi-
cally. There are three local peaks, two minimums (6 and 8 clusters) and one 
maximum (7 clusters). In this case, the seven-cluster solution was chosen be-
cause it appeared to offer a meaningful interpretation for existing attitudes. The 
essential information conceming the chosen solution can be found in Table 7.2. 
The mean factor scores (MFS) represent the mean value of factor scores that the 
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factor in question has received in the cluster. Because factor scores are normal-
ized and standardized, a positive mean value of factor scores indicates that the 
cluster having the positive mean value has a stronger-than-average tendency to 
support the views expressed in that specific factor. Similar but inverse logic cän 
he applied to negative values. The interpretation of the cluster-related mean 
factor scores is the main source of inference when essential features of the 
clusters are analyzed further. 
The clustering procedure was carried out with a reduced sample size. Five 
observations were removed because of insufficient factor scores. Sixteen obser-
vations were excluded because of high individual WTPs (WTP FIM 2500). 
This was done in order to receive more reliable mean WTP estimates within 
clusters. The exclusion of observations did not influence the cluster structure in 
any significant way. The contents of the clusters were interpreted by using the 
means of normalized factor scores and the mean WTPs of each cluster. The aim 
was to find a plausible explanation that offers a consistent overall picture about 
the relationship between attitudes and WTP. In addition, a few socio-economic 
variables were tested in order to find out possible differences regarding the 
gender, age, income, place of living, and education between the clusters. The 
characterization of the clusters is presented below, but first some general re-
marks are made. The cluster related mean values of socio-economic variables 
are represented in Table 7.3. 
Figure 7.1. Relation Between the Number of Clusters and the Test Criteria. 
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Table 7.2. Solution with Seven Clusters. 
Cluster Frequency % Mean score, 
Factor 1 
Mean score, 
Factor 2 
Mean score, 
Factor 3 
Mean WTP, 
FIM/year 
1 53 8.2 -0.83 -1.09 -1.61 149 
2 66 10.3 -1.38 -1.34 0.03 360 
3 175 27.3 0.79 0.72 0.71 410 
4 103 16.0 0.39 0.77 -0.57 223 
5 11 1.7 -0.78 1.41 -3.57 64 
6 78 12.2 -1.27 0.54 -0.47 276 
7 156 24.3 0.36 -0.71 0.55 418 
642 100.0 333 
Table 7.3. Cluster Related Means of Certain Socio-Economic Variables. 
Cluster Gender 
females-%/ 
males-% 
Age, years Gross income, 
FIM/year 
Place of 
living* 
Education* 
1 40 / 60 43 160300 4.23 2.87 
2 53 / 47 37 187600 4.68 2.82 
3 55 / 45 43 164400 2.99 2.98 
4 36 / 64 37 160500 2.81 3.42 
5 27 /73 28 160000 3.27 3.18 
6 47 / 53 35 160800 3.03 3.13 
7 63 / 37 38 154900 3.61 2.92 
Average 51 / 49 39 163000 3.40 3.03 
* Place of living and Education variables are presented in the form of an index. In the case of 
Education, the index can vary from 1 to 6, 1 representing elementary level education and 6 
indicating a university degree. The index of Place of living can also vary from 1 to 6, 1 
representing the center of a big city and 6 indicating a sparsely populated rural arca. See 
Appendix B, questions 5-1 and 5-5 for a detailed description of the response alternatives. 
The relationship between attitudes and WTP seems to be quite logical. For 
instance, the highest mean WTPs take place in Clusters that have the highest 
MFCs (Clusters 3 and 7) in relation to Factor 3. This is no doubt what could be 
expected because Factor 3 represented clearly articulated appreciation of sus-
tainable development. Correspondingly, Cluster 5 has the lowest MFS in re-
spect of Factor 3 and it has the lowest WTP of ali Clusters, which is consistent. 
The obvious conclusion is that attitudes have some infiuence on the stated 
individual WTPs. When comparing the mean WTP differences across the clus-
ters, some statistically significant2° differences were found (Table 7.4). When 
20 When reference is made to statistical significance, the 5% risk level is meant if not stated 
otherwise. 
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socio-economic variables were tested against Clusters, it was quite surprising 
that there were no differences in means among Clusters regarding income and 
education. However, some statistically significant differences across Clusters 
were detected in respect of age, gender, and place of living (Table 7.4). 
The problem with pre-tax income was that quite many respondents did not 
give the information (103 out of 642 or 16%). The missing answers were 
replaced by the average pre-tax income, which obviously led to a uniform 
cluster-related income distribution. This remarkably decreases the explanatory 
power of income and partly explains why no differences in income across 
clusters were detected. Another explanation is that attitudes do not depend on 
financial matters. Nevertheless, the economic theory presupposes that there is a 
positive correlation between income and WTP. However, in this data, the corre-
lation coefficient between income and WTP is extremely low, only 0.017, even 
Table 7.4. The Statistically Significant (t=0.05) Differences in the Cluster-
Related Means of Age, Gender, and Place of Living. 
Compared clusters 	Age 	Gender 	Place of living 	WTP 
1-2 
1-3 *** 1 *** 3 
1-4 *** 1 
1-5 *** 1 
1-6 *** 1 *** 1 
1-7 *** (60%--37%) *** 1 *** 7 
2-3 *** 2 
2-4 *** (47%--64%) *** 2 
2-5 *** 2 
2-6 *** 2 
2-7 *** 2 
3-4 *** 3 *** (45%--64%) *** 3 
3-5 *** 3 
3-6 *** 3 
3-7 *** 3 *** 7 
4-5 
4-6 
4-7 *** (64%--37%) *** 7 *** 7 
5-6 
5-7 *** (73--37%) 
6-7 *** (53%--37%) *** 7 
(The statistical significance is indicated by the symbol "***". When age, place of living and 
WTP are concerned, the number following the symbol "***" tells which of the clusters has a 
higher mean. In the case of gender, the percentage numbers refer to the percentage of males 
inherent in the clusters under comparison.) 
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when the respondents not revealing their income are removed. This means that 
it is not appropriate to derive elaborated conclusions that are based on income 
data. 
If the respondents' mean WTP is cross-tabulated in relation to education, 
some observations can be made. If those who have the highest level of education 
(a university degree) are compared to those who have the lowest education, 
there is a statistically significant difference in means, FIM 550 (N=52) versus 
FIM 237 (N=162), showing that people who have a university degree are ready 
to pay the higher amount. Although a clear linear correlation between education 
and WTP cannot be found, the considerable difference between the least and 
most educated groups suggests that education might have some influence on 
WTP. However, because we cannot detect any statistically significant differ-
ences in respect of education when the attitude-based clusters are in question, it 
may be safe to conclude that education is not a decisive factor when an indi-
vidual takes his position on issues related to the environment and agriculture or 
their interaction. 
The verbal interpretation of Clusters: 
Cluster 1: People who prefer conventional agricultural practices. At the first 
glance this cluster seems to be somewhat difficult to interpret 
because ali the MFSs are negative, meaning that people in this 
group do not really think that current agricultural production prac-
tices are environmentally harmful or that farming is a burden to 
taxpayers. In addition, people in this group neglect sustainable 
development, which is indicated by a relatively low mean WTP. In 
further tests, it appeared that 26 out of 53 members of this group 
were farmers, when random selection would have produced only 2 
or 3 farmers. Thus, the possible explanation is that people belong-
ing to this group are professionally related to agriculture and have 
mainly for this reason a positive attitude towards agriculture. This 
is why the sustainability factor scores such low points: these people 
do not see any need for change. According to their opinion, the 
current way of farming is both socially and environmentally the 
most desirable production alternative. This is perceivable because 
they also defend their economic interests: they have invested in a 
certain production technology and want to receive a decent return 
for their investment. This group has male dominance, although the 
difference is statistically significant only when compared to Clus-
ter 7, which has the largest relative amount of women. Moreover, 
because of the dominance of farmers, people belonging to this 
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group most likely live in the countryside. The difference in means21  
is statistically significant compared to Clusters 3, 4, 6, and 7 the 
members of which are more likely to be city-dwellers. 
Cluster 2: People who have a positive attitude towards agriculture in gen-
eral. This group resembles Cluster 1 in respect of the first two 
factors. According to the MFS of Factor 1, members of Cluster 2 
are even less critical towards environmental problems caused by 
conventional farming than members of Cluster 1. However, mem-
bers of Cluster 2 are more concerned about sustainable develop-
ment and state higher mean WTPs (although the difference in 
means is not statistically significant), probably as a consequence of 
their concern. Despite their appreciation of farming, the members 
of this group do not oppose changes in production practices as 
strongly as the members of Cluster 1. The members of this Cluster 
have a positive attitude towards agriculture in general and are even 
to some extent environmentally conscious, even though this con-
sciousness is at the average level (the MFS of Factor 3 is very close 
to zero, 0.03). This group has female dominance, although the 
difference is statistically significant only when compared to Clus-
ter 4, which has the second largest relative amount of women. We 
can say that Cluster 2 is a female equivalent of Cluster 1. Conse-
quently, again, people belonging to this group most likely live in 
the countryside. The difference in means is statistically significant 
compared to ali other Clusters (except to Cluster 1, of course). We 
can conclude that the increase in the relative number of woman 
shifts the attitudinal emphasis to a less conservative direction when 
environmental issues are in question. It is also interesting that in 
this group the average gross income is the highest. However, in-
come differences across Clusters are not statistically significant, as 
already indicated before. 
Cluster 3: People who demand a change in current farming practices and are 
ready to pay for it. In this group, the members perceive the prob-
lems caused by conventional agriculture and express concern about 
sustainable development. The group has a female majority, it has 
urban dominance, and its members are rather old. This group repre- 
21  Although we talk about differencies in means, the term refers both to the results of 
nonparametric tests (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, Kruskal-Wallis test) and the results of pairwise 
t-tests or Tukey's studentized range tests. Nonparametric tests were applied in the case of 
gender, place of living, and education. 
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sents people who have a critical attitude towards conventional 
farming and who simultaneously comprehend (at least intuitively) 
the importance of pro-environmental farming as a source of envi-
ronmental benefits. They are willing to pay for the maintenance of 
the rural environment if they can be convinced that new agricul-
tural production methods are environmentally sound. Moreover, 
people in this group seem to require that farmers should also take 
responsibility for paying their share of environmental taxes. Fur-
thermore, it appears that the members of this group have a ten-
dency to value environmental and natural assets more than any 
other group. In addition, 27.3% of the respondents belong to the 
Cluster, which makes it the largest one. 
Cluster 4: People who have a critical attitude towards conventional farming 
because of economic reasons but who are not worried about sus-
tainable development. People in this group can be seen to represent 
slightly masculine values, which is no doubt a reflection of a high 
relative amount of men. For this group, it is typical to agree with 
the claim that agriculture should not be supported. Some concem is 
expressed about adverse environmental impacts of agriculture. How-
ever, this view does not seem to be connected to a more holistic 
environmental concem about issues related to sustainable develop-
ment. Thus, the critique of current agricultural practices does not 
have its roots in environmental consciousness. The dislike of agri-
culture is apparently created by economic reasons, it is an opinion 
of a worried taxpayer. This Cluster is also urban like Cluster 3, but 
its members are younger than the members of Cluster 3. The mean 
WTP of Cluster 4 is also clearly lower than the mean WTP of 
Cluster 3, and the difference between the mean WTPs is statisti-
cally significant. 
Cluster 5: People whose attitudes towards agriculture are solely motivated by 
their opposition of agricultural subsidies. If the previous Cluster 
could be described as somewhat masculine in its attitudes, this 
Cluster represents the same line of thinking taken to the extreme 
(the highest relative proportion of men, 73%). Environmental is-
sues are not on the agenda at ali, sustainable development is a 
swearword. Agriculture is strongly disliked because of its frequent 
visits to the common purse of the society. The overall socio-eco-
nomic profile of Cluster 5 resembles the profile of Cluster 4 to 
some extent. We can hypothesize that this group represents young, 
urban men who are interested in technological issues. However, 
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because Cluster 5 has only eleven members (1.7% of the sample), 
we should not draw any far-reaching conclusions. It is also a ten-
dency in the cluster analysis that one of the clusters usually be-
comes much smaller than the others. Because of the small size of 
Cluster 5, a statistically significant WTP difference cannot be found 
when this Cluster is compared to other Clusters, despite the clearly 
lowest mean WTP of ali Clusters. 
Cluster 6: People whose attitudes towards agriculture are to a great extent 
motivated by their opposition of agricultural subsidies although 
the reasons for this are not unambiguous. In addition, Cluster 6 has 
some masculine characteristics, although the male dominance in 
relative numbers is not as evident as it was in Clusters 4 and 5. 
However, Cluster 6 is to a great extent parallel to Cluster 4 despite 
the difference in respect of the MFS of Factor 1. In Cluster 6, 
conventional farming is not considered a significant risk to the 
environment, while the members of Cluster 4 expressed some con-
cern about adverse environmental impacts of current agricultural 
practices. Compared to Cluster 5 we can see that the signs of ali the 
MFSs are the same. The main difference between this Cluster and 
Cluster 5 is probably the extremely pronounced negative attitude 
towards agricultural support in the latter. It may be derived more or 
less consciously from the argument that considers ali market inter-
ference initiated by the government a potential source of welfare 
loss. In Cluster 6 (as well as in Cluster 4), the opposition is most 
likely created by the view that farmers have received more income 
transfers in the form of agricultural subsidies than they would have 
earned. The overall socio-economic profile of Cluster 6 resembles 
the profile of Cluster 4; there are no statistically significant differ-
ences in mean WTPs or socio-economic variables. The same is also 
true when Clusters 5 and 6 are contrasted. 
Cluster 7: People who express concern about adverse environmental effects 
of conventional agriculture, emphasize the importance of sustain-
able development, and are ready to approve agricultural subsidies 
in order to guarantee domestic food supply and the maintenance of 
the countryside. In this Cluster, the members have a detectable 
tendency to criticize current farming practices. However, simulta-
neously they think that no serious harm to the environment has 
occurred yet. Possible adverse impacts on environmental quality 
are not irreversible. Consequently, this Cluster supports organic 
farming and sustainable development in general. This Cluster also 
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agrees on the idea that agriculture should he responsible for its 
share of environmental payments. However, the overall environ- 
mental concern is not expressed as strongly as in Cluster 3, which 
scores highest in this respect. Furthermore, this group favors the 
idea of using subsidies for the maintenance of the countryside in 
order to maintain the viability of the countryside to some extent, 
but does not support the idea of cutting down the subsidies of 
conventional farming. This is probably the greatest distinction com-
pared to Cluster 3, which shows very little sympathy regarding 
subsidies allotted to conventional agriculture. The pattern seems to 
he that a group emphasizing the importance of environmental is-
sues has a female majority. Cluster 7 has the largest relative amount 
of women and the difference is statistically significant compared to 
Clusters 1, 4, 5, and 6, which ali have a male majority. The mem-
bers of Cluster 7 live most likely in small towns or in the centers of 
rural areas. A statistically significant difference in means can be 
found when Cluster 7 is compared to two most rural Clusters, 1 and 
2, and when Cluster 7 is compared to two most urban Clusters, 3 
and 4. There is also a statistically significant difference in mean 
WTP when Cluster 7 is contrasted to Clusters 1 and 4, which both 
have the lowest mean WTPs. 
These results clearly support the conclusion that the correlation between 
attitudes and WTP cannot always he explained in a straightforward way. In 
Table 7.5 a summary is presented about the attitudes included in the seven 
Clusters and their relations to the mean WTP. The column labeled "Conven-
tional farming" expresses the overall cluster-related attitude towards conven-
tional farming. The intensity of the attitude can vary from three plus signs to 
three minus signs (a plus sign indicating a favorable attitude). Correspondingly, 
the column labeled "Sustainable development" refers to the general cluster-
related attitude towards sustainable development, the intensity of the attitude 
being depicted as explained above. When the attitude towards conventional 
farming is concerned, it is obvious that the dislike of conventional farming is 
based on environmental or/and economic grounds. The number of black dots 
indicates how heavily the dislike has its roots in environmental and/or economic 
issues. The more black dots, the more decisive is the issue in the formation of 
the expressed attitude. In the "WTP" column black dots reveal if Cluster's mean 
WTP has been low (FIM 0-99, one dot), medium (FIM 100-349, two dots), or 
high (FIM 350- , three dots). 
It is interesting to notice that the high WTP seems to depend on the respond-
ents' attitude towards sustainable development. If Cluster scores high in this 
respect, the attitude towards conventional farming can he either negative or 
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Table 7.5. Summary of the Attitudinal Profiles of Clusters. 
Attitude towards 
Conventional 	Source of critique 	Sustainable 	WTP 
Cluster farming Environmental Economic development 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
++ 
+++ 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
+++ 
++ 
• 
• • 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
positive. For instance, Cluster 2 is extremely positive concerning conventional 
farming and sustainable development while Cluster 3 also strongly supports 
sustainable development but is simultaneously very critical of conventional 
farming. Despite this obvious distinction in attitudes, both clusters express a 
high mean WTP. The conclusion is that the motive behind the stated WTP is 
probably somewhat different in each case. 
When people were asked about their WTP concerning pro-environmental 
farming, the information included in the questionnaire let the respondents un-
derstand that the maintenance of the rural environment would be carried out by 
changing prevailing agricultural production practices to a more environmen-
tally-friendly direction. This was also presented to be the way to cut down 
agricultural surplus. Furthermore, the text in the questionnaire indicated that 
agricultural subsidies will be required in the future, too. The valuation scenario 
did not actually contain any information about the possible change in the subsi-
dies. It is also essential to point out that the scenario gave the impression that 
the financing of the agricultural subsidies would be based on tax-like fees, not 
on voluntary donations. The whole framework should be kept in mind as we 
investigate possible explanations for the response motives of the respondents. 
Consider first the group having the lowest WTP, i.e. Cluster 5. In this group, 
the idea of spending tax-money on agricultural subsidies is probably the issue 
that triggers the fundamental resistance. When this is combined with a complete 
negligence about sustainable development, it is not surprising that pro-environ-
mental farming receives neither sympathy nor money from this Cluster. It is 
likely that the members of Cluster 5 would not object to a complete shutdown of 
domestic agriculture if imported foodstuffs were any cheaper. 
Clusters 1, 4, and 6 construct a category of people with a medium high WTP. 
The members of Cluster 1 believe that conventional farming is the best form of 
agricultural production. There is no need for a change. Sustainable development 
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or any other environmentally oriented concem is not a relevant issue for Clus-
ter 1. Furthermore, sustainable development is considered an unrealistic ap- 
proach. However, the members of Cluster 1 express a medium high WTP, 
mainly because they see the maintenance of the rural environment, at least to 
some extent, as a guarantee of the further existence of conventional agriculture. 
It is a smaller disadvantage to alter production practices than to quit farming 
completely. The members of Cluster 4 have actually the same kind of choice 
situation as the members of Cluster 1, namely that, although pro-environmental 
farming is not a great idea from their perspective, they are ready to support it to 
some extent, because the altemative is even worse. In this case, the altemative is 
conventional farming with its adverse environmental and, especially, economic 
effects. Cluster 6 is somewhat ambivalent in its position. If its members were 
able to choose freely, they would probably prefer more intensive, conventional 
type of farming in order to get rid of agricultural subsidies through efficiency 
gains. Thus, the mild support that Cluster 6 gives to pro-environmental farming 
and the maintenance of the rural environment is most likely motivated by the 
hope that pro-environmental farming would reduce agricultural subsidies. There 
is no trace of any environmentally oriented concem. 
When Clusters that have the highest mean WTP are taken under considera-
tion, i.e. Clusters 2, 3, and 7, it is obvious that rather different attitudinal 
profiles can produce almost equal mean WTPs, and rather similar attitudinal 
profiles can also result in widely differing mean WTPs. This is, of course, 
confusing, but we must remember that the formulation of the valuation scenario 
may offer varying Iines of action for the respondent to proceed in order to 
promote his specific goals. In a complicated response situation, the attitudinal 
profile of a respondent simultaneously covers many aspects of individual values 
and social views. It is comprehensible that seemingly similar attitudinal profiles 
in one respect may differ in some other crucial respect, causing a striking 
difference in the stated WTP. Thus, it is not always easy to identify what 
components of the attitudinal profile of a respondent function as reliable indica-
tors of actual WTP. 
In Cluster 2, the belief in the excellence of conventional farming is the 
strongest of ali Clusters, but sustainable development also receives cautious 
support. Although conventional agriculture from the point of view of Cluster 2 
does not cause any problems, pro-environmental farming is an acceptable alter-
native if it can convince people about the overall necessity of domestic agricul-
tural production. This is probably why the mean WTP is so high in this group in 
spite of its pronounced trust in conventional farming. When contrasted with 
Cluster 1, which has a similar attitudinal profile conceming the attitude towards 
conventional farming, it becomes apparent that the difference in the mean WTP 
can be explained by the positive attitude in Cluster 2 towards sustainable devel-
opment. A very similar pair of Clusters is formed by Clusters 3 and 4, which 
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both have a negative attitude towards conventional farming, but, Cluster 3 favors 
sustainable development and Cluster 4 does not. Again, the positive attitude 
towards sustainable development seems to explain the difference in the mean 
WTP. The reasoning in Cluster 3 probably goes in the following way: Conven-
tional farming is a source of many environmentally and economically adverse 
effects. Environmental farming may have potential to mitigate these disadvan-
tages. Therefore, it is not a bad idea to try to change agricultural practices that 
do not seem to benefit the society. The possible change is such a valuable thing 
that it is worth paying for. 
The third Cluster in the high WTP category is Cluster 7, which can be seen 
to be a mixture of the ,attitudes of the groups 2 and 3. As in Cluster 2, the 
attitude towards conventional farming is slightly positive, although some con-
cern about the adverse environmental effects of conventional farming is ex-
pressed as in the case of Cluster 3. In addition, the support for sustainable 
development is stronger than in Cluster 2 but not as strong as in Cluster 3. In 
Cluster 7, the high mean WTP is probably a result of the respect of peasant 
values and the peasant way of living. The members of this group see the 
importance of agricultural tradition, even though they do not completely ap-
prove of the current production practices because of their negative environmen-
tal impacts. However, the critique is not directed towards farmers as such. 
Farmers are considered to have been compelled to adopt conventional agricul-
tural production practices because of the nature • of the current agricultural 
policy. Consequently, Cluster 7 sees pro-environmental farming as a proper 
measure to hait this environmentally questionable development, which also 
contradicts with the old peasant idea about harmony between man and nature. 
So far, it has been possible to create meaningful attitudinal profiles for ali 
Clusters. However, it would be interesting to test to what extent the attitudinal 
profiles match the answers that have been given to questions that were not 
included in the factor and cluster analyses. A test was conducted in respect of a 
question in which it was inquired what the respondents think about changes that 
have taken place in the rural environment during the past twenty years. Possible 
answering alternatives were that the change of the rural environment has been 
positive, there has been no change at all, or the change has been negative. Figure 
7.2 presents how the normalized means of the answers vary across Clusters. 
Table 7.6 shows which differences in means between Clusters are statistically 
significant. 
A brief examination of Figure 7.2 and Table 7.6 shows clearly that Clusters 1 
and 2 differ from Clusters 3, 4, 6, and 7 in a statistically significant way, i.e. 
members of Clusters 1 and 2 do not regard changes in the quality of the rural 
environment as negative as members of Clusters 3, 4, 6, and 7. This is consistent 
with the attitudinal profiles because Clusters 1 and 2 have the most positive and 
the least critical attitude towards conventional farming. It is quite natural that 
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they consider the changes that have occurred positive because it is apparently 
conventional farming that has been responsible for most of the changes. Corre-
spondingly, the members of Clusters 3, 4, and 6 have a critical attitude towards 
conventional farming and are inclined to see the changes in tones that are more 
negative. The problem is, however, that this kind of reasoning does not seem to 
shed any light on the behavior of Clusters 5 and 7. Fortunately, the attitude of 
the members of Cluster 7 can be explained easily through their attitudinal 
profile, while the motives of Cluster 5 remain somewhat obscure. 
As was already indicated above, the members of Cluster 7 have a slightly 
positive attitude towards conventional farming because they believe that the 
adverse environmental effeets of conventional farming are created by agricul-
tural policy and not by farmers. Thus, they are worried about the deterioration 
of the rural environment when they simultaneously support farmers as repre-
sentatives of an endangered lifestyle. Of ali Clusters, the attitude of Cluster 5 is 
the most difficult to perceive. The group expresses extremely pronounced oppo-
sition towards conventional farming but yet thinks that the changes in the rural 
environment have been more positive than negative during the past twenty 
years. There are two possible explanations, but probably neither of them can 
really capture the truth. We can hypothesize that in their fundamental resistance 
of agriculture the members of Cluster 5 consider any sign of deterioration of the 
rural environment a good thing. Their response should possibly be interpreted as 
"Yes, we have seen many bad things happen in the rural environment during the 
past twenty years and we are now really satisfied." Another possible explana-
tion is that the members of Cluster 5 are eager supporters of technological 
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Figure 7.2. Normalized Cluster-Related Means of the Response Concerning the 
Quality Change of the Rural Environment During the Past Twenty Years. 
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Table 7.6. Statistically Significant Differences in Means between Clusters Re-
garding the Attitude towards the Change of the Rural Environment during the 
Past Twenty Years. 
Compared 
clusters 
Attitude towards the change 
of the rural environment 
Compared 	Attitude towards the change 
clusters 	of the rural environment 
1-2 3-4 
1-3 *** 1+ 3-5 
1-4 *** 1+ 3-6 
1-5 3-7 
1-6 *** 1+ 4-5 
1-7 *** 1+ 4-6 
2-3 ***2+ 4-7 
2-4 *** 2+ 5-6 
2-5 5-7 
2-6 *** 2+ 6-7 
2-7 ***2+ 
(Explanation of symbols: for instance " *** 1+ " means that the difference between Clusters is 
statistically significant and that the members of Cluster 1 have a more positive view about the 
quality development of the rural environment). 
progress and powerful use of machines. In this case, it would be understandable 
if they considered the changes more positive than negative because during the 
period of the past twenty years the mechanization of Finnish agriculture has 
reached its peak. 
7.3. Influence of Additional Information 
In connection with testing the starting point bias, the preliminary conclusion 
was that there is no statistical evidence about the existence of information 
effects in this data set. However, in Chapter 3.5 we argued in relation to the 
conceptualization of information effects or bias that the influence of changes in 
information may be dependent on the initial attitudes of respondents. In this 
connection, Romstad's (1991) ideas were referred to. He pointed out two major 
tendencies. First, it is reasonable to assume that additional information (Ia) 
increases a respondent's WTP if Ia is consistent with prior information (Ip). If 
this is not the case, a respondent' s WTP decreases. Secondly, it is plausible to 
conjecture that additional information reduces the variance of WTP responses if 
Ia  is consistent with I. Therefore, the case is the opposite, j Ia is inconsistent 
with I the variance of WTP responses increases again. 
Unfortunately, the valuation situation can be even more complicated. WTP 
changes due to rejection or acceptance of Ia clearly depend on the initial atti- 
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tudes of respondents and on the proportion of Ia included in I. In some cases it 
is ambiguous to estimate the direction of change in WTPs. Consider Table 7.7, 
where eight options that vary in respect of the nature of initial attitudes at the 
prior information level and the nature of additional information are listed. 
Apparently, the general rules presented above can be applied as such only to 
some of the alternative situations. 
Take option (1) first. Respondent have a positive initial attitude, agree with 
Ia, which is no news to them. Obviously, there will be no change in mean WTP 
or in variance of WTP. The same logic is also true in the case of option (2), if Ia 
is already included in I, there is no reason for changes. The interpretation of 
option (3) is also straightforward when it comes to mean WTP. Respondents 
have a positive initial attitude and they agree with Ia, which is previously 
unfamiliar information to them, and thus it is quite reasonable that mean WTP 
rises. However, the direction of change of the variance of WTP is somewhat 
ambiguous. We can argue that the variance of WTP decreases if initially higher 
WTP responses rise less in absolute terms than initially lower WTP responses. 
If higher WTP responses rise relatively as much as lower WTP responses, the 
variance increases. In other words, the direction of change is extremely situa-
tion-specific. That is why there is a question mark between variances in option 
(3). 
The hypothesis supported here is, however, that an increase in mean WTP 
also causes the variance to rise. The reasoning is grounded on simple arithmetic 
derived from the mathematical properties of variance. Consider a data set which 
consists of two individuals, A and B, having Ip based WTP responses of FIM 
100 and 500. They receive Ia that is consistent with their Ip. Their WTPs rise to 
FTM 150 and 560, respectively. The variance grows despite the fact that a 
Table 7.7. Initial Attitudes, Additional and Prior Information, and the Expected 
Change in Mean WTP and in the Variance of WTP. 
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relative increase of A's WTP compared to B's WTP is 50% versus 12%. 
Although no final conclusions can be drawn, the probability of having increased 
variance after receiving Ia is likely to grow when the difference between mini-
mum and maximum values in the I data set increases. 
1n option (4), the issue becomes even more complicated. It is also possible 
that a respondent finds himself in a situation where he receives Ia that is a new 
piece of information and is not consistent with I. The individual has to cope 
with an overload of information. He has two alternatives. He can totally reject Ia 
and stick to I . In this case WTP remains the same or increases somewhat when P 
the respondent tries to convince himself about the superiority of his initial 
standpoint. It is also possible that Ip-inconsistent Ia will be able to influence the 
positive initial attitude and to change it less positive. This would lead to a 
meager decrease in the respondent's WTP. Because of these opposite impacts it 
is likely that mean WTP does not change significantly. On the other hand, the 
opposite impacts suggest that the variance of WTP increases in an observable 
manner. The change in variance is likely to be the smaller the more prior 
information respondents have and the stronger their initial positive attitudes are. 
What was said above about the case of positive initial attitudes can be 
applied to the case of negative initial attitudes. The reasoning concerning op-
tions (1) and (2) can be related to options (5) and (6) as such. Additional 
information does not change Ip-based WTP or variance of WTP if it is not a new 
piece of information, no matter if it is in conflict with Ip or not. When it comes 
to option (7), we can use reasoning applied in the case of. option (3) in a 
reversed form. If Ia strengthens initial negative attitudes it is quite natural that 
WTP becomes greater than WTPa. Although it is not possible to be sure about 
the direction of the change of the variance, a parallel argumentation regarding 
option (3) can be easily developed. The mean WTP decreases and it is likely 
that high WTPs fall more than low WTPs (in absolute terms), meaning that 
Var(WTPa) becomes smaller than Var(WTP ). There is also a striking similarity 
between options (4) and (8). The reasoning goes in option (8) like in option (4). 
Most individuals probably totally disregard Ia when it is inconsistent with their 
I . However, some people's attitudes may alter to a less negative direction due P to contradictory elements of the new piece of information. Similarly, some 
people are inclined to lower their WTP after receiving conflicting information 
in order to make themselves more convinced-about the supremacy of their initial 
standpoint. Consequently, Var(WTPa) becomes greater than Var(WTPp). 
Now it is quite easy to identify situations that are the most complicated from 
the viewpoint of a CVM survey designer. As has already been pointed out, it is 
likely that when the respondent agrees with the additional information it strength-
ens his initial attitude based on the prior information. Thus, if the initial attitude 
towards the nonmarket commodity being valued is positive, WTPa is greater 
than WTP '  and if the initial attitude is negative, the reverse is true or WTPa is P 
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less than WTP . This is no doubt a potential explanation for information bias P 
since, if the CVM instrument conveys information that extensively lists both 
pros and cons of the nonmarket commodity being valued, the difference be-
tween the mean WTP of supporting and opposing groups widens. Those who 
have a positive initial attitude reject ali negative information and, correspond-
ingly, those who have a negative initial attitude refuse to take into account any 
positive information. The tendency to reject that part of additional information 
which is in conflict with the prior information dominates especially when the 
major part of the received additional information strongly supports the initial 
attitude. 
Less serious but still significant bias may emerge, as indicated above, when 
the received additional information strikingly deviates from the prior informa-
tion. The problem in this case is that the conflicting additional information may 
lead the respondent either to change his initial view, or to make him stick to his 
initial view even more categorically. Thus, depending on the nature of the 
additional information in relation to initial attitudes and the unconditionality of 
initial preferences and attitudes, WTPp can be greater, less than, or equal to 
WTPa. As a consequence, information effect is most probable when the issue at 
hand is controversial, when the respondents' level of knowledge is rapidly 
changing over time, or when the issue is of great relative importance on the 
respondent's personal agenda (Romstad 1991, p. 6). If the issue is controversial 
or if it has a high ranking on the personal agenda, it is likely that respondents' 
initial attitudes are explicitly defined and pooled. If respondents' level of knowl-
edge is changing rapidly over time, it increases the probability that respondents 
receive additional information that is not included in their prior knowledge 
about the subject. 
It seems that the valuation problem examined in this study has ali the charac-
teristics that increase the probability of the existence of information effects. The 
maintenance of the rural environment by means of pro-environmental farming is 
definitely a controversial issue. Agriculture-related problems, like surplus, sub-
sidies, and leakage of nutrients to waterways guarantee that conflicting views 
have a sound ground where to flourish. Sustainable development and other 
environment-related topics are also controversial issues because there are still 
people who give the highest priority to economic growth at the expense of 
environmental and natural resources. The public discourse concerning ali these 
issues is extensive and economic, social, and biological research ceaselessly 
produces new information about the advantages and disadvantages of different 
farming practices. Thus, the conditions of having information effects certainly 
become fulfilled when the valuation of the rural environment is concerned. 
Apparently, the testing for information effects is more difficult than the 
testing for starting point bias. If a CVM survey design where respondents face 
varying amounts of information is used, the tests for differences in mean WTPs 
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can be taken. However, as indicated above, respondents' reactions to additional 
information depend on their initial attitudes. Thus, it would probably make 
sense to compare separately the change in WTP and in variance of WTP due to 
additional information among those who have positive initial attitudes and 
among those who have negative initial attitudes. Assuming that additional infor-
mation includes favorable aspects and that at least some of the respondents with 
positive attitude are not familiar with the favorable additional information, there 
should be a greater difference in the mean WTP between less informed and 
more informed supporter groups than between less informed and more informed 
opponent groups. Furthermore, we can test if variances of WTP behave as we 
expect. 
Table 7.8 presents the cluster-related t-tests. Each Cluster is divided into two 
subgroups, into those having only prior information (Ip) and those having addi-
tional information (Ip+Ia). The information package including additional infor-
mation was added to half of the questionnaires and the sequence of some other 
sections of the questionnaire was altered, as already explained before. Addi-
tional information consisted of a brief description of the advantages of pro-
environmental farming and the importance of the rural environment. In the 
information package, the public good nature of the rural environment was also 
referred to. Furthermore, in the information package it was predicted that many 
valuable characteristics of the rural environment are in danger of disappearing if 
nothing is done to change the course of current development. In Table 7.8, we 
can see that in most clusters (except Cluster 1) both subgroups have an almost 
equal number of observations. This supports the conclusion that additional 
information does not cause extreme changes in basic attitudes in most cases, 
even though it may influence the expressed WTP. 
Cluster 1 deserves a closer look because of the difference between the sizes 
of the subgroups. A sampling error is possible, of course. There may be a 
disturbance due to a skewed sampling because there is no guarantee that the 
sample is representative if groups strongly supporting, opposing, and being 
somewhat indifferent towards the commodity being valued are not normally 
distributed across the socio-economic factors that are used as sampling criteria. 
However, this kind of sampling bias is not likely. Both types of questionnaires 
(I and Ip+Ta) were assigned randomly to the respondents and there is no reason 
to assume that any actions taken by the interviewers could have caused a bias 
like this. This means that additional information has changed the negative initial 
attitude into a positive one. If the attitudinal profiles of different Clusters are 
examined, the most likely transition takes place between Cluster 1 and Clusters 
2 and 7. The amount of additional information has not been so overwhelming 
that it could have caused a change in the attitude towards conventional farming, 
but it might have been influential enough to create a more positive attitude 
towards sustainable development. 
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Based on the frequencies of the subgroups, a possible explanation is that 
among those people who basically supported the views of Cluster 1 were some 
who had already started to question the environmental appropriateness of con-
ventional farming. When they were offered an altemative supporting sustain-
able farming practices that simultaneously guaranteed the further existence of 
farming, these people allowed themselves to consider a new option. Because 
they already had more or less clearly pronounced doubts regarding conventional 
farming, the idea of sustainable development evoked a positive response among 
them when they had a chance to think about it more carefully. 
Except in Cluster 1, it seems reasonable to assume that the additional infor-
mation package and the change of sequence of some sections in the question-
naire did not cause any large-scale conversions in people' s initial attitudes. 
Some pieces of information have been new to the respondents and this has had 
an impact, but the impact has not been big enough to make positive initial 
attitudes negative and vice versa. Thus, it is interesting to examine if evidence 
from the phenomena depicted in Table 7.7 can be found in Table 7.8. 
Take Cluster 1 under a closer inspection. In Table 7.8 we can see that WTPp 
> WTPa, even though the difference is not statistically significant. Var(WTPp) 
is also greater than Var(WTPa) and the difference is statistically significant. In 
addition, the initial attitude towards pro-environmental farming and issues re-
lated to it are negative (see Table 7.5). Based on this knowledge, it is quite easy 
to recognize that option (7) in Table 7.7 corresponds the best to the profile of 
Table 7.8. Cluster-Related Mean WTPs and Standard Deviations of Respond-
ents Receiving (I p+Ia ) or Not Receiving (Ip ) Additional Information. 
Cluster Ip 	Ip+Ia Number of 
observations 
Mean WTP, 
FIM 
Prob>ITI Standard 
deviation 
Prob>F 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
I P 
Ip+Ia 
I P 
Ip+Ta 
I P 
Ip+Ta 
I P 
Ip-Fia 
IP 
Ip+Ia 
I P 
Ip+Ia 
I P 
Ip+Ia 
34 
19 
35 
31 
88 
87 
52 
51 
5 
6 
37 
41 
73 
83 
194 
68 
186 
556 
393 
428 
276 
169 
30 
92 
264 
287 
421 
416 
0.0800 
0.0055 
0.6300 
0.0900 
0.5500 
0.7900 
0.9600 
393 
90 
310 
642 
476 
500 
374 
257 
67 
225 
385 
374 
463 
523 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.6373 
0.0090 
0.0363 
0.8627 
0.2913 
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Cluster 1. Thus, the member of Cluster 1 agrees with Ia although he is not 
previously familiar with Ia. This interpretation is consistent with the ideas 
presented in Table 7.7, but is it consistent with the reality? The brief additional 
information package consisted of information that pointed out only the advan-
tages of pro-environmental farming and maintenance of the rural environment. 
What kind of agreement is in question? The first impression is that the members 
of Cluster 1 should have disagreed with 1a because Ia clearly supported pro-
environmental farming. A deeper examination of the problem reveals another 
possible explanation, which is more likely to be correct. Additional information 
was consistent with initial negative attitudes in the sense that Ia confirmed the 
respondents' ideas about the negative consequences that could take place if pro-
environmental farming replaced conventional farming. 
Cluster 2 has characteristics that are easy to identify. The initial attitude is 
positive, WTPp < WTPa, and the difference in means is statistically significant. 
Var(WTP) is smaller than Var(WTPa) and this difference is statistically signifi-
cant. Cluster 2 clearly matches the conditions of option (3) in Table 7.7. People 
in Cluster 2 have had a slightly positive initial attitude towards sustainable 
development and when they receive new additional information pointing out the 
advantages of pro-environmental farming and the maintenance of the rural 
environment their WTPs rise considerably. The behavior of the members of 
Cluster 2 gives evidence that very strongly supports the existence of informa-
tion effects in this data set. 
Cluster 3 apparently belongs to option (1), the initial attitude as well as the 
attitude toward la  are positive, but there is no change in WTP or in Var(WTP) 
because Ia  has been included in prior knowledge. Cluster 4 shares the character-
istics of Cluster 1 and can be placed in option (7). However, the reasons why 
people in Cluster 4 feel that additional information supports their negative 
initial attitudes are probably different from the case of Cluster 1. The members 
of Cluster 1 probably reasoned that the conversion to pro-environmental farm-
ing would not guarantee the existence of agriculture as a proper line of business. 
On the other hand, the members of Cluster 4 might have thought that the 
conversion to pro-environmental farming would not change anything in respect 
of agricultural subsidies. Cluster 5 has features typical of option (8). The mem-
bers of Cluster 5 receive Ia  with mixed feelings, they cannot integrate Ia into a 
functional part of f p. The benefits of pro-environmental farming cannot be 
totally neglected, although environmental questions do not have a high ranking 
on the agenda. Conflicting views create some uncertainty about the value of Ia 
and this is reflected through increasing variance. Cluster 6 can be situated in 
either category, in (5) or in (6). This does not make any difference because in 
both cases Ia  is already included in I. Cluster 7 can be regarded as similar to 
Cluster 3 in the sense that it represents a positive initial attitude with no changes 
in mean WTP or in Var(WTP). Moreover, when the positive initial attitude is 
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taken into account, the members of Cluster 7 probably agree with Ia. Thus, 
Cluster 7 can be placed into option (1) in Table 7.7. 
7.4. Assessment of Preferences 
Attitudes can also be utilized when we investigate the nature of preferences that 
are likely to lie behind the expressed WTP responses. As explained in Chapters 
5.3 and 5.4, it is not always straightforward to interpret the response behavior. 
There may be deviations from the basic assumption that ali respondents duly 
exhibit exchange preferences, which, as noted earlier, represent the standard 
neoclassical preference concept relying on characteristics like continuity, re-
flexivity, nonsatiation, and completeness. The continuity condition means that 
any change in one good can be compensated for by a change in another good. 
This kind of substitutability becomes frequently expressed in the neoclassical 
value theory (Lockwood 1997). 
It should be plausible to assume that if an individual has a strong positive 
attitude towards pro-environmental farming, he is also willing to pay for its 
promotion at least a small amount of money if he exhibits standard neoclassical 
exchange preferences. Table 7.9 lists all attitudinal Clusters and the amount of 
zero and positive WTP responses in respect of the information content. We can 
see that also in Clusters that clearly favor pro-environmental farming (Clusters 
2, 3, and 7) there is a considerable number of zero responses. Spash and Hanley 
(1995) argue that such response behavior is an indicator of the existence of 
lexicographic preferences. This can partly be the case in this study, too, but 
there is not enough evidence to verify the exact nature of the preference struc-
ture. However, we can argue that the respondents who simultaneously favor 
pro-environmental farming and state zero WTP for it express preferences that 
are not continuously exchangeable of their nature. Thus, approximately 17% of 
the respondents (113 out of 658) behave in a manner that does not support the 
theoretical underpinnings of welfare economics in this respect.22 
Of course, we can argue that the expressed attitudes are not valid indicators 
of preferences or behavior. To some extent, this is true because intentions very 
seldom become fully acted out. Moreover, it may be that expressed attitudes are 
plagued with inconsistencies in certain respects. However, responses in this 
case seem to be quite reliable because cross-tabulations of different answers do 
not reveal any major anomalies. For instance, ali those respondents who favor 
pro-environmental farming at the attitudinal level want to convert a consider-
able amount of agricultural land under pro-environmental farming. In this re- 
22  We cannot reject the possibility that some of the respondents who favor pro-environmental 
farming and state zero WTP do so because of lack of income. However, their share is likely to 
be quite small. 
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Table 7.9. Number of Zero and Non-Zero WTP Responses across Attitudinal 
Clusters and Information Content. 
Cluster Information Responses Responses Responses Ratio of zero 
content (WTP=0) (WTP>0) (A11) responses 
1 No add. info 19 15 34 0.56 
Add. info 11 9 20 0.55 
All 30 24 54 0.56 
2 No add. info 17 18 35 0.49 
Add. info 9 23 32 0.28 
All 26 41 67 0.39 
3 No add. info 27 68 95 0.28 
Add. info 25 66 91 0.27 
All 52 134 186 0.28 
4 No add. info 15 37 52 0.29 
Add. info 19 32 51 0.37 
All 34 69 103 0.33 
5 No add. info 4 1 5 0.80 
Add. info 5 1 6 0.83 
All 9 2 11 0.82 
6 No add. info 9 28 37 0.24 
Add. info 12 29 41 0.29 
All 21 57 78 0.27 
7 No add. info 16 55 71 0.23 
Add. info 19 69 88 0.22 
All 35 124 159 0.22 
All No add. info 107 222 329 0.33 
Add. info 100 229 329 0.30 
All 207 451 658 0.31 
spect, there is no difference between people stating positive WTP or zero WTP. 
This observation again supports the interpretation that zero WTPs are a result of 
a non-exchange preference structure, not a product of conflicting and inconsist-
ent behavioral motives. 
In addition, we should not completely exclude the possibility that some of 
the zero WTP responses are protest answers. However, it is not likely that an 
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individual with well-defined exchange preferences would start to protest against 
the presented valuation scenario or the questioning situation. There are certainly 
some protesting elements included in zero WTP responses, but they are most 
likely derived from the fact that the respondents have felt uneasy about the 
offered trade-off between money and environmental benefits. Thus, the protest-
ing is still based on views that are not completely consistent with exchange 
preferences. 
If a positive attitude towards pro-environmental farming combined with zero 
WTP is considered to be a suspicious phenomenon, the same can be said 
concerning the situation where negative attitudes towards pro-environmental 
farming show up simultaneously with high positive WTPs. In Table 7.10, the 
number of WTP responses that are greater than or equal to FIM 1,000 is 
presented across Clusters. It appears that 16 respondents (2.4% of the whole 
sample) with a negative attitude towards pro-environmental farming (from Clus-
ters 1, 4, 5, and 6) are willing to pay FIM 1,000 or more for the promotion of 
pro-environmental farming, despite their views. If the critical WTP level is 
lowered to FIM 500, then the number of seemingly inconsistently behaving 
respondents is 46 (7.0%). 
The explanation for this kind of response behavior is hard to find. It is 
difficult to imagine what kind of preferences can lead to response behavior like 
this. The question is probably about well-intentioned response motives. The 
respondents have tried to please the interviewer by expressing high WTPs 
despite their actual attitudes (misinterpreting response behavior). There is also a 
possibility of strategic behavior. The respondents belonging to Cluster 1 and 
thus strongly favoring conventional agriculture may have reasoned that high 
WTPs for pro-environmental farming simultaneously act on behalf of the sur-
vival of conventional agriculture. Some of the high WTP responses may simply 
Table 7.10. Number of WTP<1000 and WTP.1000 Responses across Attitudinal 
Clusters. 
Cluster Responses 
N (WTP<1000) 
Responses 
N (WTP1000) 
Responses 
N (ali) 
Ratio of WTP._1000 
responses 
1 50 4 54 0.07 
2 57 10 67 0.15 
3 151 35 186 0.19 
4 98 5 103 0.05 
5 11 0 11 0.00 
6 71 7 78 0.09 
7 130 29 159 0.18 
Ali 568 90 658 0.14 
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be products of nonchalant response motives that have led to indifferent response 
behavior and random responses to the WTP question. 
8. Discussion: Relating the Results to the Welfare Theory 
This chapter presents a concluding assessment of the usefulness and applicabil-
ity of the contingent valuation method as an assisting tool in relation to policy-
making. First, we must examine what the welfare analysis based on mean and 
median WTP figures or the derived demand function can tell about economic 
welfare enhancing characteristics of pro-environmental farming. Then, we have 
to judge how the existence of non-exchange preferences combined with the 
findings about the interaction between attitudes and information affect the reli-
ability and validity of the results. Next, we must consider if the observed 
sources of bias and inaccuracy offer alternative approaches to inteipret the 
application of the CVM methodology and terminology. Only after this assess-
ment we can conclude to what extent this CVM application can be relied on as 
an indicator of the economic and social value of a hypothetical policy alterna-
tive. 
8.1. Total WTP for Pro-Environmental Farming and Its Interpretation 
in the Welfare Analysis Context 
The welfare analysis related to the conversion from conventional agriculture to 
pro-environmental farming is a complicated task. This is mainly due to two 
factors. Concerning both taxpayer-consumers and farmers, the conversion in-
volves welfare effects, the net value of which is difficult to determine. In 
addition, the current situation may be plagued by pre-existing distortions, the 
exact nature of which we do not necessarily know. It is very likely that the 
context of agri-environmental policy-making is prone to certain market and 
government failures that frequently create distortions. 
The conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming 
would diminish farmers' profits from agricultural production because the new, 
lower optimal amount of chemical inputs in pro-environmental farming is likely 
to reduce, in the form of lower yields, sales revenues more than production 
costs. If producer prices rise, and thus help to compensate for the negative farm 
income effect due to the conversion, consumer-taxpayers will experience an 
adverse change in consumer surplus when the prices of agricultural products 
increase. The obvious conclusion is that, as far as agricultural products are 
considered the only source of agriculture-related benefits, the conversion from 
conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming will not be socially de-
sirable. 
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It should be plausible to assume that environmental net benefits from agri-
culture have an inverse relationship with the intensity of agricultural produc-
tion. Thus, the decrease in the use of chemical inputs increases environmental 
benefits. This has a positive welfare effect on consumer-taxpayers23. Conse-
quently, consumer-taxpayers face a trade-off due to decreasing welfare derived 
from agricultural products and increasing welfare derived from agriculture-
related environmental benefits. In this setting, the total WTP for the conversion 
from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming (ranging from FIM 
0.541 billion to MM 2.216 billion24) is considered the maximum amount of 
money that the society can spend to implement the conversion. Thus, the society 
could use a sum of money up to the total WTP amount to compensate farmers 
for their farm income losses. 
In the preceding analysis we assumed the existence of a market failure that 
prevents the market from including the value of environmental net benefits in 
agricultural product prices. This is no doubt a relevant starting point, because 
many agriculture-related environmental benefits possess characteristics of pub-
lie good type. In the sense, the market failure conceming the market's inad-
equate ability to price environmental public goods is a pre-existing distortion 
affecting the interpretation of welfare changes. Furthermore, in order to make 
the analysis of welfare effects related to the total WTP for the conversion more 
realistic, we have to consider the possibility of other pre-existing distortions. 
At the time when the survey was conducted, Finnish agriculture was more 
heavily subsidized than currently, and the magnitude of agricultural support 
continuously criticized in the public. Thus, agricultural support represented 
another source of a pre-existing distortion, probably due to a government failure 
in agricultural policy design. Taking this into account, it is likely that part of the 
respondents considered that the major advantage of pro-environmental farming 
would he its ability to cut down agricultural support. From the viewpoint of 
welfare analysis this is not problematic as such, because the motives of valua-
tion are irrelevant as long as they do not affect the validity of reliability of the 
welfare measure. However, the situation becomes somewhat different, if there is 
reason to doubt that people's WTP responses do not reflect valuations in the 
sense that is presupposed in the welfare change analysis. 
The respondents (almost one third of ali respondents) who expressed zero 
willingness to pay are the most critical group when the welfare effects are 
concemed. It is quite possible that certain respondents felt that the conversion 
23  Of course, farmers also benefit from higher environmental quality but in order to simplify the 
analysis, it is reasonable to assume that farmers' welfare is determined by the profit function. 
24  The magnitude of the total WTP depends on the chosen estimate. The lowest average WTP 
was FIM 150 (median WTP in BG-PC) and the highest average WTP was FIM 615 (mean 
WTP in non-parametric model 0.A+500). The target population was 3,603,852. 
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from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming would have dimin-
ished their welfare. This applies especially to Cluster 1, which represents people 
who prefer conventional agriculture and consider it superior to pro-environmen-
tal farming25. We cannot rule out the possibility that the zero WTP respondents 
in Cluster 1 would even have expressed negative willingness to pay if this had 
b e en allowed. 
The respondents in Clusters 4, 5, and 6, in turn, represent the view that 
agriculture and especially conventional agriculture is a source of social welfare 
loss. They consider any increase in the public financing of,agriculture undesir-
able from the viewpoint of consumer-taxpayers. However, they are not critical 
towards pro-environmental farming as such, they on'ly see its impact to be 
insignificant regarding the most central issue, which is the income transfer from 
consumer-taxpayers to farmers in the form of too eXcessive agricultural support. 
Nevertheless, whatever the arguments behind the opposition towards the con-
version from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming are, they 
may act as a source of negative willingness to pay. 
In addition, as noted before, the critical question is whether people would 
still be willing to pay the amount that they have stated if they recognized that 
pro-environmental farming practices would be carried out in a larger or smaller 
magnitude than they have considered to be appropriate and essential. Consider a 
situation where a respondent is willing to pay a certain amount for a complete 
conversion of agricultural land from conventional agriculture to pro-environ-
mental farming. Then the respondent is told that the actual policy proposal, 
which has been chosen to be implemented, will only convert one quarter of 
agricultural land to pro-environmental farming. In this case, it is more than 
likely that when the conversion scale diminishes, the respondent also wants to 
reduce his willingness to pay for the conversion. This is consistent' economic 
behavior, because people usually pay less if they receive less. 
It may even be possible that the increase of the conversion scale diminishes 
the initial willingness to pay, although this argument seems to contradict with 
the standard presumption stating that people are willing to receive more of a 
commodity if their total expenses for doing so do not increase. In this respect, it 
would be consistent to assume that a respondent who is willing to pay a certain 
amount for the conversion of one quarter of agricultural land from conventional 
agriculture to pro-environmental farming would not mind a more extensive 
conversion if he was guaranteed that the complete conversion could take place 
without any additional costs. However, we also have to consider the possibility 
that the one-quarter conversion of agricultural land to pro-environmental farm-
ing is a different commodity from the complete conversion to pro-environmen- 
25 We have to keep in mind that a considerable number of respondents in Cluster 1 were 
farmers. They might have had a strategic motive to underestimate their WTP. 
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tai farming. Thus, the increase of the acreage under conversion is not necessar-
ily more of the same commodity, but another commodity. Consequently, it is 
not possible to be sure that a respondent stating certain WTP for the one-quarter 
conversion to pro-environmental farming would express as high WTP for the 
complete conversion. This reasoning indicates that the total willingness to pay 
for the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming 
estimated in this study can, at its best, be the upper bound for the total WTP. 
The estimate for the total WTP for the conversion from conventional agricul-
ture to pro-environmental farming is, however, policy relevant, because it shows 
the magnitude of welfare increase that could be gained if an optimal conversion 
policy could be designed. Unfortunately, this is not possible because of the 
public good nature of the benefits that pro-environmental farming provides. It 
dictates that as long as the production of the benefits due to pro-environmental 
farming is financed by using income transfers based on public tax revenues, also 
those who would prefer a lower-than-current level of provision have to contrib-
ute their share of provision costs of the current level. And vice versa, those who 
feel that the current level of provision is inadequate cannot exclude themselves 
from cost-sharing. 
It seems that because of the number of possible interpretations related to the 
results we should not derive any unambiguous conclusions concerning the wel-
fare effects of the implementation of pro-environmental farming. Although a 
clear majority of respondents expressed a positive WTP in relation to the 
conversion scheme, we must still be careful when we interpret the total WTP as 
the indicator of social desirability of the conversion from conventional agricul-
ture to pro-environmental farming. The possible existence of non-quantified 
negative willingness to pay creates a serious assessment problem. If we assume 
that the respondents are capable of fully informed decisions related to their 
stated WTP, then we also have to admit that the large number of zero responses 
is a sign of dislike or at least disinterest towards pro-environmental farming. 
It may be that the possibility of negative WTP is correlated with the details 
of policy implementation. If the conversion from conventional agriculture to 
pro-environmental farming is carried out in such a way that farmers' rights to 
choose their production techniques will not be threatened, and the conversion 
will not be a source of ever-increasing agricultural subsidies, the possibility of 
negative willingness to pay will probably diminish considerably. It is not likely 
that anybody would oppose agriculture-related environmental benefits due to 
pro-environmental farming as such if the policy measures to be implemented are 
designed to take into account the reservations that some groups may have 
regarding the related agricultural policy aspects. 
Nevertheless, keeping ali the listed reservations in mind, it is probably 
justified to argue that the estimated total WTP (FIM 0.541 - 2.216 billion) for 
the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming can 
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be interpreted as the maximum amount of money which the society could spend 
for the socially acceptable compensations to farmers for their losses of farm 
income, if the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental 
farming occurred. 
8.2. Preferences, Attitudes, Information, and Validity of the Results 
The use of money metric measures of welfare change is based on certain 
assumptions of the nature of people's preferences. If we want to aggregate 
individual WTPs, we must assume that people express their preferences in a 
continuous manner. If this holds, it makes sense to claim that people reveal their 
preferences in a reliable way in a hypothetical transaction situation where they 
are asked to trade environmental quality for money. We can say that people 
exhibit exchange preferences. Another essential preference issue is stability, 
which is important especially from the policy-making point of view. If prefer-
ences were not stable, it would be problematic to use them for decision-making 
purposes. Furthermore, the validity of WTP measures depends on response 
motives and respondents' ability to perceive correctly the different elements of 
the valuation instrument. As noted above, a respondent may conceal his true 
preferences and express goal-oriented response motives in order to pursue aims 
not intended by the researcher. Moreover, even in a case where a respondent has 
well-intentioned response motives, he may fail to cooperate with the researcher 
as expected because of cognitive shortcomings. 
The empirical findings of this study seem to suggest that it is an oversimpli-
fied view to assume that ali respondents have preferences that follow the idea of 
continuous substitutability between monetary units and the good being valued. 
A significant number of the respondents (17%) had a positive attitude towards 
pro-environmental farming, although they simultaneously expressed zero will-
ingness to pay for it. If we assume that the respondents had well-intentioned 
response motives and that they perceived the valuation scenario as intended, it 
seems peculiar that the positive attitude towards the good being valued does not 
produce a positive WTP. Although there are a number of possible explanations, 
we should not rule out the prospect that zero responses are produced by a 
preference structure that deviates from exchange preferences. The possible pref-
erence-related explanations cover noncompensatory and weakly comparable 
preferences. 
The problem is that the empirical data is not detailed enough to make it 
possible to separate respondents with noncompensatory (lexicographic) prefer-
ences from respondents with weakly comparable preferences. This would be 
interesting from the theoretical point of view because the validity of valuation 
methods based on value commensurability becomes more seriously challenged 
if we accept that a considerable number of people exhibit weakly comparable 
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preferences. Noncompensatory preferences as such are not in a conflict with the 
idea of monetary valuation because people with noncompensatory preferences 
are able to produce a value ranking between different alternatives such that one 
alternative can be said to be better than another. Thus, the transitivity of choices 
is not threatened. The situation changes considerably when weakly comparable 
preferences become the prevailing ones. The complexity of the choice context 
makes it possible that even if A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, C can 
still be preferred to A. As a consequence, transitivity no longer holds. An 
outside observer is not able to produce a consistent ranking across different 
alternatives, which makes it difficult to provide coherent policy recommenda-
tions. 
Of course, zero responses can also be explained without assuming non-
exchange preferences. First, a respondent expressing zero WTP and having a 
positive attitude towards pro-environmental farming may exhibit goal-oriented 
response motives. He anticipates that other respondents will state WTP amounts 
that are high enough to guarantee a sufficient magnitude of pro-environmental 
farming. However, the existence of strategic behavior of this kind is question-
able. As noted earlier, strategic behavior is very seldom detected in CVM 
applications, and it is not very plausible that respondents would try to free-ride 
when the expected utility due to truthful preference revelation is considerably 
larger than the required contribution. Nevertheless, the introduction of a more 
reliable test for the detection of possible free-riding behavior would require an 
analysis of the psychological profiles of the respondents. We can reason that the 
more risk-averse person is in question, the less inclined he is to attempt to free-
ride because there is always the risk that after a certain point excessive free-
riding would prevent pro-environmental farming from taking place. This would 
completely obliterate the benefits due to pro-environmental farming. 
The second possibility is that some of the zero respondents with a positive 
attitude towards pro-environmental farming consider that they already contrib-
ute enough in the form of existing agricultural subsidies. Although they strongly 
prefer pro-environmental farming, they still feel that the conversion should be 
carried out by reallocating agricultural support. If this is the motive behind zero 
WTP, we cannot prove that these respondents possess other than exchange type 
preferences. However, because the valuation scenario did not explicitly spell 
out the role of agricultural subsidies in respect of different agricultural policy 
actions and their financing, it is probably safe to assume that only some of the 
zero respondents would have been able to see the connection between agricul-
tural support and taxes that they pay. 
The third possibility is that the respondents have exchange preferences and 
express well-intentioned response motives but fail to perceive correctly the 
valuation instrument. The result would be, at least from the researcher' s point of 
view, irrational behavior. Unfortunately, it is not possible to analyze the re- 
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spondents' answers in detail in this respect. However, the examination of the 
answers of the respondents who had a negative attitude towards pro-environ-
mental farming but who expressed high WTP seems to suggest that the number 
of "irrational" answers is not that significant. The same probably applies to the 
group of zero respondents. Thus, the conclusion is that most respondents per-
ceived the elements of the valuation instrument reasonably well and were able 
to answer the questions without major cognitive problems. 
When the stability of preferences in relation to additional information is 
considered, two somewhat different issues must be addressed. First, additional 
information may change the intensity of preferences. In this case the basic 
nature of the relationship between the initial attitude and the good being valued 
does not alter. However, the change of preference intensity becomes reflected in 
terms of the expressed WTP. If the additional information reinforces the initial 
positive attitude, it is likely that individual WTP increases. This phenomenon 
was observed in Cluster 2, where the mean WTP rose considerably (from FIM 
186 to FIM 556) when additional information was provided to the respondents. 
The difference between the mean WTPs was also statistically highly significant 
(t = 0.0055). A similar but opposite phenomenon took place in Clusters 1 and 4, 
where the provision of additional information reduced the mean WTP. In this 
case the difference between the mean WTPs was not statistically significant but 
clearly indicative (t = 0.08 and t = 0.09, respectively). Based on these examples, 
which are also supported by theoretical arguments, we can claim that the infor-
mation content of a CVM survey correlates with stated WTPs if the attitudinal 
profiles of the respondents are of a certain type. 
Second, additional information may cause a fundamental change in the ini-
tial attitude towards the good being valued. This is a more serious implication 
because in this case the stability of preferences becomes highly questionable. A 
change in preference intensity can be regarded as a minor source of bias, but a 
change from a negative initial attitude to a positive initial attitude or vice versa 
can be considered a major indicator of preference instability. The empirical 
evidence of the existence of this kind of phenomenon is not completely convinc-
ing in this survey, but some signs were detected. 111 other clusters except in 
Cluster 1 the number of respondents receiving and not-receiving additional 
information was almost equal. Because the same number of questionnaires of 
both types were assigned to the respondents, it is likely that in every attitudinal 
cluster there should be an equal number of them if additional information has 
not affected the initial attitudes of the respondents. Since this is not the case in 
Cluster 1, we can conclude that additional information has been influential 
enough to change the initial attitudes of some of the respondents who otherwise 
would have belonged to Cluster 1. It seems plausible that the introduction of 
additional information has made some respondents move from Cluster 1 espe- 
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cially to Cluster 7, where there is a slight surplus of the respondents who have 
received additional information. 
Considefing the empirical evidence presented in this study, we seem to have 
some reason to question the exchangeable nature of preferences that is implic-
itly assumed to hold when money metric measures of welfare change are ap-
plied. On the other hand, we have to take into account that the prevailing view 
among CVM researchers is that, by means of appropriate survey design, distort-
ing information effects can be eliminated. However, sensitivity to the informa-
tion provided does not explain ali the observed peculiarities. There is evidence, 
although somewhat preliminary, that a considerable number of respondents has 
expressed preferences that are non-exchangeable in their nature. This observa-
tion is of great importance because it indicates that money metric measures of 
welfare change may have a more restricted domain of application than tradition-
ally believed. From the policy-making point of view this is also a highly rel-
evant conclusion because the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle loses part of 
its qualification as a social decision-making criterion. 
8.3. Possible Policy Recommendations 
When the social decision-making process is in question, it is never possible to 
produce unanimously approved policy recommendations. Because the ranking 
of distinct social states is a normative procedure involving subjective value 
judgments, it is apparent that for each set of value judgments adopted a different 
social ordering results. Thus, there is no objectively unique way to order social 
states, indicating that there is no decision-making eriterion, either, that could be 
considered the most preferable. Consequently, any method that aims to assist 
social decision-making should be assessed by analyzing its inherent value pos-
tulates. 
In real-life social decision-making situations a valuation method can serve its 
purpose, despite some shortcomings found in its theoretical and methodological 
validity and reliability. Thus, as long as the context-dependence and observed 
inadequacies are properly taken into account, CVM results can be utilized to the 
extent that seems to be expedient. The fact is that market-based solutions or 
referendum-like direct democratic processes cannot always be applied when 
decisions are made about the allocation of environment-related resources. There 
will always be a social necessity for methods that somehow reveal and mediate 
people's preferences. In this respect the CVM can be employed if its limitations 
are not forgotten and its inherent value judgments are treated with appropriate 
thought. 
As we have noted previously, the total WTP for the conversion from conven-
tional agriculture to pro-environmental farming ranges from FIM 0.541 - 2.216 
billion depending on the chosen estimate for the average WTP. Currently, in 
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1999, the annual expenses of the Finnish agri-environmental program (FAEP), 
which is aimed to enhance the environmental quality of agriculture, are around 
FIM 1.7 billion. The equivalence is significant. It would be tempting to argue 
that the result shows that the Finnish agri-environmental program represents a 
high level of social desirability. However, the equivalence between the total 
willingness to pay for pro-environmental farming and the expenses of the FAEP 
is more or less a coincidence. The pre-existing distortions combined with cer-
tain interpretation problems of the WTP results indicate that the social desirabil-
ity of the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farm-
ing cannot be proved in a conclusive manner. 
In cases where economic and social implications of the prevailing institu-
tional system are complicated, it is not possible to design valuation instruments 
that could take into account ali the relevant aspects related to the proposed 
institutional changes. Especially when a valuation instrument includes a major 
change in property rights or in some other central social or economic institu-
tions, the results should be interpreted with great care. Apparently, the choice of 
the WTP approach in this case implicitly indicates that farmers are perceived to 
own the rural environment and they have to be paid by non-farmers if the latter 
ones want to enjoy higher environmental quality produced by pro-environmen-
tal farming. It is quite natural if some of the respondents regard this kind of 
distribution of property rights as unacceptable. 
The accuracy of the average WTP estimates can also be challenged on other 
grounds. We have to doubt the respondents' ability to make elaborate benefit 
and cost calculations when they are interviewed. Some people may have an idea 
of how much they spend on agricultural pro ducts, but only very few people can 
judge what their share of the tax money used to finance agricultural support is. 
The same reasoning applies to agriculture-related benefits. Most people per-
ceive the advantages of domestic food production and appreciate agricultural 
landscape, but the evaluation of changes that take place at the ecosystem level is 
much more difficult. The respondents should be extremely knowledgeable and 
well-informed in order to be able to assess ali the relevant benefits and costs 
that are related to a major change in agricultural or environmental policy. 
However, despite these shortcomings, the CVM can provide useful informa-
tion. Consider the valuation exercise at hand. The valuation situation related to 
the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming is 
very complicated because of its physical extent, conceptual complexity, and 
institutional peculiarity. There are not too many altematives to communicate 
this kind of valuation situation to people whose preferences are being examined. 
Compared to most other methods based on the revelation of people's prefer-
ences, the CVM excels due to its wide applicability. Hypothetical markets can 
be created anywhere. In principle, there are no geographical or conceptual 
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limits. Thus, very complicated valuation situations can be described by using 
the CVM framework. This is clearly an advantage. 
Nevertheless, considering the complexity of the whole valuation framework 
regarding pro-environmental farming and the rural environment, it is obvious 
that the respondents' WTP answers refiect more general perceptions related to 
environmental and agricultural issues than a careful analysis of the likely wel-
fare effects of the proposed agricultural policy measure. This perception is also 
indirectly supported by the observed influence of additional information. If the 
respondent's initial attitude towards a policy measure being valued was posi-
tive, then the piece of additional information had a significant increasing impact 
on the respondent's WTP. Furthermore, the same information was neglected if 
the respondent's general attitude towards the object of valuation was negative. 
This indicates that the respondents' preferences are not so well-developed that 
they could be accurately refiected at the societal level in the form of money 
metric measures of welfare change. 
Thus, we argue that the information related to the attitudinal profiles of the 
respondents, impact of additional information, and information on preference 
structures of the respondents may be more useful than the individual willingness 
to pay measures. If almost two-thirds of the respondents have a positive attitude 
towards the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farm-
ing, it is a clear signal to agricultural policy-makers independent of the recorded 
magnitudes of individual WTPs. In this respect, the current development in-
duced by the Finnish agri-environmental program and especially its supplemen-
tary protection scheme, which has led to a rapid increase of agricultural land 
under organic farming, certainly seems socially acceptable and desirable. 
Furthermore, if we accept that preferences related to pro-environmental farm-
ing and maintenance of the rural environment can be in some cases non-ex-
changeable of their nature, agricultural and environmental policy measures 
should be designed in a manner that pays more attention to ethical viewpoints 
and property rights as an essential part of people's valuation process. The 
money-based thinking that has promoted monetary valuation approaches needs 
to be extended to cover aspects that cannot and should not be made commensu-
rable in monetary units. The CVM also has a role in this framework, but it 
cannot be regarded as the only source of value determination. 
In this respect, it seems that the major future research challenge for the CVM 
will somehow be related to the nature of people's preferences. The nature of 
preferences dictates the theoretical validity of money metric measures of wel-
fare change. It would be useful to examine in different monetary valuation 
contexts to what extent, if any, people express preferences of non-exchangeable 
nature. Especially, an attempt should be made to empirically distinguish be-
tween respondents with noncompensatory and weakly comparable preferences. 
The nature of preferences will also be reflected in policy recommendations 
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derived from WTP responses. It would be a step forward if such valuation 
scenarios were developed which could cope with pre-existing distortions and 
conceptually- incorporate negative willingness to pay into the valuation frame-
work. 
Ali in ali, considering the methodological difficulties and the complexity of 
agricultural policy context in relation to the CVM results presented, we have to 
conclude that this study could not unambiguously prove the social desirability 
of the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming. 
However, this study hopefully succeeded in showing the true nature of prefer-
ences, attitudes, and valuations that the Finns have towards the rural environ-
ment and its maintenance through pro-environmental farming. This is no doubt 
useful background information when agri-environmental policy decisions are 
being made in the future. 
9. Summary 
The overall purpose of this study was to investigate the applicability of the 
contingent valuation method, in particular, and monetary valuation in general, 
in a situation where the CVM is used to elicit a monetary value of the conver-
sion from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming for the social 
policy-making purposes. In more specific terms, this study aimed to assess, 
based on the average WTP estimates and taking into account both the limita-
tions set by the policy-making context and the implications of the survey find-
ings and design, what can be said about the social desirability of the conversion 
from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming. 
At the empirical level, the study had two objectives. First, the reliability of 
the willingness to pay results, i.e. their consistency and repeatability, was 
analyzed. The task was carried out by using different elicitation formats, theo-
retical models, and statistical estimation techniques in the estimation of the 
average WTP figures. This helped to assess how robust and logically behaving 
the means and medians derived from people's WTP responses were. Second, the 
validity of the CVM results, i.e. their ability to reveal people's "true" prefer-
ences, was examined. The focus was on the commensurability of preferences, 
influence of attitudes, and the effect of additional information. 
The motivation behind the study is related to the change in agricultural 
policies that has taken place in Finland, as well as in other EU countries, during 
the past two decades. Problems with the surplus of agricultural products com-
bined with emerged adverse environmental impacts due to agriculture have 
made it clear that agricultural production influences the social welfare consider-
ably, creating undesirable side-effects that should somehow be eliminated. The 
recognition of this fact has led governments to design agricultural policy meas- 
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ures which pay attention to the importance of the joint production of foodstuffs 
and agriculture-related environmental public goods. The dilemma is that the 
environmental benefits of the public good type are not necessarily reflected in 
the prices of agricultural pro ducts. This is why we need a method that can attach 
a monetary value to the non-priced environmental amenities, too. By doing this, 
i.e. by giving them certain commensurability in respect of market goods, we 
make them visible to the market place and other social institutions. The CVM 
can accomplish this, at least to some extent. It can convey information that is 
required in the social decision-making process when the decisions are made 
about desirable agricultural production practices and the overall development of 
the rural environment. 
In order to frame the social decision-making context, a theoretical model was 
developed to derive the basic social design of pro-environmental farming when, 
in addition to conventional input choice, the aspects of agriculture-supporting 
ecosystem, rural public goods and extemalities are included in the social wel-
fare maximization problem consisting of the sum of consumers' and producers' 
surpluses in relation to the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-
environmental farming. Based on this pro-environmental farming was argued to 
be an agricultural production altemative that maintains and enhances the eco- 
logical and environmental quality of the rural environment. Conceptually, this 
definition means that pro-environmental farming is considered an agricultural 
production practice that creates positive extemalities in the form of enhanced 
environmental quality. The problem is, however, that the rural environment 
consists of so many elements, visible or invisible, concrete or abstract, human-
originated or natural, that people may have difficulties to perceive ali the dimen-
sions which are relevant to the valuation. In essence, people may not correctly 
understand what they are asked to value. This possibility of miscomprehension 
is one source of bias that is always present in CVM studies. 
The contingent valuation method also has some significant advantages. The 
CVM involves the use of sample surveys or questionnaires to elicit the respond-
ents' willingness to pay for commodities, projects, or programs that are gener-
ally hypothetical of their nature. In other words, the CVM creates a contingent 
market that imitates the real market place. Clearly, the appeal of the contingent 
valuation method was in its hypothetical nature, which gives a wide applicabil-
ity in relation to the valuation of somewhat unlikely policy proposals. In this 
case, the CVM made it possible to contrast conventional agriculture and pro-
environmental farming and, consequently, value the hypothetical conversion 
from the former to the latter. Nevertheless, we have to remember that the 
hypothetical nature of the valuation situation can sometimes also be a problem. 
If the respondents consider the valuation scenario presented too hypothetical, 
they may give WTP answers that do not appropriately reflect their preferences. 
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Moreover, the CVM has another very useful quality. When we are making an 
attempt to value environmental goods, we very often have to cope with values 
that are not necessarily related to the use of these goods. In other words, people 
can have nonuse values that are motivated, for instance, by intergenerational 
faimess, intragenerational altruism, or the intrinsic value of the nature. Mon-
etary valuation methods that are based on revealed preferences, like the travel 
cost and hedonic price methods, cannot necessarily take nonuse values into 
account. Because of the public good nature of environmental goods, the joint 
consumption of the market good and the environmental good can be an inferior 
indicator of the total economic value of the environmental good in question. 
The third advantage of the CVM is that the monetary estimates that it 
produces represent theoretically correct money metric measures of welfare 
change. In this sense, the use of the CVM is more preferable than, for instance, 
the use of market value approaches or methods relying on expert knowledge. 
This quality combined with the two other qualities, the wide applicability due to 
hypothetical market construction and the ability to include nonuse values, have 
proved to be of great importance when decision-makers have been provided 
information on the possible costs and benefits of a project with major environ-
mental consequences. Thus, the rapid increase of the popularity of the CVM is 
at least to some extent due to its applicability in the benefit-cost analysis 
framework. 
The data needed in the empirical analysis of willingness to pay were ac-
quired by using face-to-face interviews. A sample of 671 respondents was 
chosen from the target population of 3,603,000 Finnish people between 16 and 
69 years of age. The sampling method applied was a combination of stratified 
and clustered sampling techniques. In the interview the respondents were asked 
how large a proportion of the agricultural land should be converted from con-
ventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming. Then, the respondents were 
asked the actual WTP question, which inquired their willingness to pay for the 
conversion in the magnitude that they had stated in the previous question. Three 
different starting point bids, FIM 100 (ca. USD 20), FIM 500 (ca. USD 100), 
and FIM 1,300 (ca. USD 260), were used, and the primary elicitation method 
applied was a combination of a bidding game and payment cards (BG-PC). In 
addition to the BG-PC elicitation method, the dichotomous choice elicitation 
format based on a bidding vector consisting of the starting point bids was 
constructed. The questionnaires were also differentiated in respect of the infor-
mation content, half of the questionnaires providing more information than the 
other half. In addition, questions revealing attitudes and socio-economic back-
ground variables were asked. 
The first empirical objective, the analysis of the reliability of the average 
WTP results, was carried out by using both the BG-PC and the dichotomous 
choice elicitation approaches. Related to the BG-PC, it was tested whether the 
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starting bid and the information content affected the stated WTP. It was found 
out that the starting point bias was present, but the information content did not 
have a statistically significant effect. Concerning the dichotomous choice, three 
different model specifications were used. A random utility model with the logit 
specification acting as the cumulative distribution function was developed. In 
addition, a simple spike model was constructed, and a non-parametric estima-
tion technique based on the dichotomous choice data was also applied. 
There was some variation in the average figures depending on the chosen 
elicitation method or model specification. Mean WTP for the whole sample 
extended from FIM 290 to FIM 615, and median WTP for the whole sample 
ranged from FIM 150 to FIM 379. However, it is a matter of judgment if the 
observed variation in mean and median WTPs is considered to reduce the 
reliability of the results from the policy-making perspective. Despite some 
minor statistical peculiarities in certain estimation procedures, we were able to 
conclude that ali the elicitation techniques and model specifications applied 
seemed to be reliable enough when the mean or median WTPs for the whole 
sample were concerned. The observed variation in the average figures was due 
to different presumptions behind the alternative models, not inadequate reliabil-
ity of the contingent valuation method as such. 
The second empirical objective, the examination of the validity of the CVM 
results, was carried out by analyzing response behavior in relation to prefer-
ences and the effects of the interplay between information and attitudes. A 
conceptual model including response behavior and response motives was devel-
oped. Five main categories of response behavior, i.e. strategic behavior, misin-
terpreting behavior, indifferent behavior, protest behavior, and expected behavior, 
were singled out. They were considered to be based on goal-oriented, noncha-
lant, and/or well-intentioned response motives. A goal-oriented response motive 
means that a respondent is willing to promote his own interests instead of acting 
according to the wishes of the researcher. A nonchalant response motive indi-
cates that a respondent is not interested in engaging in the questioning situation 
at ali. A well-intentioned response motive implies that a respondent is willing to 
act according to the wishes of the researcher, but there is no guarantee that the 
respondent perceives the researcher's goals correctly. 
The most desired type of behavior is expected behavior. A respondent be-
having expectedly perceives the valuation instrument correctly and is ready to 
express his actual willingness to pay and other relevant preferences without any 
hidden agenda. A respondent behaving misinterpretingly exhibits well-intentioned 
response motives, but he fails at least partly to understand certain essential 
characteristics of the valuation instrument. Therefore, the stated individual WTP 
can be misleading. Strategic behavior means that the respondent has a clear idea 
of how he should behave in a survey situation in order to benefit from the 
survey outcome as much as possible. His response motive is thus goal-oriented, 
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i.e. the respondent intentionally misrepresents his preferences. In the case of 
indifferent behavior, the respondent does not really want to consider the valua-
tion scenario presented, and that is why he gives nearly random responses in 
order to get through the survey with minimum effort. 
The fifth mode, protest behavior, is the most complex form of response 
behavior. In its extreme, protest behavior means that the respondent refuses to 
participate in the valuation situation in any manner. By doing this, the respond- 
ent does not attempt to mislead the researcher by misrepresenting his prefer-
ences, but he merely signals that his preferences are not compatible with the 
valuation scenario introduced by the researcher. This is usually due to two 
reasons. First, the respondent is not satisfied with the property rights that are 
related to the good being.valued, the provision structure, or the payment vehicle 
in the valuation scenario. Second, the respondent may oppose the whole idea of 
making a trade-off between money and an environmental public good. 
Thus, meaningfid response behavior can be based on three types of prefer-
ence expressions: weakly comparable, noncompensatory, and. exchangeable. 
Weakly comparable preferences indicate that an individual can choose between 
different alternatives, although he is not able to produce a general ranking 
across them. If preferences are noncompensatory or exchangeable, they are 
always strongly comparable, assuming that different alternatives can be com-
pletely ranked based on their value. An individual with noncompensatory pref- 
erences can produce a value ranking of the alternatives such that one alternative 
can be said to be better than another, even though the individual is unwilling to 
make a trade-off between the alternatives. Exchangeable preferences represent 
the standard economic notion of preferences. Both weakly comparable and 
noncompensatory preferences clearly challenge the applicability of the CVM or 
any other monetary valuation method. 
In order to assist the identification of non-exchangeable preference based 
response behavior and the possible interplay between additional information 
and attitudes, an analysis of the respondent's attitudes was carried out by means 
of the factor and cluster analyses. The factorization was based on the responses 
to attitudinal claims that were presented in the questionnaire. Three factors were 
extracted. They represented attitudes towards both agricultural and environmen- 
tal issues. Factor 1 described an attitudinal dimension that considered the ad-
verse environmental impacts due to conventional agriculture the most severe 
agriculture-related problem in Finland. Factor 2 presented an attitudinal dimen-
sion the core of which was dislike towards agriculture because of agricultural 
subsidies. Factor 3 expressed a more holistic attitudinal dimension, the major 
concern of which was the environmental damage that may already have been 
caused and which thus has reduced the welfare of future generations. 
Utilizing the factor scores that each respondent received in the three factors, 
the respondents were divided into seven attitudinal groups through the cluster 
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analysis. Cluster 1 consists of the respondents who prefer conventional agricul-
tural practices. Cluster 2 includes the respondents who have a positive attitude 
towards agriculture in general. Cluster 3 represents the respondents who de-
mand a change in current farming practices and are ready to pay for it. The 
respondents in Cluster 4 have a critical attitude towards conventional farming 
because of economic reasons, but they are not worried about sustainable devel-
opment. Cluster 5 portrays the respondents whose attitudes towards agriculture 
are solely motivated by their opposition of agricultural subsidies. Cluster 6 
contains the respondents whose attitudes towards agriculture are to a great 
extent motivated by their opposition of agricultural subsidies, although their 
opposition is not on the grounds of firm principles. The respondents in Cluster 7 
express slight concern about adverse environmental effects of agriculture, un-
derstand the importance of sustainable development, and are ready to approve 
of agricultural subsidies in order to guarantee domestic food supply and the 
maintenance of the countryside. 
When the effect of additional information was tested by using a simple 
comparison of the mean WTPs of the two questionnaire types with differing 
information content, the difference between the mean WTPs did not appear to 
be statistically significant (t = 0.0719), even though the mean WTPs deviated 
considerably (FIM 357 without Ia versus FIM 446 with Ia). The situation changed 
when the effect of additional information was tested inside the attitudinal clus-
ters. In Cluster 2, the mean WTP rose considerably (from FIM 186 to FIM 556) 
when additional information was provided to the respondents. The difference 
between the mean WTPs was also statistically highly significant (t = 0.0055). 
The conclusion was that the provision of the additional information can raise 
the stated WTPs if the attitudinal profile of the respondents is of a certain kind, 
i.e. they have a positive initial attitude towards the good being valued, and the 
additional information provided reinforces their initial attitude, being simulta-
neously relatively "new" to them. There was also some evidence that a negative 
initial attitude towards the good being valued combined with the additional 
information conflicting with the initial attitude could result in a decrease in the 
mean WTP. However, this evidence was not conclusive in terms of statistical 
significance. 
The information on the respondent's attitudes was utilized further when the 
nature of their preferences was examined. A significant number of the respond-
ents (17%) had a positive attitude towards pro-environmental farming, although 
they simultaneously expressed zero willingness to pay for it. If we assume that 
the respondents had well-intentioned response motives and that they perceived 
the valuation scenario as intended, it seems peculiar that the positive attitude 
towards the good being valued does not produce a positive WTP. Thus, it is 
reasonable to believe that non-exchangeable preferences (probably both 
noncompensatory and weakly comparable preferences) were represented among 
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the respondents. From the policy-making point of view, this is a highly relevant 
conclusion because the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle loses part of its 
justification as a desirable social decision-making criterion. 
The average WTP results were also used in the welfare change analysis that 
aimed to assess whether the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-
environmental farming can be considered a socially desirable policy action. The 
conclusion was that if certain reservations related to the possible existence of 
negative WTP and the design of the survey are properly taken into account, it is 
justified to argue that the estimated total WTP (FIM 0.541 - 2.216 billion 
depending on the chosen estimate for the average WTP) for the conversion from 
conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming can be interpreted as the 
maximum amount of money which the society can spend for the socially accept-
able income transfers in order to make the conversion happen. 
Finally, some conclusions were derived concerning agricultural policy-mak-
ing in relation to the possible conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-
environmental farming. An interesting equality in magnitude was detected be-
tween the total WTP estimated in this study and the annual expenses of the 
Finnish agri-environmental program. Even though this match was considered 
more a coincidence than a sign of intuitively successful agricultural policy-
making, it should not be forgotten that two-thirds of the respondents in this 
study expressed a positive willingness to pay for the conversion from conven-
tional agriculture to pro-environmental farming. It is a clear indicator that the 
public supports the maintenance of the rural environment and environmentally-
friendly agricultural production practices. In this respect, the current develop-
ment induced by the Finnish agri-environmental program and especially its 
supplementary protection scheme, which has led to a rapid increase of agricul-
tural land under organic farming, seems well-grounded. 
Although it was not possible to make a final and conclusive assessment 
about the acceptability, applicability, and feasibility of the contingent valuation 
method as the indicator of the socially most desirable policy development, the 
monetary valuation of the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-
environmental farming appeared to provide essential information on people's 
willingness to pay, attitudes, and preferences in relation to the rural environ-
ment and environmentally-friendly production practices. Its usability for the 
purposes of agri-environmental policy-making remains to be seen. 
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Appendix A: Structure of the Sample 
Table A-1. Sample in Respect of Gender, Province and Type of Place of Living. 
Females Males Ali 
Province of Uusimaa 
-city 78 69 147 
- rural commune 25 24 49 
103 93 196 
Province of Turku and Pori 
-city 23 25 48 
- rural commune 18 21 39 
41 46 87 
Province of Häme 
-city 18 17 35 
- rural commune 22 20 42 
40 37 77 
Province of Kymi 
-city 9 11 20 
- rural commune 12 9 21 
21 20 41 
Province of Mikkeli 
-city 5 5 10 
- rural commune 6 7 13 
11 12 23 
Province of Kuopio 
-city 13 12 25 
- rural commune 8 14 22 
21 26 47 
Province of Keski-Suomi 
-city 10 10 20 
- rural commune 9 10 19 
19 20 39 
Province of Pohjois-Karjala 
-city 6 6 12 
- rural commune 6 6 12 
12 12 24 
Province of Vaasa 
-city 25 22 47 
- rural commune 3 3 6 
28 25 53 
Province of Oulu 
-city 13 15 28 
- rural commune 15 13 28 
28 28 56 
Province of Lappi 
-city 5 3 8 
- rural commune 6 6 12 
11 9 20 
335 328 663 
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Table A-2. Sample in Respect of Gender and Age*. 
Females Males Ali 
15-19 years 31 40 71 
20-29 years 70 68 138 
30-39 years 73 67 140 
40-49 years 63 67 130 
50-59 years 51 51 102 
60-69 years 39 42 81 
327 327 654 
* Nine respondents..clid not.report their age- (8 feniales and 1 male). 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire 
Six different types of the questionnaire and the sequence of the elements in each 
of them. 
Questionnaire type 1:  
Questions inquiring basic socio-economic characteristics of the respondent 
Additional information package 
Attitudinal questions and claims 
Willingness to pay iteration question (starting bid FIM 100) 
Questions inquiring extra socio-economic characteristics of the respondent 
Questionnaire type 2:  
Questions inquiring basic socio-economic characteristics of the respondent 
Additional information package 
Attitudinal questions and claims 
Willingness to pay iteration question (starting bid FIM 500) 
Questions inquiring extra socio-economic characteristics of the respondent 
Questionnaire type 3:  
Questions inquiring basic socio-economic characteristics of the respondent 
Additional information package 
Attitudinal questions and claims 
Willingness to pay iteration question (starting bid FIM 1,300) 
Questions inquiring extra socio-economic characteristics of the respondent 
Ouestionnaire type 4:  
1. Questions inquiring basic socio-economic characteristics of the respondent 
4. Willingness to pay iteration question (starting bid FIM 100) 
3. Attitudinal questions and claims 
5. Questions inquiring extra socio-economic characteristics of the respondent 
Questionnaire type 5:  
1. Questions inquiring basic socio-economic characteristics of the respondent 
4. Willingness to pay iteration question (starting bid FIM 500) 
3. Attitudinal questions and claims 
5. Questions inquiring extra socio-economic characteristics of the respondent 
Ouestionnaire type 6:  
1. Questions inquiring basic socio-economic characteristics of the respondent 
Willingness to pay iteration question (starting bid FIM 1,300) 
3. Attitudinal questions and claims 
Questions inquiring extra socio-economic characteristics of the respondent 
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1. Questions inquiring the basic socio-economic characteristics of the respondent 
1-1. Sex 
female 
male 
1-2. Age 
15-17 
18-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-64 
65-69 
1-3. Marital status 
married or living together 	c) divorced 
widow 	 d) not married 
1-4. Number of family members living at home 	, of which 
under 5 	 
5-12 	 
13-18 	 
1-5. Do you live in a 
block of flats 
link house 
detached house 
farm 
somewhere else, where? 
 
  
1-6. Do you 
own your flat/house/farm 
live as a tenant 
2. Additional information package 
Farming is a way to maintain the rural environment in Finland. It consists of man-made 
and natural elements. Hundreds of years of cultivation carried out by farmers has left its 
mark on the flora, fauna, and scenery. This unique combination of two different systems 
is known as the rural environment. 
In the rural environment you are free to enjoy its recreational values, beauty of 
scenery, and peaceful atmosphere. The rural environment is, in a way, a public good 
maintained for you by farmers. 
The rural environment is, however, threatened by various forms of social develop-
ment and agricultural production practices. Increased use of pesticides and artificial 
fertilizers changes the nature of ecosystem and agricultural land is developed for the 
needs of urban expansion. 
Many valuable things are in a danger of disappearing if we do not understand the 
meaning of the rural environment as a source of pleasure and recreation. 
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3. Attitudinal questions and claims 
3-1. Quality of the rural environment is nowadays better than it used to be. Do you 
agree? 
Yes, I do 
No, I do not 
There has not been any change 
3-2. How important is it to you that the characteristics of the rural environment will also 
he maintained in the future? 
Very important 
Quite important 
Quite unimportant 
Completely unimportant 
3-3. What is the most important task of Finnish agriculture? 
Self-sufficiency in agricultural production 
To keep the countryside viable and inhabited 
To maintain the rural environment 
To give farmers adequate income 
To secure the appreciation of entrepreneurship in the society 
1) To preserve the traditions of a peasant way of living 
3-4. What is the next most important task of Finnish agriculture? 
Self-sufficiency in agricultural production 
To keep the countryside viable and inhabited 
To maintain the rural environment 
To give farmers adequate income 
To secure the appreciation of entrepreneurship in the society 
1) To preserve the traditions of a peasant way of living 
3-5. Which of the following issues contributes the most to the well-being of Finnish 
society? 
High employment rate 
Taking care of the environment 
Guaranteeing the individual freedom of choice 
Stable economic growth 
Guaranteeing private property rights 
1) National cultural heritage 
High educational level 
Solving problems related to housing 
3-6. Which of the following issues contributes the second most to the well-being of 
Finnish society? 
High employment rate 
Taking care of the environment 
Guaranteeing the individual freedom of choice 
Stable economic growth 
Guaranteeing private property rights 
215 
National cultural heritage 
High educational level 
Solving problems related to housing 
3-7. A set of claims will be presented. There are five altematives from which to select 
your answer. The alternatives are: 
1) I agree completely with the claim 
2) I agree to some extent with the claim 
I disagree to some extent with the claim 
I disagree completely with the claim 
3) I do not know 
Set of claims: 
To secure his own existence man has to co-operate with the nature 
Man has a right to force the nature to satisfy his needs 
Man has been created to control the creation 
It is possible to raise our standard of living in the long run without any restrictions 
Man's interference in the processes of the nature very often has harmful conse-
quences 
Rapid economic growth is more often a disadvantage than an advantage 
Man has already misused natural resources in an irreversible way 
Most environmental problems can be solved by means of scientific and technologi-
cal innovations without a change in the man' s way of living 
Deterioration in the state of environment cannot be stopped until man gives up 
seeking a rapid increase in his material welfare 
Environmental conservation should have greater emphasis, even at the expense of 
economic growth 
The present generation must take better care of the environment that will be left to 
the coming generations 
1) Environmental problems caused by agriculture are already significant 
The use of fertilizers and pesticides is at too high a level in Finnish agriculture 
The intensification of Finnish agriculture deteriorates the environmental quality and 
food safety 
Conventional agriculture should quickly be developed into the direction of organic 
farming 
The publicity given to the environmental problems caused by agriculture is objective 
in its nature 
q) Conventional agricultural subsidies can be cut down if the corresponding amount of 
money will be used to promote environmental investments and environmentally 
related subsidies in agriculture 
Agriculture has to carry its fair share of the environmental taxes 
Agriculture itself is the best way to protect environment 
Polluter pays principle should be applied without any exceptions 
Agricultural subsidies financed by taxpayers must be cut down if agriculture is not 
able to produce foodstuffs at competitive prices 
It is a right thing to allocate tax money for the maintenance of agriculture because 
the viability of the countryside and the pleasantness of the environment depend on 
agricultural activities 
216 
4. Willingness to pay iteration question 
4-1. Pro-environmental farming has been offered as a solution to the problems of Finnish 
agriculture. Pro-environmental farming can be defined as an agricultural production 
practice in which the emphasis is on the maintenance of the distinctive characteristics 
of the rural environment and on the protection of the functions of natural ecosystems. 
Pro-environmental farming aims to reduce both agricultural surplus and adverse envi-
ronmental impacts from agriculture. Primarily, this can be carried out by reducing the 
use of artificial fertilizers and pesticides. 
What do you think is the amount of agricultural land which could be converted into 
pro-environmental farming? 
0 % 	 e) 75 % 
10 % f) 100 % 
25 % 	 g) some other %, how much? 	 
50% 
4-2. How much would you be willing to pay annually in order to secure that pro-environ-
mental farming would be carried on in the magnitude that you stated in your previous 
answer? Would you be willing to pay a tax-like annual payment of FIM  X _ ? (X is 
equal to 100 or 500 or 1,300) 26 
4-3. Was it difficult to answer the willingness to pay question? 
it was easy 
it was difficult 
I do not know 
[In case that the respondent's answer was b) to question 4-3, he was asked 
4-4. Why was it difficult to answer? 
I do not have enough information about what the concepts "pro-environmental 
farming" and "rural environment" mean 
I did not understand what was really meant by the question 
These questions are too theoretical to be answered in a proper and sensible way 
Some other reason, what? 	  
4-5. Which way would you prefer to pay the pro-environmental farming fee? 
Through taxation 
Through increased prices of agricultural products 
Does not matter 
4-6. Do you feel that you receive some satisfaction/pleasure/utility from the maintenance of 
the rural environment? 
No, I do not 
Yes, I feel refreshed every time I visit the rural environment or practice activities 
there 
Yes, I receive some pleasure from the thought that other people and future 
generations can enjoy the rural environment 
Yes, I receive satisfaction from the fact that the rural environment exists 
Yes, the maintenance of the rural environment produces me some utility, but my 
utility does not correspond to any alternatives presented above 
26  A more detailed description of the revealing process of a respondent's willingness to pay can 
be found in Appendix C. 
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5. Questions inquiring extra socio-economic characteristics of the respondent 
5-1. Educational background 
comprehensive school 
high school 
vocational education 
higher vocational education 
matriculation examination 
0 university 
5-2. Family gross income per year, FIM 
0 - 20,000 
20,001 - 50,000 
50,001 - 80,000 
80,001 - 120,000 
120,001 - 160,000 
5-3. Own occupation 
a) Farmer 
b) Worker 
c) Official 
d) Entrepreneur/manager/director 
5-4. Father's occupation 
a) Farmer 
b) Worker 
c) Official 
d) Entrepreneur/manager/director 
0 160,001 - 200,000 
200,001 - 250,000 
250,001 - 300,000 
300,001 - 400,000 
over 400,000 
e) Full-time mother/father 
0 Student 
Retired (former occupation 
Other 
e) Full-time mother/father 
Student 
Retired (former occupation 
Other 
5-5. Where do you live? 
In the center of a city of more than 50,000 inhabitants 
In the suburb of a city of more than 50,000 inhabitants 
In a town of fess than 50,000 inhabitants 
In the center of a commune 
In a village 
In a scattered settlement 
5-6. Do you have a garden of your own? 
Yes 
No 
5-7. Do you have a summer cottage? 
Yes, we own a summer cottage 
Yes, we have rented a summer cottage 
No, we do not have 
5-8. The sign of the commune 
The sign of the province 
The sign of the interviewer 
Date and time 
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Appendix C: Exemplary Iteration Process to Reveal the Respondent's 
Willingness to Pay 
In this example FIM 500 is the initial starting bid. The iteration process presented below is a 
combination of a bidding game and payment cards. The interviewer's first question is: 
"How much would you be willing to pay annually in order to secure that pro-
environmental farming would be carried on in the magnitude that you stated in your 
previous answer? Would you be willing to pay a tax-like annual payment of FIM 
500?" 
1. The respondent approves the initial starting bid  
If the respondent says YES, the next question will be: "Would you be willing to pay FIM 
1,300". If the answer is still YES, the respondent will be asked whether he is willing to pay 
FIM 2,500. If the answer is still YES, the interviewer presents an open question: 
"State the highest amount that you are willing to pay". 
If the respondent is willing to pay FIM 500 but not FIM 1,300 he will be shown a payment 
card with some altematives: 
FIM 500 	 e) FIM 900 
FIM 600 FIM 1000 
FIM 700 	 g) FIM 1100 
FIM 800 h) FIM 1200 
and he is asked to select the altemative which is closest to his willingness to pay. 
Also, if the respondent is willing to pay FIM 1300 but not FIM 2500 he will be shown a 
payment card with some altematives 
FIM 1300 	 g) FIM 1900 
FIM 1400 h) FIM 2000 
FIM 1500 	 i) FIM 2100 
FIM 1600 j) FIM 2200 
FIM 1700 	 k) FIM 2300 
0 FIM 1800 1) FIM 2400 
and he is asked to select the altemative which is closest to his willingness to pay. 
2. The respondent does not approve the initial starting bid 
If the respondent is not willing to pay the initial starting bid (FIM 500) he will be asked if he 
is willing to pay FIM 100. If the answer is NO, he will be asked if he is willing to pay FIM 
50. If the answer is still NO, the interviewer interprets that the respondents willingness to 
pay is FIM 0. 
If the respondent is not willing to pay FIM 100 but is willing to pay FIM 50, the respond-
ent's WTP will be denoted to be FIM 50. 
If the respondent is willing to pay FIM 100 but not FIM 500 he will be shown a payment 
card with some altematives 
FIM 100 	 e) FIM 300 
FIM 150 0 FIM 350 
FIM 200 	 g) FIM 400 
FIM 250 h) FIM 450 
and he is asked to select the altemative which is closest to his willingness to pay. 
219 
Appendix D: Parameter Estimates for Standard Logit Models 
(This print is produced by using the SAS ° statistical package and its CATMOD procedure) 
STANDARD LOGIT MODEL THE WHOLE SAMPLE 
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS-0E-VARIANCE TABLE 
Source 	 DF 	Chi-Square 	Prob 
INTERCEPT (a) 	 1 	 10.76 	 0.0010 
BID ([3) 	 1 59.80 0.0000 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO 	 1 	 3.32 	 0.0683 
ANALYSIS OF MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES 
Standard 	Chi- 
Effect 	 Parameter 	Estimate 	Error Square 	Prob 
INTERCEPT (a) 	1 	-0.41510 	0.126600 	10.76 	0.0010 
BID(13) 	 2 0.00140 	0.000181 59.80 	0.0000 
STANDARD LOGIT MODEL WITHOUT ADDITIONAL INFO 
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS-OF-VARIANCE TABLE 
Source 	 DF 	Chi-Square 	Prob 
INTERCEPT (a) 	 1 	 2.58 	 0.1081 
BID (13) 	 1 28.47 0.0000 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO 	 1 	 0.39 	 0.5327 
ANALYSIS OF MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES 
Standard 	Chi- 
Effect 	 Parameter 	Estimate 	Error Square 	Prob 
INTERCEPT (a) 	1 	-0.28840 	0.179500 	2.58 	0.1081 
BID (13) 	 2 0.00139 	0.000261 28.47 	0.0000 
STANDARD LOGIT MODEL WITH ADDITIONAL INFO 
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS-OF-VARIANCE TABLE 
Source 	 DF 	Chi-Square 	Prob 
INTERCEPT (a) 	 1 	 9.15 	 0.0025 
BID (13) 	 1 31.33 0.0000 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO 	 1 	 3.81 	 0.0509 
ANALYSIS OF MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES 
Standard 	Chi- 
Effect 	 Parameter 	Estimate 	Error Square 	Prob 
INTERCEPT (a) 	1 	-0.54200 	0.179200 	9.15 	0.0025 
BID (13) 	 2 0.00141 	0.000253 	31.33 	0.0000 
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Appendix E: Cattell's Scree Test Plots of Eigenvalues 
Method 1: Principal factor analysis based on an orthogonal common factor model with 
SMC prior communality estimates 
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Method II: Principal factor analysis based on an orthogonal common factor model with 
prior communality estimates calculated by using a variable's maximum absolute correlation 
with any other variable 
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Method III: Maximum likelihood factor analysis with SMC prior communality estimates 
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Appendix F: Essentials of the Factor Analysis 
When an attempt is made to summarize a large body of data including many 
variables by means of relatively few parameters, a number of different statistical 
methods in the field of multivariate analysis can be applied. The interest of most 
multivariate techniques lies on the simplification of data in a manner that helps 
rather to create a hypothesis than to test it. In the case at hand, where the aim is 
to find certain identifiable differences in attitudes towards agriculture and the 
environment, the question is about an analysis of interdependence in the sense 
that the set of attitudinal variables taken under closer inspection are assumed to 
have an equal status. This means that the variables, although expected to be 
interdependent, cannot be classified as dependent variables and explanatory 
variables (Chatfield and Collins 1980, pp. 7-8). Thus, the regression analysis 
and related methods are not applicable. 
Methods that are the most often used to reveal interdependencies between 
variables with equal status are called the principal component analysis (PCA) 
and the factor analysis (FA). The principal component analysis is concemed 
with explaining the variance-covariance structure through a few linear combina-
tions of the original variables. Although initially p components are required to 
reproduce the total system variability, often a small number, k, of the principal 
components can account for much of this variability. If so, there is almost as 
much information in the k components as there is in the original p variables. 
Thus, the original data set, consisting of n measurements on p variables, is 
reduced to one consisting of n measurements of k principal components. An 
analysis of the principal components often reveals relationships that have not 
been previously detected and thereby allows interpretations that would not 
ordinarily result otherwise (Johnson and Wichem 1982, p. 361). Furthermore, 
although the PCA accomplishes to some extent the explanation of the covariance 
structure through the factorization of covariance matrix, it is still merely a 
transformation rather than the result of a fundamental model for covariance 
structure. In this respect, the PCA also possesses other shortcomings: the forms 
of the components are not invariant under changes in the scales of the re-
sponses, and no rational criterion exists for deciding when a sufficient propor-
tion of the variance has been accounted for by the principal components (Morrison 
1976, p. 302). 
The factor analysis shares the core ideas of the principal component analysis. 
The idea is to derive new variables called common factors, which are expected 
to give a better understanding of the data. The PCA produces an orthogonal 
transformation of the variables, which depends on no underlying model, whereas 
the FA is based on a proper statistical model. The FA is more concemed with 
explaining the covariance structure on the variables than explaining the variances. 
The part of the variation that is explained by common factors is called common 
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variance. Any variance which is unexplained by the common factors can be 
described as unique variance and it is explained by unique factors27. Further-
more, unique variance can be divided into error variance and specific variance. 
Error variance results from the imperfections of the test measurement. Thus, 
specific variance is the part of the total variance that is left, and it is related to 
individual variables and their qualities. Each FA model possesses some particu-
lar qualities that are not shared with any other FA model, and some portion of 
the variation arising from these qualities produces specific variance. Unfortu-
nately, it is not possible to separate error variance from specific variance. 
Consequently, the fundamental distinction between the FA and PCA analyses is 
their outlook on unique variance. The presence of unique variance is taken into 
account in the FA, whereas in the PCA the intrusion of unique variance is 
ignored (Child 1990, pp. 28-30). 
The factor analysis is clearly the preferred method in this case. When possi-
ble differences in attitudes expressed through several responses are sought, the 
primary task is not to construct new variables (= principal components) that 
would explain the total variance of the original variables as well as possible, but 
to group original variables in the form of a statistical model that explains as 
much as possible of the covariance and correlation among variables. Conse-
quently, such latent variables can be found that convey essential information in 
a form that is easier to interpret than the information found dispersed over the 
original variables. Thus, if the original variables do not have a high correlation 
among them (positive or negative), it is not worthwhile to carry out the factor 
analysis (Ranta et al. 1989, pp. 474-476). 
The basic factor analytic model is given by Equations F-1 a and F-lb, the 
latter of which is a matrix form version of the first one. Both equations define 
the factor equation: 
(F-1a) 
(F-1b) 
y u = s 1 ../1 S 2Ljjj 	+ W jN 	iu ju 
Y= S LT + Su 
(pxN) (Nxm) (pxN) (7Vxm) 
where i = I, 2, .., p (the number of subjects), j = 1, 2, .., m (the number of 
observable variables), and k=I, 	N (the number of latent variables or 
factors). The individual elements identified in Equation F-1 a as su, sur , are 
the factor scores for subject i across the various factors. The matrix of factor 
27 J may be useful to clarify the concepts applied: A common factor can be defined as an 
unobservable, hypothetical variable that contributes to the variance of at least two of the 
observed variables. A unique factor is an unobservable, hypothetical variable that contributes 
to the variance of only one of the observed variables (SAS 1987, p. 451). 
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scores is denoted S in Equation F-lb with subjects as rows and factors as 
columns. The individual elements identified in Equation F-la as , are j 	••• 
called pattern elements or factor loadings for factors 	N. Instead of 
relating one observed variable to another observed variable, factor loadings 
relate factors to observed variables. The collection of factor loadings forms the 
factor pattern matrix, L. Matrix L has variables as rows and factors as columns. 
Thus, the symbol y ,, in Equation F- 1 a denotes an observed element of Y, where 
the first subscript denotes subjects, and the second subscript denotes the number 
of variables that have been obtained. In essence, Y becomes simply a data 
matrix and it is known as a raw-score matrix. Although the factor analytic 
model does not require raw scores to be scaled in any particular form, we 
usually assume that each column of Y is normalized with a mean of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 1. 
The final term in Equation F-la, siuÅfu, is the pro duct of two quantities that 
represent the unique variance. There is one unique factor for each variable in the 
model. The loading of each variable on its corresponding unique factor is given 
by Åiu  and, by definition, ali other variables are assumed to have loadings of 0 
on tfiat factor. Moreover, the factor score of the subject on each unique factor 
has the same properties as the factor scores for the other factors. Of course, the 
inclusion of the term s. Å or its matrix counterpart SuLTu is optional. If the ju 
terms are included, the model is a classical form of a common factor model, and 
if not, then the model is a principal component model. (Bernstein et al. 1987, pp. 
161-162). 
An alternative and a more common notation to describe a factor analysis 
model is presented in Johnson and Wichern (1982, pp. 402-403). Suppose that 
the observable random vector X with m components (X1, X2, .., Xrn ) has a mean 
ju. The factor model postulates that X is linearly dependent upon a few 
unobservable random variables F1, Fip F N , called common factors (the 
matrix F) (N < m), and m additional sources of residual variation, ei , so that 
(F-2a) 
	
X = F ..± 1 N FN e j + LL j  
or, in matrix notation 
(F-2b) 
	
X= L F E 
(mxN) ( NxI) (mxl) („,xv 
ParameterÅjk  and matrix L are similar to their counterparts in Equations F-la 
and F-lb, so that Å is the loading of the jth variable on the kth factor and L is the j k 
matrix of factor loadings. The variate e. describes the residual variation specific 
to the jth  variable (includes both error variance and specific variance) (matrix E 
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is the corresponding matrix and conceptually represents the same role as SuLTu 
does in Equation F-1b). 
At this point, it is necessary to introduce the covariance matrix Cov(X) often 
denoted by X: 
 
where L is the matrix of factor loadings, is the factor correlation matrix, and 
is a matrix that consists of the variances of e.s (later denoted as 
Based on Equation F-2a and assuming that the common factors F1, 
are independent of each other (i.e. 0 = /), we can write 
var(x)= (A71)2 + ( 2,Jil )2  +...-E(A ffi )2 +7;  
The portion of the variance of the jth variable contributed by the N common 
factors is also called the jth communality or 117. Thus, the communality 
depicts how large a portion of the variation related to the ith variable XJ can be 
explained by the N latent variables or common factors. That portion of Var(Xj ) 
due to the unique factor is called the unique variance, as already mentioned 
above. Moreover, we can see that the ith communality, 11 2, is the sum of factor 
loadings of the jth variable on the N common factors. (Johnson and Wichern 
1982, pp. 402-404; Korhonen and Manninen 1994, pp. 61-62). 
The independence of factors assumed in Equation F-4 means that the factor 
model is an orthogonal factor mode128. Intuitively, if the common factors are 
independent of each other, it seems to be easier to interpret them. Furthermore, 
the residual variates, ei, are assumed to be independent of one another and of the 
common factors, Fk. In addition, it is customary to assume that the common 
factors and the residual variates each have a multivariate normal distribution. 
The conditions for the orthogonal factor model are formally denoted in Equa-
tions F-5a, F-5b, and F-5c: 
(F-5a) E(F)= 0 ; Cov(F)= E[FF T ]=.T' = 1 
(Nx1) 	 (NxN) 
28 Another alternative is an oblique factor model. If the common factors Fk are correlated so that 
0 is not diagonal, the resulting factor model is the oblique factor model (Johnson and 
Wichern 1982, p. 403) 
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0 	... 	0 
0 W 2 ... 0 
(F-5b) E(8)= 0 ; Cov(s)= Eki= 91 = 
(mx.1) 	 (nxm) 
0 	0 	... v._ 
(F-5c) COV( e, F) = E[eFl= 0 
(nxN) 
In practice, it is seldom possible to give factor loadings a direct interpreta-
tion even in the case of the orthogonal factor model. Usually, some transforma-
tion is required. This is called factor rotation. The idea of factor rotation is to 
make the factors move closer to relevant variables in order to receive more 
easily interpretable factor loadings for each original variable. Theoretically, 
factor rotation is based on a certain feature of factor loadings known as the first 
form of factor indeterminacy. When k> 1, there is always some inherent ambi-
guity associated with the factor model. This can be seen by taking any orthogonal 
matrix, say G, so that GGT = GTG =I. Now, Equation F-2b can be rewritten as 
X=LF+e-Fµ=LGGT F+E+p, 
Since the random vector GTF also satisfies the conditions expressed in Equa-
tions F-5a and F-5c, it is impossible, on the basis of observations on X, to 
distinguish the loadings L from the loadings LG. That is, factors F and GTF 
have the same statistical properties, and although the loadings LG are, in gen-
eral, different from the loadings L, they both generate the same covariance 
matrix 1. That is: 
= LLT 	= LGGT LT  
This indeterminacy in the definition of factor loadings can be resolved by 
rotating the factor loadings to satisfy an arbitrary constraint, such as LTY/L is 
diagonal or LTD-/L is diagonal (D = diag(Gii,  • 	where in both cases the 
diagonal elements are written in a decreasing order. At the moment, the most 
widely used orthogonal rotation method is probably the varimax method. Its 
rationale is to provide axes with a few large factor loadings and as many near-
zero factor loadings as possible. This is accomplished by an iterative maximization 
of a quadratic function of the loadings. The specific function that the varimax 
procedure maximizes is the sum of the variances of the squared factor loadings 
within each column of the factor loading matrix, L, where each row of loadings 
is normalized by its communality (Mardia et al. 1989, pp. 257-258, 268-270). 
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